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ABSTRACT
The Europeanization of French, German and British China Policies: The case of the
arms embargo on China
by Vivien L. Exartier

This study analyzes the impact of France, Britain and Germany on European Union
sanction policy on China. The study argues that Britain, France and Germany affect the EU
sanction policy on China through bottom-up and horizontal Europeanization due to their
historic and strategic ties to the PRC and their predominance in the armament industry. The
study specifically reviews the case of the handling of the lift of the arms embargo between
2003 and 2005, imposed on the wake of the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989. The
methodology combines a questionnaire, addressed to defense and foreign affairs officials
from the three member states and EU officials, press articles, interviews and speeches and
applies three theories about responses to Europeanization. The study found that The Big
Three influence the agenda-setting and policy formulation by uploading their policy
preferences but cannot implement those policies if they conflict with US interests.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.0 Introduction
For the past twenty-five years, the People’s Republic of China and the European
Community/European Union have been similar and different, compatible and incompatible at
the same time1. The PRC always had a choice of dealing either with Europe as an ‘abstract'
amalgam’ of industrialized West European nation states, or with the EC/EU as the “concrete
yet fuzzy and at times yet frustrating technical framework of Europe”2. At first sight, due to its
own political tradition of developing close relationships before developing partnerships, China
felt closer to individual European countries. China however quickly grasped the importance of
the European Community as an economic powerhouse and sometimes tried to play the former
against the latter. It was a logical reaction since the EC was mostly dealing with trade issues at
the time it started a relationship with China. Politically then, the point of reference for China
was individual states, including Britain, France and Germany who all established relations with
China prior to the EC.
The EC only started its transformation into a political union (European Union) in
1992 with the Maastricht Treaty by developing a stronger identity as a foreign policy actor.
The Union is far from being achieved especially when it comes to common foreign policy
where domestic interests might conflict with EU interests. Today, from a EU perspective, the
relation with China is at a flourishing stage. Economically, EU-China trade in goods has

1

Kay Möller. “Diplomatic Relations and Mutual strategic Perceptions: China and the European Union”. The
China Quarterly: 196, (March 2002), Special Issue: China and Europe since 1978: a European Perspective:
10-33, 10
2
Möller, 11
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increased more than 30-fold, amounting to about €146 billion in 2003; European Commission
President Barroso recently stated that the EU was at a dynamic moment in its relationship with
China and that developing its relationship would be one of the Union’s top foreign policy
objectives. In strategic domains, multiple agreements have been signed and levels of
cooperation have certainly been expanding. The EU has been supporting China’s integration
into global institutions in order to increase its stake in making them work more effectively.
When it comes to the role of China on security issues however, Member States diverge and
they have not seen any urgent need to develop collective strategic thinking related to China3.
The European Union imposed an arms embargo on China following the Tiananmen Square
incident in 1989 and since 2003, there have been discordant voices for a possible lift of the
embargo. European policymakers are also concerned by China’s policy of offering
unconditional political support, economic aid and weapons to autocratic regimes that might
otherwise collapse or be susceptible to international pressure (including Sudan, Iran, Burma,
Zimbabwe, North Korea, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and Angola). Of course, China’s support for
autocratic regimes is not designed to upset the West: Beijing wants access to oil, gas and other
natural resources, as well as support against Taiwan at the UN. Member States cannot reach
consensus because they have conflicting economic and strategic interests. Ultimately, countries
tend to compete against each other to be Beijing’s best political friend and trading partner thus
undermining EU China policy. France and the United Kingdom for instance, as co members of
the United Nations Security Council always took a more cooperative stance4 compared to

3

Anthony Sipri. “Military relevant EU-China trade and technology transfers: issues and problem”. (Paper
presented at the Conference on Chinese Military Modernization: East Asian Political, Economic, and Defense
Industrial Responses, organized by the Freeman Chair in China Studies and the Pacific Forum Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., 19-20 May, 2005)
4
Anthony Sipri. “Military relevant EU-China trade and technology transfers: issues and problem”. (Paper
presented at the Conference on Chinese Military Modernization: East Asian Political, Economic, and Defense
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Northern European Member States who always had a less conciliatory attitude because of
Chinese records on human rights. Political ties and commercial interests justified then the
Franco-German crusade for a lift of the embargo. There are top-down influences from Brussels
to Member States as well as bottom-up influences coming from Member States to Brussels
when it comes to EU policy-making. This process is called ‘Europeanization’ and is defined
by McGowan as the interactions and impact of the EU on domestic actors and structures5. EU
China policy-making does not escape such process: Brussels tailors a EU China policy that
member states’ behaviors might contradict.
This study analyzes the impact of France, Britain and Germany on EU sanction policy
on China. Sanctions are an instrument of a diplomatic or economic nature that seek to bring
about a change in activities or policies such as violations of international law or human rights,
or policies that do not respect the rule of law or democratic principles. Arms embargoes differ
from traditional EU sanctions because their implementation ultimately depends on the good
will of individual member states while dealing with the embargoed country. The case of the
handling of the lift of the arms embargo, imposed on the wake of the Tiananmen Square
Massacre in 1989 illustrates how the EU was unable to formulate a common and coherent
position in its China policy. I argue that Britain, France and Germany affect the EU sanction
policy on China based on their historic and strategic ties to the PRC.
The study combines a questionnaire on China policy and sanction policy addressed to
defense and foreign affairs officials from the three member states and EU officials, press
articles, interviews and speeches from that period, applies the theory used by Tanja Börzel,
Industrial Responses, organized by the Freeman Chair in China Studies and the Pacific Forum Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Washington D.C., 19-20 May, 2005)
5
Lee McGowan. “Europeanization unleashed and rebounding: assessing the modernization of EU cartel
policy”, Journal of European Public Policy 12:6, (December 2005): 986-1004, 996

3

who recognizes three kinds of reactions from the member states to Europeanization: pacesetting, foot-dragging and fence-sitting combined with policy misfit theories by Cowles et al.
and Falkner et al. to understand the responses of Europeanization and explain the goodness of
fit between the three Member States and the EU policy.
I expect to find that the three states set the agenda of the European Union, formulate
policies and influence other Member States to follow their policy choices through a bottom-up
and horizontal process of Europeanization but that their capacity to influence such processes
might be hampered by domestic and external constraints. The Three Big States have a unique
vision of the place of China in the international security system that they would like to see the
Common Foreign Security Policy adopt, but that might conflict with EU cohesion strategy,
domestic and US interests. Our findings will also show that external factors, such as US
influence, may overpower the will of the Big Three to affect the sanction policy.

1.1 Research Problem
I am interested in comparing the impact of the French, British and German China
policies on EU China policy dealing with foreign policy and security matters. Comparing a set
of policies between the EU and the main Member States with regard to China is a somewhat
difficult exercise for methodological, historical, and functional reasons. First of all, the field of
comparative security study is fairly recent, and there are constant evolutions of the definition of
security and foreign policy. Second, from a functional perspective, the three states belong to
the EU, and I compare the policies of an organization they belong to and their own policies that
might go beyond the policies of the EU. Finally, historical relations with China started at
different moments. The formal relationship between the EU/EC and China began in 1975 while

4

the three states recognized the PRC much earlier (with Britain being the first European power
to recognize the People’s Republic of China in 1950 and France the first to exchange
ambassadors with the PRC in 1964, followed by Germany’s recognition in 1971).
As I mentioned, the EU China policy in the field of foreign and security policy is still
young and between 1975 and the early nineties, the relationship mostly focused on trade. Trade
is the most cohesive EU policy, where the EU achieved the highest level of supranational
coordination. However, a political union only took shape in the late eighties through the
Maastricht Treaty that established a second pillar of EU policies dealing with foreign policy
issues and the first European Security Doctrine which followed in 2003. The political union
also occurred in the context of the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. Records on human
rights and the fact that the Chinese political system did not fit any traditional Western
democratic regime model prevented Member States from adopting a common stance. Member
States have conflicting opinions about tying deeper political cooperation with progress on
human rights records or not. I established earlier that Britain, France and Germany had a very
special interest in EU China policy. The three states have a historical relationship prior to the
EC/EU and have prime strategic importance in shaping EU foreign policy. Britain, France and
Germany are the most influential Member States when it comes to defense issues, because they
have the largest defense resources (army, manpower and budget). As member states of the
European Union, the Big Three participate in the European Security Defense Policy (ESDP);
they also have an overlapping membership with NATO, another major security provider for
Europe. The NATO membership brings up the importance of another actor outside the
European Union regarding European security matters: the United States. The United States as

5

the only superpower always seemed a proponent of a more autonomous European Union
provided that it did not conflict with U.S. interests.
Based on their historical relationship with China, the three countries have been
developing their own perception and vision of China’s role in world security which might
conflict with US’s own perception of China. In particular, the three Member States’ leadership
contributed to define the status of partnership with China: whether China was a strategic
partner, a special partner, or just a partner to cautiously handle cautiously. I am specifically
interested in how much influence the three Member States had in carving this partnership
between the EU and China. Some scholars argue that individual European countries have been
losing influence to the benefit of the EU as a whole6. There has been a top-down
Europeanization of the three member states’ foreign policy vis-à-vis China and their policies
have been converging. However, the Franco-German initiative for a lift of the embargo
showed that the big member states were very capable of shaping the agenda. I want to assess
the process of Europeanization in EU policy vis-à-vis China. Is there a horizontal
Europeanization on EU China policy where Britain, France and Germany pushed for ideas
across the Union? Or did the EU supply much coordination leading to a convergence in their
policies? Do individual member states pursue an individual strategy and try to upload their
vision of a China policy at the EU level? Ultimately, the role of China in the world security is
at stake: Do the bilateral relations, such as between France and China or the United Kingdom
and China, and state-centered perceptions help or hinder the development of a coherent EU
security policy? Do state interests prevail when it comes to China or is there a basis to develop

6

Reuben Wong. “Towards a Common European Policy on China” (paper presented at the conference ‘The
European Union and the World: Asia, Enlargement and Constitutional Change’, organized by IPSA Research
Committee 3 on European Unification, in Beijing, 5-6 May 2005).
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a common strategy? When it comes to building partnerships with the PRC, do other actors in
the international system intervene e.g. the U.S.?
Theory: Britain, France and Germany have a significant impact in shaping the EU
sanction policy on China due to their strategic and historical bonds with the PRC and their
key role in the EU.
H1 or Null Hypothesis: The influence of the three member states is negligible, dissolved
in EU because the EU dictates the strategic choices regarding China policy through the
CFSP and downloads its policies, leading to convergence.
H2: The Big Three influence the agenda-setting and policy formulation of EU policy visà-vis China, and upload their policy preferences
H3: The Big Three influence other Member States to have them follow their policy
choices regarding EU policy by exchanging ideas through horizontal Europeanization.
H4: The Big Three may influence the agenda-setting and the policy formulation of EU
China policy but the implementation of the given policy is inherently tied to U.S. approval,
due to its strategic interests in the region
To test our hypotheses, I chose the case of the lifting of the arms embargo imposed on
China following the Tiananmen uprising. Arms embargoes represent an original EU sanction
since their implementation ultimately depends on the discretion and compliance of the
individual member states. The lift of the arms embargo is an issue where the EU has been
struggling in reaching common agreement.

7

Table 1.1 The Timeline of the EU arms embargo on China
June 6, 1989: The European Council imposed a series of punitive measures on China for its violent
repression of the Tiananmen democracy movement.
May 25, 1998: Member States adopted the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, outlining principles
and guidelines based on eight criteria for future exports of military equipment.
December 2003: In visit to China, Chancellor Gerhard SchrÖder told Premier Wen Jianbao that “the
time had come” to lift the embargo
December 12, 2003: The European Council instructed its foreign ministers (General Affairs Council),
under the initiative of President Chirac from France to ‘re-examine the question of the embargo on
the sale of arms to China’.
December 18, 2003: The European Parliament rejected the lift by a landslide vote (373 in favor, 32
against) due to continuing violations of human rights
January 26, 2004, EU foreign ministers failed to reach an agreement after discussing the issue. They
asked two working groups, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the
Political and Security Committee, to examine the matter further.
January 27, 2004: President Chirac from France, at a joint conference with visiting Chinese President
Hu Jintao, publicly called for the lifting of the arms embargo on China.
April 26, 2004: The European Council discussed the embargo and called for further discussion
October 11, 2004: The European Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers reviewed the state of
discussions on the embargo. It also took a series of decisions on the EU-China
Dialogue on Human Rights.
December 8, 2004: The EU confirmed its intention to ‘continue to
work towards lifting the embargo’.
March 14, 2005 The PRC People’s Congress adopts the Taiwan Anti-Secession Law which inflicted a
severe blow to the initiative
March 14-19, 2005: A European Union defense team visits Washington to explain the proposal to lift
its Tiananmen Square arms embargo on China without convincing their U.S. counterparts.
April 14, 2005: The European Parliament approved a resolution that called on the European Council
not to lift the arms embargo on China
July 1, 2005: The UK takes over the EU presidency and does not put the embargo issue on the agenda
November 2005: German Chancellor Elect Merkel opposes the lift

8

1.2 Timeline and background information about the embargo issue

Following the 1989 Tiananmen massacre, the European Council meeting in Madrid
issued a document imposing a number of EU-wide diplomatic and economic sanctions on
China, including an arms embargo7. The EU embargo is somewhat vague and, as a result, it
has been interpreted differently by individual EU member states. Because there was no
common list of embargoed goods, the embargo never became EU coherent in its
implementation and scope. Despite a general restraint with regard to signing new contracts8,
EU member states continued to sell goods after June 1989, which could be used as weapons
by China. Those goods were identified as ‘dual-use technology products’ or ‘non-lethal
defense items’, i.e. s radar systems, aero-engines, communications systems, and even satellite
technology. The commercial and military opportunities for European companies in China
were huge. The European arms industry was attracted to China’s untapped defense market
that was so far almost exclusively monopolized by Russian arms manufacturers: in 2002
alone, Chinese purchases of foreign weapon systems were valued at $3.6 billion which
Russian received.
Any decision to lift the arms embargo would need the unanimous agreement of all EU
member states. The process itself could take place at the European Council, a meeting of EU
heads of government, or at the monthly meetings of the foreign ministers9. At the European
Council Meeting in Brussels in 2003, chief executives of the Member States invited their
foreign ministers to reexamine the need for the arms embargo and the arguments for and
7

Eugene Kogan. “The European Union Defense Industry and the Appeal of the Chinese Market”. (Report,
Studien und Berichte zur Sicherheitspolitik, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, January 2005),
12
8
Kogan, 16
9
Kogan, 12
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again its removal10. A number of EU leaders made statements that China was very different
politically from other countries on which the EU had imposed arms embargoes. EU leaders
also recognized that China’s leadership had changed since 1989 and that there had been
dramatic changes in Chinese society.11
France and Germany were the champions of the lift and Britain did join the process.
With other members, France and Germany claimed that the embargo hindered stronger EU
political and economic relations with China. While visiting Beijing in December 2003,
German Chancellor Gerhard SchrÖder told Premier Wen Jianbao that “the time had come” to
lift the embargo. That same month, during a summit of EU member states, French President
Jacques Chirac led European leaders in referring the issue to their respective foreign
ministers (General Affairs Council), urging them “to re-examine the question of the embargo
on the sale of arms to China”.12 However, in December 2003, the European Parliament
rejected the lift by a landslide vote (373 in favor, 32 against) due to continuing violations of
human rights. The European Parliament, before the Lisbon Treaty did not have any authority
in foreign policy making and was only an advisory body, but the landslide result sent a strong
signal to heads of government across the EU that the move was not the wisest and the most
popular.
At their first meeting of the year in Brussels in January 2004, EU foreign ministers
failed to reach an agreement after discussing the issue. They asked two working groups, the
Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and the Political and Security
Committee, to examine the matter further. The day after the ministerial meeting, then

10

European Union Council. “Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions”, December 12-13, 2003
Sipri, 9
12
Frank Ching. “Changing dynamics in EU-China arms relations”. China Brief, Volume 4, Issue 5 (March 8,
2004), 1
11
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President Chirac, at a joint conference with visiting Chinese President Hu Jintao, publicly
called for the lifting of the arms embargo on China. On April 26, 2004, the Council discussed
the embargo, noting that “it had been imposed as a response to specific events in 1989 and
that a solution for the matter had to be found which was in line with the current situation in
China, the increasingly close bilateral relations and the EU’s intention to develop a strategic
partnership with China”. The matter was further referred to the Permanent Representatives
Committee and the Political Security Committee. The fact that the repeal could not be
concluded prior to the 1 May 2004 accession of ten Eastern European and in some cases proU.S. states into the European Union served as one of the greatest blows to a quick resolution
of the arms ban.13 On 11 October 2004, the ministers reviewed the state of discussions on the
embargo. The Council’s overall assessment was that there was a ‘mixed picture of progress
in some areas and continuing concerns in others’. On 8 December 2004 in The Hague, the
EU Council confirmed its intention to ‘continue to work towards lifting the embargo’.
Throughout 2005, senior EU officials, especially Javier Solana, High Representative for
Foreign and Security Policy continued to describe the arms embargo variously as ‘unfair’,
‘anachronistic’ and ‘insignificant’ in terms of positive influence on the policies of the current
Chinese leadership. But once again, on April 14, 2005, the European Parliament challenged
the view of the member states and approved a resolution that called on the European Council
not to lift the arms embargo on China, decision based on poor human rights and the large
number of missiles in southern China aimed at Taiwan (431 in favor to 85 against)14.

13

Saalman Lora, Yuan Jing-Dong. “The European Union and the Arms Ban on China”. (Center for Non
Proliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute of International Studies, July 2004), p.5
14
Austin Greg. “The 1989 China Arms Ban: putting Europe’s position to Congress”. The Foreign policy
Centre, (April 2005), 6
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Among Member States, there was a debate on the desirability and the conditions of the
lift. On one hand, China did not belong to the same category of ‘pariah’ countries such as
Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe – the three other countries against whom there were an EU
arms embargo. On the other hand, the human rights record did not seem sufficient, and Member
States feared the use of European technology by China. As a safeguard, the EU came up in 1998
with the “Code of Conduct” on arms sales. The Code of Conduct barred the sale of equipment
that could be used in regional conflicts or domestic repression, which would still be enforceable
on sales to China. This meant that even if the EU did lift the embargo, sales of certain weapons
would still be illegal,15 and the EU promised not to lift the embargo until it had strengthened its
Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and introduced a transitional regime for recently embargoed
countries16. The Code of Conduct would prevent a radical change in the strategic balance in
Asia-Pacific region.
France, Germany, and Spain made the case that the ban should be lifted without placing
conditions upon its removal, while Britain argued that a reinforcement of the Code of Conduct
on Arms Sales would help.17The proposal for lifting the arms ban was partially driven by
economic and political considerations. Expanding with China at all levels was an important part
of European efforts to stimulate economic growth. In arguing for a lifting of the ban, French
Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin stated “Our feeling is that the embargo is out of date as
relations between Europe and China improve. ... [Beijing is] a privileged partner and a
responsible one. ”18 The French stance also resulted from Chinese pressure on its French partner,
15

Ching, 2
Eugene Kogan. “The European Union Defense Industry and the Appeal of the Chinese Market”. (Report,
Studien und Berichte zur Sicherheitspolitik, Schriftenreihe der Landesverteidigungsakademie, January 2005),
14
17
Saalman et al., .3
18
Wolfe Adam. “France and Germany Move to Resume Arms Sales to China,” Power and Interest News
Report, (11 February 2004).
16

12

and also pressure from domestic French weapon manufacturers. The main argument was that
China had dramatically changed and improved in many areas since 1989, including human rights
abuse. The arms embargo in President Chirac’s opinion was ‘a relic of the Cold War’19. At the
same time, Germany suffered from a greater degree of domestic debate and opposition because
of the Germany-Taiwan friendship group and the Green Party’s objections to perceived ongoing
human rights abuses in China20. The UK showed an interest in reconsidering the ban, arguing
that the European Union’s Code of Conduct on Arms Export, while not legally binding, with
some enhancements would provide a solid safeguard against worrisome arms exports by EU
states

to

the

Chinese

in

the

future21.

On the other side of the aisle, the Netherlands, Finland, Belgium, Portugal and Sweden
voiced concerns over lifting the ban without significant improvements in China’s human rights,
but their position did not seem irreconcilable. The Netherlands and Denmark in January 2004
demonstrated a willingness to agree to lift of the weapons embargo if it represented the will of
the majority of states. Several non-EU members also joined the chorus: Russia, as mentioned
was China’s primary source of China’s military equipment since the imposition of the 1989
embargo ($2.1 billion of China’s total arms purchases in 2002) along with Israel and both
countries were not keen on giving up a significant market share. Yet by far the loudest opponent
had been the United States. While much of the European rhetoric regarding the ban tended to
focus on the economic implications, Washington was more concerned with the strategic
implications of the lifting of the arms embargo. China demonstrated a particular interest in
19
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systems that could be used against U.S. forces in a potential conflict over the Taiwan Strait. The
Transatlantic relationship was damaged from the rift about the invasion of Iraq and both sides
were keen on repairing it. The passage on the Anti-Secession law in March 2005 was a severe
blow to the initiative. China was warning that any move by Taiwan towards independence would
be considered as an aggression against mainland China (See Appendix).
Despite a EU diplomatic offensive to convince the US partners and the launch of a EUUS Dialogue in China, the Anti-Secession Law comforted opponents to the lift in their opinion
and contributed to convince skeptics. The weakening of France following the rejection of the
referendum about the EU Constitution in the spring of 2005, the prudent attitude of the Blair
government and the electoral campaign in Germany helped burry the issue.

1.3 The US interference in the debate
As soon as the U.S. got wind of a possible removal of the embargo by the EU,
intelligence officers were sent to several EU member states to convince them that the
embargo should remain in place. Following the January 2004 Foreign Ministers Council
decision to look into the feasibility of the lift, US diplomacy issued several complaints with
the EU, arguing that the EU embargo was complementary to the US embargo, and both were
imposed for the same reasons.
In an effort to mend fences after the tensions provoked by the Iraqi crisis, US
President George W. Bush appeared resigned to the likely EU decision to lift the embargo on
his February 2005 European tour. However, a couple of months later, the US House of
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Representatives passed a bill in the spring that would restrict military exports and
technology- I -sharing with those European countries that sell arms to China. 22
The US lack of consistency reflected two schools of thought in the US strategy
towards China: one believed that China should be better integrated into the international
community; the other preferred to contain China militarily and economically.23 The latter
seemed defiant of a closer relationship between the PRC and the EU and was wary of the
notion of “strategic partnership”.

The US feared that the deepening of Sino-European

political relations reflected a hidden agenda to create a multipolar world to counter US
influence.

24

Given the US commitment to Taiwan, there were fears in Washington that

balance of forces between China and Taiwan would be affected were the PRC to acquire
sophisticated arms. 25

1.4 Significance for the Literature and Chapters Overview
The contribution to the literature is significant since there had not been many comparative
studies on Europeanization applied to foreign policy. As the literature shows, studies of
Europeanization in foreign policy cover one country and do not compare three member states.
The study may also contribute to the literature through the use of policy misfits and adaptation
theories. Most of the work in the literature (Börzel 2000, Falkner et al. 2005, Cowles et al. 2001)
covers harmonization and compliance at the domestic level and did not include foreign policy.
Chapter 2 starts by reviewing the key concepts related to the EU sanction policy,
Common Foreign Security Policy, relationship between Member States and EU institutions and
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an extensive discussion of Europeanization.

The chapter continues by presenting the

methodology used in the study: a questionnaire combined with official documents, press articles
and the application of three theories allowing us to understand responses from member states to
the Europeanization of their China policy.
Chapter 3, 4 and 5 analyze the countries of the study, i.e. France, Britain and Germany.
These chapters follow the same structure. They start with a history of the relationship of the
given country with China, then its impact on EU China policy, then its reasoning regarding the
lift of the arms embargo and then looks into the level of adaptation to EU China policy in the
case of the embargo.
Finally, the last chapter offers a comprehensive review of the findings and opens the
discussion on the role of China in the international sphere and how the transatlantic relationship
gets affected by it.
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Chapter 2

Definition of Concepts

2.0 Introduction
I will now review the literature of the different concepts mentioned in the study: the
role, attributes and functioning of the EU Common Foreign Security Policy, a definition of
sanctions, a discussion of the concept of security, an analysis of the concept of
Europeanization and its application to foreign policy, and finally the theories of Tanja Börzel
and Cowles et al. and Falkner et al. on the responses to Europeanization

2.1 Formulation and conduct of Foreign Policy in the European Union
The study reviews the influence of member states on EU sanction policy. Sanctions or
‘restrictive measures in force’ are adopted in the framework of the Common Foreign Security
Policy. They are under the European Commission External Relations Directorate but decided
by the European Council of Member States. Sanction policy illustrates the complexity of the
EU foreign policy. The CFSP was recently modified under the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. For the
purpose of our case study which was between 2003 and 2005, we need to review how the
CFSP functioned then, meaning pre-Lisbon Treaty.
2.1.1 Short History of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 was the first to contain provisions on the EU's
responsibility for all questions relating to its security, including the eventual framing of a common
defense policy. The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina had definitely been an impetus. In August 1991,
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the twelve members requested the Western European Union (WEU) to assess options for
deployment of a European interposition force of 30,000 troops without US or NATO support. But
in September 1991, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom vetoed WEU involvement,
arguing that military operations should exclusively remain a NATO competence26. From the point
of view of military capabilities, Europe’s ability was never questioned: it has always been a
political and ideological issue. The Maastricht Treaty defined these tasks as part of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy. But the idea of having cooperation in terms of foreign policy had
been brought up as early as in the 1970s with European Political Cooperation (EPC), a mechanism
for foreign policy coordination among member states. EPC was transformed into the CFSP, like a
caterpillar to a butterfly, during the 1991 EU Intergovernmental Conference (ICG).
The CFSP was established as the second pillar of the European Union in the 1993 Treaty
on European Union signed at Maastricht. The Treaty envisaged that the EU, having no military
capabilities of its own, would request the Western European Union (WEU) to elaborate and
implement planned military measures on its behalf. The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam incorporated
into the Treaty on the European Union the Western European Union's (WEU) "Petersberg tasks",
establishing which types of military operations the EU can undertake.

The most extended

definition has been included in Article III-309 of the draft of the European Union Constitution:
‘joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks,
conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces undertaken for crisis
management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization.”27 This laid the treaty basis
for the operative development of the European Security Defense Policy.
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The project of developing an independent European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP)
was officially launched by the 1999 Cologne European Council, which agreed to embark on a
Common Security and Defense Policy (CESDP) within the overall framework of the CFSP. The
aim of ESDP was and still is to complete and thus strengthen the EU's external ability to act
through the development of civilian and military capabilities for international conflict prevention
and crisis management28. With the 1998 St Malo Initiative, France and Great Britain developed
"the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces in order to respond to
international crises.29" There was a stated desire for the EU to make decisions and approve
military action where NATO as a whole was not engaged. The two governments also agreed to
develop within the EU institutional framework the ability to deploy a European Rapid Reaction
Force within sixty days (up to 50,000- 60,000 men). The German government, which occupied the
rotating six-month presidency of the EU in the first half of 1999, welcomed the French-British
declaration and quickly placed the strengthening of a common security and defense policy at the
top of its EU agenda. 30
At the Cologne Summit on 3 June 1999, European leaders agreed on a common defense
strategy. Their stated desire to incorporate the dormant WEU into the EU by the end of the year
2000 was effectively achieved by the Marseilles Declaration of November 2000. The Finnish
presidency included the St Malo initiative in the Headline Goal (HG) agreed at the Helsinki
European Council (December 1999). The Headline Goal aimed to make available to the EU
necessary capabilities, including the necessary command and control, intelligence, logistics and air
and naval assets, to enable the deployment of 60,000 troops within 60 days and for a sustainable
28
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year. Given the need to rotate forces the HG would require a pool of some 180,000, allowing for
forces on standby and standing down equal to the force deployed. As defined in the Capabilities
Development Mechanism (CDM), follow-up of the Headline Goal is ensured by a working group
of experts, the Headline Goal Task Force (HTF), with the support of the EU Military Staff
(EUMS)31.
The Treaty of Nice (2000) made the St Malo Initiative a reality, creating the Rapid
Reaction Force. Some Treaty amendments truly reflected the operative development of the ESDP
as an independent EU project. One could argue that France and Britain were true engines of
Defense integration despite their different visions on the role of NATO. However, in the midst of
the Iraqi crisis, the traditional Franco-British axis was strained. Instead of stopping European
defense integration, France, Germany, Belgium and Luxembourg took the lead to launch plans for
a EU planning capability, also known as the Tervuren initiative32. But because of its timing, and
the strains in EU-US relations over the war in Iraq, the so-called Tervuren initiative was seen in
London as a deliberate snub to Prime Minister Tony Blair. German officials at the time said Mr.
Blair dropped his earlier reluctance to the initiative in exchange for assurances that the club would
remain open to other EU members at all times. At a summit held in Berlin in September 2003 to
mend fences, the three major powers confirmed their attachment to common initiatives. An
internal document approved by Britain, France and Germany said: “The European Union should be
endowed with a joint capacity to plan and conduct operations without recourse to NATO resources
and capabilities. Our goal remains to achieve such a planning and implementation capacity either
in consensus with the 25 (member states) but also in a circle of interested partners.” About a year

31

European Council, “Helsinki European Council Summit: Presidency Conclusions”, Helsinki, Finland:
December 10-11, 1999
32
Benoit Bertrand et al.. “Blair backs EU plans for joint defense project”, The Financial Times, September 22,
2003

20

later, EU defense ministers agreed in November 2004 to establish thirteen so-called battle groups
that would be deployable rapidly for crisis management around the world outside the NATO
framework at the request of the United Nations. The groups, each 1,500-strong (one battalion plus
supporting units) can be deployed within ten days of the decision to launch an operation and are
sustainable for 120 days until the termination of the operation or until relief by another, longerterm force, deployed by the EU, the UN or regional organization such as the African Union. By
2007, between seven and nine battle groups, either national or multinational, were to be made
available, adding 10,500 to 13,500 rapidly deployable combat troops for high-intensity operations
of the Helsinki Force Catalogue (HFC).33
The evolution of ESDP did not betray its original purpose, which was to provide military
and civilian assets for international conflict prevention and crisis management. Since the EU
sought to promote non-violent settlement of conflicts, alongside the military capabilities, the EU
aimed to emphasize the development of civilian capabilities which focus on the four priority areas
(police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection capacities) adopted at the June
2000 Feira European Council. US decision-makers always felt reluctant to see the ESDP expand
though ESDP seeks to strengthen and consolidate the EU's alliance with the US and Canada within
the framework of NATO, and also by complying with the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations. ESDP's purpose was not to replace but to complement NATO. Member States armed
forces remain under the control of their national commanders and will only be led by a military
supreme commander for the duration of any EU mission.
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2.1.2 Role and attributes of the EU institutions in the CFSP
The EU's efforts to assume a political role have been handicapped by awkward
institutional arrangements, designed to separate the CFSP from the usual EU decisionmaking process with its greater limits on state sovereignty. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty
addressed most of the institutional challenges and some decision-making unbalances. But
whether it was before or after Lisbon, the EU has multiple institutions to deal with foreign
and defense policy. These institutional issues reflect the contradictions between the ambitions
of EU member governments to play a larger international role and their reluctance to move
beyond an intergovernmental framework in doing so.34 It resulted in a constant power
struggle between the Commission and the Council, since Member States were (and still are in
2010) the primary decision-makers despite a few responsibilities assigned to the
Commission. The CFSP was not like the Common Commercial Policy. Other forms of EU
external action might rather be understood as being based on the ‘traditional Community
method’. Trade policy, for instance, has been characterized by a considerable delegation of
responsibilities to the Commission for developing and managing policies, instruments and
agreements.35 The member states have not surrendered national sovereignty to supranational
institutions for foreign and security policy, let alone defense policy in the EU. Foreign and
Security policy is neither an exclusive EU competence nor an area of mixed EU-member
state competence. Foreign and security policy is one area where essential authority remains
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with EU governments, although the European Commission and, to a lesser extent the
European Parliament, are associated with the process.36
The Commission since Maastricht has been ‘fully associated with the work carried
out in the common foreign and security policy field’ (article 27 Treaty of the European
Union) through its right of policy initiative (though not exclusive as it is in ‘core’ EU
competencies in the then ‘first’ pillar), its budgetary powers and by representing the EU
through a network of delegations. The Commission was still responsible for a big part of
external relations: it had sole responsibility for Community actions in the areas of
humanitarian, development assistance, rehabilitation and reconstruction and sanctions
regulations.
Over the years, the Commission increased through informal and institutional measures its
autonomy vis-à-vis the Council. For instance, the Commissioners entrusted with foreign affairs
have always tried to coordinate and focus their efforts. The Council of Ministers meetings have
been attended at least by six RELEX Commissioners (from the French Relations Extérieures). The
Commission has been participating in meetings at the working levels of the Council (COREPER
and working parties).

On the international stage, the establishment of Independent General

Directions, for instance, allowed the Commission to benefit from network of 150 embassies
worldwide. The creation of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism in February 2001 was another measure
that allowed the European Commission to dispatch community funds rapidly in case of an
emergency. The creation of the RRM was a response to the new EWU development in crisis
management, such as the Situation Center, within the Council.
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Before Lisbon, the European Parliament only had a consultative role on the
developments of the CFSP. The European Parliament could ask questions to the Council and
make recommendations to it.37 Through its Committee on Foreign Affairs, the European
Parliament had regular contact with the EU’s High Representative for the CFSP, regarding
member accession, international agreements with non-member countries.38 The main area of
interest for the Parliament remained the human rights issue and that, often put the Parliament in
conflict with the European Council. The Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs directly
addressed the human rights issue outside the Union through annual reports on each of these
countries and monthly meetings during which breaches on human rights, democracy and the
rule of law were discussed and could eventually be followed by a resolution condemning
governments in case of breaches.
Before Lisbon, the key role went to the European Council (which is actually still the
case after Lisbon). Member states had set up an elaborate system at the EU level in an
intergovernmental pillar of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) to coordinate their
policies more closely and to attempt to devise common strategies, reach common positions,
and take joint actions on a wide range of issues.39 The Council was presided over for a
period of six months by each member state in turn, in accordance with a pre-established
rotation.

The Presidency was assisted by the Council Secretariat and the Secretary-

General/High Representative. The High Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana at the time,
had three job titles. First, he was the Secretary General of the European Council; secondly,
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he was the Secretary General of the Western European Union, which is the quasi defense arm
of the European Union. And thirdly, he was the High Representative for the Common
Foreign and Security Policy. He essentially had to deal with the political and military aspects
of ESDP. In other words, he had to integrate as much of the Western European Union into
the EU as is possible, set up the structures, and make sure the member states are meeting
their targets on capabilities.
The Council of Foreign Ministers, also known as the General Affairs and External
Relations Council (GAERC) was the main decision-maker. It would meet monthly to discuss
foreign policy and institutional issues and would define and implement the EU's Common
Foreign and Security Policy on the basis of guidelines set by the European Council. The
Council's formal positions were published as "conclusions" or "statements" of the Council.
Declarations were also issued by the Presidency and the High Representative. Since the late
1990s, EU defense ministers also got somewhat involved. Although there was no formal
Defense Council as such, at least one informal meeting of defense ministers is held during
each presidency and defense ministers attend one session of the External Relations Council
devoted to politico-military issues.
The Permanent Representatives Committee (COREPER) and the Political and
Security Committee (PSC) prepared the work of the Council, with COREPER preparing the
work of the Council as a whole and the PSC dealing with political and security issues.
Working parties dealing with CFSP, composed of experts from EU Member States and the
Commission, met along geographical lines (covering, for example, Asia) and thematic lines
(covering, for example, human rights) prepared PSC and COREPER meetings. They made
joint analyses of the situation in third countries and of multilateral issues and they drafted
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possible common positions. They drew up proposals for measures to implement the CFSP,
such as declarations by the presidency on behalf of the EU, for approval by the PSC and then
by the Council. They also formulated recommendations to the PSC for future initiatives in
the field of the CFSP.40
In terms of decision-making, decisions before the Lisbon Treaty were taken
unanimously except in the implementation of some joint actions. Until 1997, each Member
State had a veto right over the formulation of a common position. The 1997 Amsterdam
Treaty sought to resolve that problem with the introduction of the concept of "constructive
abstention." Henceforth, a member state that did not like a proposal could abstain and not be
obliged to apply the resulting decision. But the abstaining government had to accept that the
decision committed the Union and must refrain from doing anything that would conflict with
the EU action.41 The unanimity requirement was criticized for limiting the field of action of
the EU. In addition, other than in Pillar I policies, member states are fairly free to decide
whether they want to use the EU at all for pursuing certain policies in the area of CFSP42, or
whether they prefer to go ahead alone or in case-specific coalition which happened in the
case of the embargo. One of the recurrent criticisms against the CFSP has been the lack of
enforcement compared to first pillar policies: namely, the European Court of Justice’s
jurisdiction is excluded from the area of CFSP43.
The institutional arrangement before Lisbon also suffered from some inconsistencies.
Decision-making power and implementing capacity did not for instance match. CFSP is
40
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decided by the Council and implemented by the Council presidency and the High
Representative. However, the Council Secretariat which is the supporting structure of the
Council, primary decisions-maker for CFSP, lacked manpower (roughly 400 and two offices
abroad), technical and financial resources. Paradoxically, the Commission, a secondary
decision-maker for CFSP matters, disposed of 2260 staff in the RELEX office in Brussels
and 4755 personnel in its 123 delegations abroad. Indeed, it often fell to the Commission to
implement parts of CFSP decisions; it also played a key role in long-term conflict prevention,
an important concern of CFSP44.
Naturally, the Commission wanted to see its prerogatives expand. Following the German
reunification, EU member states recognized the link between European Monetary Union, CFSP
and Political Union. Twenty years later, the link between those three did not necessarily lead to
deeper integration. Euroskeptiks and intergovernmentalists argued that foreign policy must remain
a matter for national governments. They refused to see some responsibility over foreign policy
given to the European Commission and European Parliament. This school of thought championed
reinforcing the Council to give the EU more legitimacy, because elected member states politicians
would take decisions.

45

The big member states traditionally resisted the Commission's ambitious

demands for wider powers at the expense of the Council. But smaller countries despised any
proposal that appeared to challenge the power of the Commission and saw it as an attempt to
undermine the body that protected their interests. However, the perception that the Commission
was a secondary decision maker in foreign policy was, as we proved earlier, entirely wrong. The
Commission was for instance highly involved in the conduct of EU’s trade related external
relations. The heart of the problem with the multi-faceted profile of EU’s foreign policy was that
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the Commission had never been invested with a similar central role in the CFSP

46

.

The

Commission fought for a long time against its weak role in the CFSP, but lost all major
engagements.
But there is a constant feeling that the Commission might be left out and ignored by the
Council. The External Relations Directorate General – that coordinates all aspects of the Union’s
policy towards a country to make sure it does not encroach upon Commission responsibilities47under Commissioner Christopher Patten was not a DG trying to push for more Commission
visibility in the field of CFSP but rather was a DG trying to protect the competencies acquired in
the past and to deliver efficient and effective policies. The Commission was extremely sensitive
concerning any potential loss of competency in external relations. However, in some cases, the
Commission has been proactive and crises had been solved under its leadership. For instance, the
signature of the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the Commission and the
FYROM was a strong incentive that the High Representative Solana used to pressure the two
parties to reach a deal48. Indeed the SAA gives the FYROM the status of a potential candidate,
thus opening up the possibility of future accession to the EU.
The issue of representation prevented greater coherence of the CFSP but was addressed by
the Lisbon Treaty. Externally, the EU often sent three representatives to international meetings,
one from the Presidency, one from the Commission (either its President or the External Relations
Commissioner) and the High Representative: Secretary Kissinger always wondered whom to call
when a European foreign policy needed to be discussed. Internally and externally, it appeared
that there was no clear political leadership - no single individual able to drive change and act as a
46
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figurehead for the EU’s citizens. The External Affairs Commissioner concentrated very much on
financial and economic assistance, including trade.

Christopher Patten, former External

Commissioner called himself the “quartermaster of the European Union” and the High
Representative was a kind of general.49 The former President of the Commission, Romano Prodi,
proposed taking some of the initiative in foreign policy away from member states, by placing the
EU high representative in foreign affairs within the Commission. The High Representative, not
the states, would formulate policy, although EU leaders would decide to adopt it or amend it.
Britain and France did not want a foreign minister drawn too closely to the Commission, and
away from the control of member states.50
The 2009 Lisbon Treaty addressed most of inconsistencies of the CFSP mechanisms
and might impact EU sanction policy in the near future. The new treaty formally abolished
the pillar structure, merged all general treaty provisions on external relations into one title
and provided the EU with a single and express legal personality51. A single legal personality
should reinforce the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the EU on the world scene.
Henceforth, all external action, be it CFSP, trade or development, will be governed by the
same general principles and objective, which again could have an impact on issues such as
embargoes.
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The decision-making will however follow the “traditional” EU decision-

making patterns: the Council will act by qualified majority with respect to agreements on
most ‘Community’ matters, but by unanimity in CFSP affairs.53 The European Parliament
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will be granted full co-decision rights and the Commission will lose its power of initiative in
non-CFSP matters.
The representation is the major innovation introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and
should bring much more consistency and cohesion to the EU foreign policy. To remedy the
challenge of the brevity of the rotating Presidency, the Lisbon Treaty established the office of
a permanent president of the European Council, appointed for two and a half years and
replacing the rotating presidency at the level of the European Council. The President tasks
include the chairing and preparation of European Council meetings and their follow-up.
The creation of the office of the European Union's High Representative for Foreign
Affairs and Security Policy combines the responsibilities of the CFSP High Representative
and the EU Commissioner for External Relations. The High Representative, currently
Baroness Catherine Ashton, is also the Vice-President of the Commission54The High
Representative will act as the Union’s single foreign policy chief, share agenda-setting
capacities with member states (the Commission loses its right to initiative for CFSP matters)
This ‘double-hatted’ nature is the groundbreaking feature of the position. It is a bridge
between former first and second pillar policies. With the ‘Council hat’, the High
Representative chairs the Foreign Affairs Council and conduct the Union’s foreign and
security policy as mandated by the Council. With the ‘Commission hat’, the High
Representative exercises the Commission’s responsibilities in “external relations” and
coordinate “other aspects of the Union’s external action” such as development or trade
policy. The High Representative will be appointed by the European Council, acting by
qualified majority. The Commission President has to give his consent to the nomination. In
addition, the high representative will be subject to the European Parliament’s vote of
54
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approval. His term of office (normally five years) may be ended by the European Council,
again acting by qualified majority. The Commission president may also request the high
representative to resign. This request, however, has to be confirmed by a qualified majority
in the European Council. Finally, the European Parliament can dismiss the Commission as a
college, (de facto) including the high representative.55
The presence of the Union on the ground will now be reinforced: the Commission
delegations became Union delegations and now carry a heavier workload, talking over some
of the tasks previously handled by the rotating Presidencies. The Foreign Minister, currently
Baroness Catherine Ashton will also have at her disposal a corps of Diplomats, called the
European External Action Service, a team composed of officials from the Council the
Commission and the Member States, to provide back-up and support to the High
Representative, in conjunction with the diplomatic services of the Member States, in the
implementation of the CFSP56.
Finally in the field of defense, The Lisbon extends crisis management tasks to areas such as
disarmament and counterterrorism. A mutual assistance and a solidarity clause will be introduced
into the EU treaties, the former relating to armed aggression, the latter to terrorist attacks and
natural or man-made disasters.54 Furthermore, the treaties will provide for the first time for
differentiation in the field of CSDP; notably by allowing that the execution of CSDP tasks may be
entrusted to a group of member states (acting in association with the high representative), and by
enabling a group of countries to enter into a ‘permanent structured cooperation’. The Lisbon treaty
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will also create the express legal bases for the (already existing) European Defence Agency and a
start-up fund for CSDP operations.
We just reviewed the institutional set-up of CFSP, ESDP. “Unless a beautiful butterfly,
the CFSP/ESDP is cumbersome and colorless and has great difficulty getting off the ground”,
summed up Dinan57. Given the divergence of member states’ foreign and security policy interests
and orientations and the weakness of CFSP instruments and mechanisms, the CFSP at the time of
our study cannot be as formidable as its name implies. The case of the arms embargo illustrates
this tension between supranational institutions and individual member states.

2.1 Sanctions
Our study analyzes the influences the Big Member States on sanction policy and reviews
various arguments about the impact of sanctions on a country, in this case, China. We need to
define sanctions, review the sanction literature and the EU record of its sanction policy
Sanctions are an instrument of a diplomatic or economic nature which seek to bring
about a change in activities or policies such as violations of international law or human rights, or
policies that do not respect the rule of law or democratic principles.58 Sanctions usually target the
perpetrators of human rights abuses, who may be individuals, non-state actors, government elites
or the military59. Analysts continue to ask: “Do sanctions work?” Much has been made of the
failure of sanctions to deter late Iraqi President Saddam’s efforts to acquire weapons of mass
destruction and the devastating effects of those sanctions on the civilian population. On the other
57
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hand, it is commonly accepted that economic sanctions contributed to bring down the South
African apartheid regime and weakened Milosevic’s Serbia60. Proponents of economic sanctions
argue that sanctions can be as effective as military force and are more humane and that they are
often

an

efficient

instrument

for

achieving

an

important

goal.61

However, there has never been a clear consensus on the effectiveness of sanctions in
the literature. The first major wave of research on the topic in the sixties and seventies argued
that sanctions were not as effective as military force. A new wave of scholarship in the eighties,
based on the utility of economic pressure argued that sanctions had been underrated by policymakers and scholars due to infamous fiascoes, such as the US embargo on Cuba.
The key evidence supporting such evidence was the study by Gary Hufbauer, Jeffrey
Schott, and Kimberly Elliott (HSE), reviewing 115 cases of sanctions between 1914 and 199062.
The study reported success in 40 cases or 34%. Pape however, after reviewing the HSE database
and theory argues that economic sanctions did not achieve any major foreign policy goals and
that the HSE is flawed (since most of the case were solved by direct or indirect use of force or do
not qualify as economic sanctions).63 The persistent failure of sanctions suggests that states’
reasons for employing them must lie somewhere else. Pape offers three hypotheses. First,
economic sanctions should be most effective in disputes involving minor issues that do not affect
the target country’s territory, security, wealth or the regime’s domestic security. Pape predicts,
for instance, that an oil boycott of Libya would urge Colonel Qaddafi to surrender the men
suspected of bombing Pan Am 103. Second, one might expect that economic sanctions would be
60
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more effective agents target states whose trade is completely on the coercer. Regarding this
hypothesis, the evidence is not strong, the only available evidence being Lesotho conceding to
South Africa’s demands in 1983 and Nepal conceding to India’s demands in 1989.64Third, it is
plausible that economic sanctions may be more effective against societies with extremely uneven
income distributions than those with more income equality: that would explain the fall of the
apartheid under the weight of sanctions and the strong resistance of Iraq to sanctions65. Pape
argues that even if future research discovers under which conditions, economic sanctions can
achieve foreign policy goals, sanctions might not be as liberal an alternative to military force as
their advocates suggest. Economic sanctions often inflict significant human costs on the
population of target states regardless of whether they ultimately succeed or fail (567,000 Iraqi
children died due the UN embargo imposed on Iraq following the Gulf War while the war
claimed a much smaller number of lives, 40,000)66.
Shen argues that international economic sanctions can be effective as long as four criteria
are met: the legitimacy of sanctions through international law or moral standards, the effect of
the sanctions on the senders, the degree of international participation, and the sanctions’ strength
as a deterrent.67 Shen gives the example of the example of the sanctions against the apartheid in
South Africa which fitted the ‘profile’. The Apartheid regime violated human dignity and
equality; the Universal Declaration on Human Rights was the legal and the moral reference
against such violations; a majority of countries boycotted the South African government which
made the sanctions deterrent. 68 Shen gives a counter-example where all conditions were not met,
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such as the boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, which did not affect the military involvement
of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.
Shen also reviews the evolving attitude of China regarding sanctions. The PRC does not
generally support the concept, seeing it as an ‘unacceptable approach’ to resolving disputes.
China believes that state sovereignty should not be violated in any shape or form. China did
however adapt its position, reflecting its changed perspectives and interests. China denounced
the abuses of the Apartheid regime based on human rights abuses and the fact that the antiapartheid movement was part of a larger independence and political liberation trend in Africa.
China’s views on sanctions are also shaped by its experience of the EU and the US embargo
following the events at Tiananmen Square. Given the involvement of foreign powers in its
domestic affairs in the case of the embargo, China tends to find international sanctions
objectionable. The PRC believes that sanctions render nations unequal and tend to suppress less
developed countries. 69
To Hansen and Borchgrevink, the international support is the most important element to
determine whether a sanction is going to be effective, as well as for McLean and Whang. 70
McLean and Whang review the existing literature according to which without a sufficient level
of international cooperation, the impact of economic sanctions will be limited and undermine the
sanctioning state’s abilities to obtained concessions from the targeted state71. Elliott goes further
by saying that globalization brings about a greater flexibility for the targeted state as it can use
alternative sources and trade with others and that a sanctioning state should take into account the
target’s ability to utilize these outside options. The sender might disregard these alternative
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providers available to the target only when the latter significantly depends on the sender’s
goods72. McLean et al. focus on the international cooperation for the target instead of the sender,
and argue that increasing trade for the sanctioned countries an indicator of international
cooperation73. The authors find that international support for economic sanctions is not the only
factor that influences sanction effectiveness but also international assistance to the target. The
sanctioner is considerably more likely to succeed in obtaining concessions from its target when
the sanctioned country trading partners support the sanctioner’s coercive action and decrease
trade exchanges with the target. In our case, it is particularly relevant since the PRC imported
weapons from other countries besides the US and the EU member states. Hansen and
Borchgrevink illustrate their argument with the case of Norway which suspended aid to Ethiopia
during the 1998-2000 war with Eritrea without international coordination, the aid suspensions
did not have impact on the course of the war and seemed primarily motivated by domestic
constraints. At the time, Norway had been lobbying for a seat at the Security Council and wished
to demonstrate its concern for peace-building in Africa.74 The authors however show that other
countries based their domestic factors explained policy choices towards Ethiopia based on
domestic constraints: Germany cut its aid budget to Ethiopia against the advice of the German
diplomats posted in Addis Ababa. They conclude by stating that the fact that countries make
decisions largely for internal reasons shows that they have a few incentives for consulting with
other countries and coordinating their decisions. This means that coordination is less likely, even
though it is a necessary condition to make a sanction effective.75
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Baldwin offers an alternative explanation, arguing that the premises of the debate on
sanction policies are false. Scholars and policy-makers need to clearly separate the question of
whether sanctions are likely to work from that of whether sanctions should be used76. Answering
one does not automatically provide an answer to the other. Second, the importance of costs must
be acknowledged. Regardless of whether one is trying to determine the absolute utility of sanctions
or their utility in comparison with alternative policy options, costs must be considered77. Third, the
need for comparative evaluation of policy instruments must be acknowledged. The wisdom of
using economic sanctions cannot be determined by studying the costs and benefits of sanctions in
isolation from the costs and benefits of alternative techniques of statecraft such as military and
diplomacy. Fourth, the complexity of ‘success must be acknowledged: both literature on economic
sanctions and military statecraft cannot use simplistic definitions of success that imply zero-sum
games’78. In the context of German-Soviet relations, Newnham demonstrates that states can use
economic power to gain political and security advantages in international relations, and to support
arguments in favor of positive sanctions or “linkage.” Newnham argues persuasively that positive
sanctions succeed more often than negative sanctions because they are psychologically easier for
the target state to accept, they have positive spillover effects on other aspects of the two states'
relationship, they have a positive impact on groups within the target state, winning allies for the
initiating state, and they offer little economic incentive for outsiders to work to break the
sanctions.79
Moore and Early in two different pieces explain the behavior of ‘busting sanctions’
states, or in other words, why some state would ignore a sanction on another country by continuing
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to trade80. Moore specifically looks into the application of arms embargoes. The use of embargoes
has increased from two in 1990 to eleven by the end of 2006, despite fewer arms conflicts.81 The
study of arms embargoes focuses on the behavior of the embargoed state and whether the weapons
get through. Studies regarding the impact of the embargo on the sanctioned state showed that the
achievement of policy goals was limited.82 The increasing use of arms embargoes as a policy
makes the understanding of the motivations of the senders an important contribution to the
literature, and the scholarship on sanctions busters and their motivations has been
underdeveloped83. Embargoes provide test cases of collective action problems and an opportunity
to understand the causes of collective failure at the international level. Moore argues that states
breach embargoes due to the benefits of arms exports and to advance their strategic interests.
Embargoes create an incentive for violations by increasing the utility of an arms transfer from an
exporting state.84 Moore shows that, first, exporters use arms as a form of influence to garner
future concessions from the buyer and that, second, import dependence can be an indicator of
similar political interests and political alignment. The current focus on the utility of arms
embargoes as a tool of the international community to change the behavior of sanctioned countries
ignore the benefits incurred by the exporting country. Early develops a measure to identify
sanctions-busting behavior for a dataset covering 77 sanctions cases from 1950 to 1990 using
liberal and realist explanations. Early uses the simple definition of an economic sanction by Askari
et al. as “a restriction placed by a sender on commercial activities with the intent to inflict
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economic losses on others.”

85

This definition focuses on economic sanctions as a coercive policy

tool used by a country against another, but the tool is not necessarily tied to the type of policy
changes being sought.86 Early finds that the liberal theory provides a better account of sanctionsbusting, assuming that if the opportunity to sanction-bust arises, states would uniformly seek to
exploit it. Early also finds that a sender state’s closest allies are more likely to breach sanctions
than its rivals. Finally, Early identified some predictors of sanction-busting among third parties and
over which the senders have little control: the third party’s GDP, trade openness and strong preexisting commercial relationship with the sanctioned state.87
Although there had not been an official EU sanction strategy till 2004, the EU has been
implementing them since 198288. Little attention has been given to EU sanctions in the literature
and in those studies it is argued that ‘if there is any European sanctions policy, it would be a
preference to use positive rather than negative measures, or carrots over sticks’89. There is no
common agreement among researchers about the appropriate date of when to begin studying EU
sanctioning policies, based on the legal and institutional developments of the EU: 1957 (Ginsberg
1989, 2001), 1970 (Nutall 1997), 1987 (Kalbermatter 1999, Hazelzet 2001) or 1992 (Anthony
1991, Edwards and Nutall 1994, de Vries and Hzelzet 2005). The early proponents support their
argument based on Article 57 in the Treaty of Rome stating that ‘any member state may take such
measures as it considers necessary for the protection of the essential interests of its security, which
are connected with the production of or trade in arms, munitions and war material…’90 The EU
does not like using the term ‘sanction’ and prefers the concept of “Restrictive Measures’ due to an
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EU culture that focuses on incentives and multilateral approaches.91 Sanctions have certainly been
frequently imposed, either on an autonomous EU basis or implementing binding Resolutions of the
Security Council of the United Nations. The EU presented an official document on the use of
sanctions in June 2004 entitled: “Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures” established
an approach to sanctions as a useful foreign policy instrument, emphasizing their ability to
maintain and restore peace and security in accordance to the principles of the UN Charter and the
CFSP.

It revolves around three principles: respect for international law (including the UN

Charter), the physical security of EU territory (including promoting peace and international
cooperation, and norms and values, such as democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms.
Those same three themes are the guiding principles of the ESDP, enunciated in the European
Security Strategy.92 The Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures93 argue that the
primary sanctioning actor is the UN, but that the EU is also willing to employ sanctions, preferably
with broad international support. In the advent of EU sanctions, these should be considered part of
a more comprehensive policy ‘including political dialogue, incentives, conditionality, and could
even involve, as a last resort, the use of coercive measures”94.
Since the mid 1990s, the EU made an effort to sanction in a ‘smarter’ way, targeting key
actors to avoid effects on the civilian population. Smart sanctions include arms embargoes, travel
bans and financial freezes, as well as prohibitions on trade in lucrative natural resources (timber,
diamonds and oil is)95. Restrictions of admission have consisted of refusing individuals or groups,
the right to enter the Union. The implementation depends on the immigration authorities of the
91
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member states. Diplomatic sanctions, sporting and cultural boycotts, and suspension of
cooperation are largely symbolic measures traditionally employed by states to signal disapproval
of other actor’s behavior. There are very few examples of such. As mentioned earlier, the EU has
managed to create approaches combining carrot and stick techniques through the programmatic
use of suspending cooperation with third countries, such as in the conditionality clauses in trade
arrangements96.
The legal basis for EU sanctions depends on the exact nature and scope of the restrictive.
Where Community action is required, a Common Position, defining the approach of the EU to a
particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature must be adopted under Article 15 of the
Treaty establishing the European Union. As an instrument of the CFSP, the adoption of a new
Common Position requires unanimity from EU Member States in Council. If the Common Position
provides for the reduction or interruption of economic relations with a third country, i.e. introduces
economic and financial sanctions, implementation at Community level is governed by Article 301.
Once it is adopted, the Member States must ensure that their national policies conform to the
approach that has been established97.
In practice, it includes both embargoes on EU products and a ban on the import of
products from the targeted country. Furthermore, the EU can restrict diplomatic contacts and
instigate restrictions on the admission of individuals in EU territory. Once it is adopted, the
Member States must ensure that their national policies conform to the approach that has been
established.98. In these cases, the Commission is required to make a proposal for a Council
Regulation, which the Council can adopt by a qualified majority:99 The Commission is then
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responsible for the implementation, since a sanction consists of a restriction on the common
market where restrictive measures target persons, groups and entities which are not directly linked
to the regime of a third country. However, when it comes to national security, Article 57 (currently
Article 296) in the 1957 Treaty of Rome includes several restrictions on EU authority, including its
legal ability to impose arms embargoes. A consequence of this is that the implementation of all
arms embargoes is the responsibility of the individual member states.100 Although trade in
manufactured goods falls under exclusive Community competence, issues regarding the member
states’ national security have been excluded from the common regulations. In this case, adoption
of the Regulation by the Council requires unanimity and prior consultation of the European
Parliament. Such is the case with arms embargoes. It is, therefore, common practice that arms
embargoes are imposed by a Common Position and enforced on the basis of export control
legislation of Member States (although the prohibitions on providing related financial or technical
assistance are implemented through a Regulation). The Presidency or one of the Member States,
usually assisted by the Council Secretariat, or the Commission, first prepares a proposal for a
Common Position. This proposal is examined and discussed by the relevant Council groups,
typically, the Council group responsible for relations with the third country concerned and, in all
cases, the Foreign Relations Counselors Working Group (RELEX) and the Committee of
Permanent Representatives (COREPER), which refers the Common Position proposal to Council
for adoption. Following the adoption of the Common Position by Council, the text is published in
the Official Journal of the European Union.101 Recent Common Positions related to particular arms
embargoes have given more precise guidelines to the Member States on how the embargo should
be implemented. The language used in recent Common Positions has made clear that restrictions
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not only apply to physical items but also services of different kinds (such as technical training or
assistance related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of the items on the list).
The specific issue with arms embargoes becomes the reliability of individual states, and
both the UN and the EU have had problems in ensuring compliance of their member states with
embargoes102. The forms of domestic measures to implement embargoes vary greatly from state to
state. These measures can include primary legislation (Acts and Statutes), secondary or
subordinate legislation (regulations), as well as administrative orders, decrees, government orders
or rules103and depend upon whether the state’s legal system is common law (Act), as in the United
Kingdom (UK), or civil law, as in France and the Netherlands. EU member states refer to the 1996
Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and
Technologies for guidance on which equipment should be controlled through export control lists.
However the Wassenaar list is only a minimal common standard which can be interpreted
differently in national lists of controlled exports. The 1998 EU Code of Conduct on arms exports
remedies these approximations and constitutes a modern version of the Common Criteria for arms
exports adapted in 1991 and 1992 and covers the Common Military List of the European Union.
The Code applies criteria against which member states must evaluate applications for export
licenses by would be purchasers and outlines reporting procedures and mechanisms for
intergovernmental denial notification and consultation. The evaluation of licenses takes into
account respect for human rights in the applicant country and threats to peace by it.104 The EU
reviews the performance by its member states against the Code’s criteria on an annual basis, and,
quite comprehensively, public reports on the granting of export licenses to any country for military
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related technologies are made annually both by the EU and member states.105 The Code was
revised on the eve of enlarging to ten members and is regularly revised. In addition to the Review
Process, the Conventional Arms Exports Working group (COARM) took additional decisions and
made the EU member states agree that they will ‘fully apply the Code of Conduct to license
applications where it is understood that the goods are to be incorporated into products for reexports’.
Institutionally, the RELEX sanctions formation is in charge of monitoring and evaluating
the technical implementation of arms embargoes and sanctions in general. The RELEX sanctions
formation is a type of sub-committee where delegations discuss and compare sanctions of all
kinds. In comparison, the Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports (COARM) is where
delegations endeavor to harmonize their arms export policies on the basis of the 2000 EU Code of
Conduct.106 The RELEX group provides the following on a regular basis: first, exchange of
Information and experience between member states and with international organizations and third
countries relating to the application of sanctions, breaches of sanctions and international sanctions;
second, the evaluation of results and difficulties encountered in implementing sanctions, and third,
development of good practice. In general, the RELEX group addresses horizontal issues (legal,
administrative and so on) linked to the preparation and implementation of the decisions of the
Council. 107 The RELEX group specifically monitors activities in ancillary services, which include
financial freezes; bans on technical assistance related to arms; bans on finances for the acquisition
of arms; denials of export credit; and bans on equipment that could be used for internal repression.
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Unlike politically binding Common Positions that establish arms embargoes, legally binding
Regulations establish the prohibition of ancillary services.
Regarding the China case, the arms embargo does not have a solid basis in EU law. As I
said earlier, the embargo was declared before the creation for the CFSP. There has not been any
decision to reform to revise the form of the embargo after 1989, and the form remains vague,
unlike other embargoes decided post-1989 with strict guidelines and explicit Common Positions. It
could be argued that there is no one arms embargo on China but a series of domestic arms
embargo. In 1995 for instance, the United Kingdom government made clear that the embargo
applied to weapons, and equipment which could be used for internal repression, license
applications to export other defense articles and services as well as dual-use goods and
technologies intended for military applications have been considered on a case-by-case basis in the
light of the criteria that govern all defense exports. Under this policy, the UK export control
authorities have approved exports of equipment with military applications—such as the
Searchwater radar—to China. In the same fashion, in 1997, the then French minister for Defense,
Charles Millon, observed that the embargo on equipment sales did not mean that no forms of
military cooperation with China were possible. Under the policy adopted by France, it has been
possible to export, for example, the AS-365N Dauphin-2 helicopter after the 1989 Declaration.
The absence of a clear basis in EU law has created implementation and enforcement difficulties for
a number of the countries that joined the EU in the latest round of enlargement. Several faced the
possibility that exporters could question the basis for state decisions to deny export licenses to
China. If faced with such questions, state authorities would not be able to make reference to any
EU legislation or decision in explaining license denial.108
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2.2

Security
The issue of the arms embargo brings up conflicting and complementary visions of
security within the EU, outside the EU, in terms of the transatlantic relationship, the role of
China and the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait.
The subject of security has been at the heart of the study of international relations for the

past fifty years. Its political significance has been enormous during this period Security is a term
widely used in both the analysis and the practice of international relations. Issues such as war and
peace, the balance of power, arms race, arms control, and disarmament have been at the heart of
the discipline of international relations. The beginning of a debate about security and perhaps its
emergence as a contested concept are developments that only occurred in the early 1980s109.
“National security” signifies protection of the state’s people and territories against physical assault
and in that narrow sense is equivalent to the term defense. But “national security” also implies
protection, through a variety of means, of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which
could threaten the fundamental values and vitality of the state110. Since power is widely distributed
among the world’s many actors and is of limited projectability, none of the participants is entirely
sufficient; none is perfectly capable of fully satisfying its perceived security needs111. Therefore at
one time or another, all have found it necessary to resort to one of several devices or approaches to
compensate for state inadequacies. States then use collective security (League of Nations, UN),
alliances and coalitions and international law at one time or another, sometimes simultaneously, to
meet their perceived security needs or as means to advance domestic goals. Each approach can
count both successes and failures in avoiding armed conflict.
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New thinking on security confirms the influence of different spheres. The Copenhagen
School of international relations goes beyond the traditional state-centric focused definition in
attempts (e.g.) to integrate economic, social and environmental threats, along with the political
one112. This school of thought moves down to the level of individual or human security, and then
up in the other direction to the level of international or global security. Another school of thought
has remained within a state-centric approach, but deployed diverse terms as modifiers to security
in order to assess different forms of inter-state security co-operation. According to Karuse,
however, these different approaches seem to confuse ‘problems’ and ‘threats’. To the social
scientist, the concept of security is an essentially contested one with multiple meanings and
methodological, ontological, and epistemological underpinnings. The concept of security is linked
to the concept of identity. To Ernest Gellener, identity is a multi-faceted phenomenon derived
essentially from a Western conception of civilization. Identity is a ‘more or less fluid, more or less
constraining resource through which actors identify themselves, with its fluidity or constraints
depending on the facts of history and societal opinions’. New identities emerge as potential rivals
to the state generated outside its control, thus changing the nature of security in a wholly new
context of political behavior113.
Comparative defense or national security policy cuts across such traditional divisions as
international politics and economics and comparative and economic systems114. The first studies in
the field were done in the early seventies by scholars such as Horton, Warner and Rogerson115. In
1975 and 1987, Baileys and others published comparative essays that examined the defense
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policies of the United States, the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom and France116. A
related enterprise has been the study of comparative military-political sociology117. Some scholarly
journals deal with comparative defense studies such as Armed Forces and Society, International
Security, Defense Analysis and Comparative Strategy. Finally, credit must be given to works
produced primarily in the 1950s and 1960s that examine military elites, particularly in the Third
World, where they have been seen as agents of modernization and political development, but by
others as obstacles to democracy. Murray builds upon these early studies to develop a
methodology to study it118. Several approaches to comparative defense studies can be taken. One is
to select recurring issues such as military doctrine, force posture, the decision-making process, and
weapons acquisition and then to compare and contrast how different countries deal with these
issues. An alternative approach is to focus upon the budget119. Murray and Viotti chose a countrystudy approach on defense policy. This is a useful framework for the study at hand, where a
country or an organizational approach for its foreign / defense policy on China is analyzed. Murray
looks at four different parts: (1) the international environment as it is perceived by the state, (2) the
particular state objectives, strategy and military force employment doctrine of that state. (3) The
state’s defense policy-making process: and (4) various recurring issues-force posture, the use of
force, weapons acquisition, arms-control and civil-military relations.
The European Security arrangements have undergone a period of rapid transition since
1989. The demise of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, the movement towards a
common foreign policy in the EU, and the triumph of western liberal democratic values have been
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much commented upon on both sides of the Atlantic120. Pagedas121 argues that between 1991 and
2000, Europe witnessed not only the end of the Soviet threat to Europe and its replacement by
lower level, less intensive crises in the Balkans but also the sharp reduction of U.S. forces in
Europe and Washington's reluctance to engage in European affairs militarily. But many of the
certainties characterizing the Cold War were based on fragile underpinnings. There were tensions
on both sides. On the Soviet side, Eastern European countries’ economies demanded lots of
attention from the Kremlin. On the Western side, there were tensions between Atlanticism and
Europeanism and how the United States related to the Wet Europeans and vice and versa. All of
those scars impact the current state of European security.

Bipolarity has now given way to

multipolarity and the fragmentation of the Eastern bloc has presented new problems for the EU.
The EU’s foreign policy project is unsettled in the sense that it lacks definitive goals.
The need to counterbalance an economic power with a political one is the main argument
put forward by the proponents of a truly European common foreign, security and eventually
defense policy. The European Union has steadily grown as an actor in international affairs, but its
power and influence are predominantly of soft security argues Fraser122. ‘Soft security’ is basically
looking at security in its widest context, that is, trying to promote democracy and the rule of law,
protect minorities, and sustain economic development. The EU is by far the main provider of
humanitarian assistance to the former republics of Yugoslavia and of economic aid to Russia, the
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and the Palestinians. That has been the focus of EU
external policy over the last several years. Fraser argues that the EU has to move on from soft
security to take part in hard security. That is at least partly a reflection of the fact that the EU is
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much more credible as a commercial and economic power on the world stage than as a political
player. There is a need for the EU to speak with a ‘single voice’. It is in the Union’s interest to
create strategic space for itself in a world in which US strategies and tactics begin to seem very
different from those that have been cultivated within the Union over time. An increasing disregard
for European participation in strategic decisions that will affect Europe as well as the international
system makes it harder to pursue European policies alongside the United States. American policy
and its own shifting perceptions of its interests123 could become a major strategic restraint on the
success of the ESDP if the Europeans do not manage “to negotiate their way through the rapids”
with skill and speed, and also with the courage of their convictions. The 2003 European Union
Security Doctrine124 was drawn up by Javier Solana following the Iraqi crisis to addresses the need
for a more muscular foreign policy to deal with weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and the
conflicts of the post-cold war era125. It is the first time in fifty-five years that the EU was able to
draw up a common doctrine. The Big Three immediately endorsed the doctrine: Britain was
anxious to deal with weapons of mass destruction, Germany strongly supported it because it was
under an institutional umbrella, and France did so because the doctrine spelt how countries,
including the US, could not act alone and expect to be effective. The ten candidate countries at the
time, the which, for the majority, were pro-US, welcomed the doctrine because of the explicit
support for the US and NATO. The doctrine specifies how the EU must put teeth on its traditional
“soft power” tools of political, diplomatic and economic pressure. It also focuses on spending more
on defense.
The creation of Western institutions such as the European Community and NATO was
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inspired by a notion of security that was both economic and military. The European Coal and Steel
Community was created to bind France and Germany in an economic partnership and reduce the
possibilities of a military conflict. NATO was also established to protect Western Europe from the
Soviet Union. The security provided by the EU was facing inward, while the security provided by
NATO was facing outward126. But both notions of security formation stress the importance of a
‘border of order’ provided by the two, which ran through the center of Europe, argue Fierke and
Wiener. The ‘iron curtain’ represented a border of order for the EU and NATO, in so far as it
played an important role in the process of identity formation for both organizations. Through
political practice, NATO and EU member states have created a notion of belonging to a community
with a particular order127. This order was built on liberal democratic principles that were, to a large
extent, established and sustained by negative perception of the communist East. The collapse of the
Soviet Union profoundly challenged the specific institutional identities. Enlargement was not
simply a means to extend membership to member states from the other bloc; it also involved
incorporating what was the ‘Other’. During the Cold War, the self-definitions and normative ideals
of both NATO and the EU were defined in the opposition to the East.
David Calleo envisions three pan-European models,128 projecting a different relationship
between the EU and NATO in each case. In a bipolar Pan-Europe, the West claims its Cold war
victories, and Western institutions enlarge; NATO and the EU include most of the CEECs, and
financially helped a crippled Russia while keeping it under watch. In the second model, unified
pan-Europe, the old East and West of Europe join to create a closely integrated Eurasian system.
The EU and NATO extend eastward, and eventually embrace rather than exclude Russia. In the
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third model, tripolar pan-Europe, the EU, Russia and the United States form three distinct but
articulated poles. Each, while tied to the others, remains sufficiently distinct so as not to undermine
its own cohesion. Neither the EU nor NATO becomes itself pan-European. Instead, each remains
a critical Western element within a larger and looser pan-European superstructure. The EU for
instance extends full membership only to Central and East European countries whose political
economies are sufficiently convergent with the West to be absorbed successfully129. The EU does
not imagine including Russia but nevertheless develops close economic relations with it, and also
with former Soviet States. The US remains present in Pan-Europe through NATO but less as the
ultimate guarantor of Western Europe against a resumption of Russian aggression or against an
explosion of violence in the Near and Middle East. The US and Russia cultivate their common
security interests in the Far East. NATO grows more European and less American-dominated, as
the EU develops autonomous diplomatic and defense institutions, capable of acting effectively
either inside or outside NATO. Russia does not actually join this more European NATO but
cooperates closely with it through some overarching pan-European security structure130.
The tripolar pan-Europe model seems to fit the timeframe of our study (2003-2005) and
afterwards. The case of the lift of the embargo shows a EU with increasing influence with some
aspirations in Asia, the US, as involved as it is in Europe and in Asia, reluctant to see Europe
trading weapons with China and finally Russia, though not included in our study, sharing the US
mistrust of a closer relationship between the US and the EU. There are certainly several possible
models of European security based on ideology, culture or vision of the world. The relationship
between the ESDP and NATO is the best illustration of which actors should be involved and how
defense and security policies within the EU should be led. The absence of a tradition of an
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independent European security structure combined with those ideological debates and the change in
World Order affected the creation of European Union Security institutions. It seems there is a
constant struggle of what European Security needs to achieve and how. Concretely, there are sharp
differences over the ESDP-NATO relationship among France, Britain and Germany. True, the
confluence of British and French foreign and defense policies have helped to create a European
Security structure that promised to bridge the long-standing NATO-EU divide, but the proposals for
a common defense before the Convention of Europe in November 2002 made by France, Germany
and UK illustrated fundamental tensions over what kind of links ESDP should have with NATO.
The proposals revealed the inherent ambiguities over the St Malo initiative launched by Britain and
France in 1998. This was supposed to complement the EU's economic power with a defense and
security arm. Instead, London saw it as an attempt to improve Europe's defense capabilities under
the umbrella of NATO. Paris, on the other hand, saw it as an opportunity for the EU to develop its
own security policy, with the US-led military alliance kept at a distance.
True, it is often argued that the enlargement of both the EU and NATO will bring strategic
advantage but functional loss.131 There is a greater sense in having the two organizations with
closely overlapping memberships, but that the practicalities of politics within these organizations
will make them less manageable over time. However, a close membership overlap must overtime
be the loss of one or other of these organizations, unless they become functionally different from
each other. The revival of the Franco-German axis during the Iraqi crisis was a surprise, since,
historically, defense is one of the rare topics where France and Germany have different
conceptions132. The 1963 Franco-German Treaty of Friendship (also known as the Elysée Treaty)
strengthened the links between the two countries in terms of security and diplomacy. However, one
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of the French proposals brought up during the discussion was the creation of a European Defense
Union, which was rejected by Germany, stating that the treaty should not affect Germany’s
commitments to NATO133. Similarly, when the French thought up the Eurocorps in 1992, they
wanted it autonomous; but the Germans insisted on placing it in a NATO framework. When their
security was at stake previously, the Germans always chose the US rather than France, though their
overall policy was to be friends with both and a mediator between them. But the Iraqi crisis
showed that Germany deliberately broke this historical pattern- and chose France over the US.
For the purpose of this study, security is defined as the protection of the Union’s people
and territories against physical assault and the protection, through a variety of means, of vital
economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten the fundamental values and
vitality of the state134. The ESDP / CFSP is the enabler of this protection, using military and
civilian assets for international conflict prevention and crisis management.

2.3 Europeanization
Europeanization is a key concept of our study and needs to be thoroughly reviewed.
The concept started emerging in the nineties135. Within the political science literature, most
of the authors define it as the interactions and impact of the EU on domestic actors and
structures136. Olsen lists several definitions of Europeanization: Europeanization as changes
in external territorial boundaries, as the development of institutions of governance at the
European level, Europeanization as the central penetration of state and sub state systems of
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governance, Europeanization as exporting forms of political organization and governance
that are typical and distinct for Europe beyond the European territory and finally,
Europeanization as a political project aiming at a unified and politically stronger Europe137.
Bulmer and Radaelli define Europeanization as a process consisting of a) construction b)
diffusion and c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy
paradigms, styles, ways of doing things, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined
and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic
(national and sub national) discourse, political structures and public policies138. In the past
few years, the concept has been applied to the study of an increasing range of EU activities.
However, the concept is a contested one since there is a split between authors who perceive
Europeanization as a process and those who see it as an outcome. The absence of agreement
among scholars and a lack of consistent and systematic frameworks accounting for the
varying patterns of adaptation across countries and sectors, makes testing Europeanization
potentially problematic139. Clearly, at the very least, there are analytical difficulties in
separating 'cause' from 'effect' as well as risks of confusing Europeanization with ‘European
Integration140’. European Integration focuses on what happens to the state and its sovereignty
whereas Europeanization analyzes what happens to domestic institutions and actors141.
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Europeanization is just one mechanism within the broader construct of European
integration142.
The effects of Europeanization are also widely debated in the literature. Rather than
talking about effects and causes, Hitz and Goetz distinguish between direct and indirect impacts of
Europeanization143. Direct impacts are outcomes that require domestic policies to be changed to
conform to new European-wide norms144. For example, the regulatory regime has forced the
liberalization of domestic markets. To them, the indirect impact of European governance is more
interesting. The creation of planning authorities at the regional level produces in turn demands for
a democratization of these requested structures, and hence the creation of elected regional
assemblies and governments145. Those outcomes either reinforce existing trends or serve as
catalysts for reforms. When member states already have regional authorities (such as Italy or
France), EU regional policies have reinforced their demands for further delegation of policy
competences away from central government. In contrast, when there are no such regional
institutions, the EU acts as a catalyst in creating such institutions146. Scholars refined the concept
of impacts by saying that Europeanization is a two-way process in which member states
governments both shape European policy outcomes and adapt to them. The top-down approach
refers to how member states respond to a growing European impact on their domestic level of
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policy147. The top-down studies consider ‘the consequences for national structures, policy-making
and outcomes that result from the development of institutions and policies at the EU level’148.
The “bottom-up” refers to how successfully a state ‘uploads’ its institutional models,
policy preferences and ‘ways of doing things’ to the EU level149. Uploading is also a way to
minimize the costs, which the implementation of European norms and rules may impose on
member states’ constituencies. Therefore, member states have an incentive to upload their
domestic policies to the European level in order to minimize the costs of EU adaptation150.
Member states seek to shape European policy-making according to their interests and institutional
traditions151. Uploading may also enable state governments to address problems, which preoccupy
their constituencies but can no longer be dealt with effectively at the domestic level (e.g. organized
crime, environmental pollution)152.
Tanja Börzel recognizes three kinds of reactions from the member states to
Europeanization: pace-setting, foot-dragging and fence-sitting153. Pace-setting means that Member
States actively push policies at the European level, reflecting policy preferences and minimal
implementation costs. Downloading would then create fewer problems for the pace-setter, who can
easily incorporate it into existing arrangements. Pace-setting not only presupposes established
domestic policies but also the capacity to push them through the European negotiation process,
very often against the opposition of other member States with diverging policy preferences. To the
contrary, foot-draggers block or delay costly policies in order to prevent them altogether or to
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achieve at least some compensation for implementation costs. The foot-draggers usually show a
poor level of compliance154. The fence-setter is a neither-nor: neither systematically pushing
policies nor trying to block them at the European level but building tactical coalitions with both
pace-setters and foot-draggers155. Fence-setters tend to take an indifferent and neutral position, or
they build changing coalitions with pace-setters and foot-draggers, depending on the issue
involved.156 Börzel’s theory applies well to our case. The issue with the EU China policy is that
the relationships started prior the EC. Most of the policies emanated from Member States
themselves, especially the big ones. There might be then some leadership on policy initiatives and
policy formulation based on the density of the relationship but also some reluctance to see adopt a
policy which might be contrary to a Member State’s interests.
Very few studies applied the concept of Europeanization to foreign policy.
Europeanization has been mainly used for first pillar policies (pre-Lisbon or also called
community method post Lisbon) as an interactive, ongoing and mutually constitutive process of
‘Europeanizing’ and ‘Europeanized countries, linking national and European levels157. As
mentioned earlier, foreign policy is mainly intergovernmental, governed by treaties not
legislation. It is then more challenging methodologically to measure EU impact on the state level
since these processes are not as clearly detectable in the second pillar as they are in the first
pillar. “Coordination generating EU input and domestic change” exists, but when compared with
the level of institutionalized integration evident in the first pillar, it is rather weak. Major argues
then that there is a risk of overestimating Europeanization as an ‘all explaining factor’,
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neglecting the importance of other domestic and international spheres158. Due to those
methodological challenges, Europeanization of foreign and security policy is less a clear-cut
domestic adaptation and more a gradual transformation. The lack of supranationalism in EU
foreign policy leads to a ‘horizontal pattern of Europeanization’ marked by an exchange between
governments and the resultant learning of shared policy principles’ as opposed to the hierarchical
vertical governance usual in first pillar policy areas159. Europeanization can be considered a
learning process about good policy practice for elites for which the EU sets the scene, offering a
forum for discussion and a platform for policy transfer’160. The idea of cross-loading refers to
these horizontal patterns and socialization as mechanisms of Europeanization in foreign and
security policy. Domestic change might not only be generated at the EU level but might come
indirectly through the transfer of ideas and norms form European neighbors, domestic entities.
Bulmer and Radaelli remind that national governments are the key actors, where the policy
process is not subject to European law. It does not mean that Europeanization does not take place
but it means that it is much more voluntary 161and non-hierarchical. When member states cannot
reach an agreement such as during the Iraqi crisis, the policy is not Europeanized. On the other
hand, if there is an exchange of practice, leading to ‘cross-fertilization’ of idea and learning,
there is Europeanization, for instance in the case of the Palestinian issue162. Ben Tonra defines
Europeanization in foreign policy as”…a transformation in the way in which national foreign
policies are constructed, in the ways in which professional roles are defined and pursued and in
the consequent internalization of norms and expectations arising form a complex system of
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collective European policy making”163. This ‘transformation’ usually translates as adaptation to
EU norms and standards, an ‘incremental process orienting Member States’ politics and policies
towards the EU. Wong argues that the weight of the acquis of EPC/CFSP/CESDP should
increasingly have some impact on the foreign policies of the EU states, leading to convergence
of foreign policies towards China164.
Three examples of Europeanization applied to foreign policy illustrate these
theoretical challenges. In his book ‘Europeanization of British Defense Policy”165, Robert
Dover argues that European security and defense integration can be best explained in liberal
intergovernmentalist terms. Dover conceptualizes Europeanization as a process whereby EU
member states upload their state preferences to the European level. This process occurs either
‘formally’ when supranational provisions become codified at intergovernmental conferences
(IGCs or ‘informally’ in the formulation of day-to-day EU politics). Dover’s study is based
on fifty elite interviews. Dover argues that the initial definition and adoption of the ESDP
reflected core British defense preferences. Thus Dover points out that from 1997 onwards the
Europeanization of British defense policy was part of a deliberate strategy, developed and
implemented by a small group of officials and politicians under the aegis of Premier Blair,
which aimed at ensuring a continued US engagement in the European security architecture
and a strengthening of the pan-European military capabilities following the Kosovo
debacle’.166
The British government was successful in invoking political, military and economic
power during the Anglo-French Saint Malo negotiations and several subsequent bilateral
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negotiations with French and German officials, as well as the 2000 Nice IGC to impose its
preferences. However, Dover shows that past attempts to upload British preferences have not
been always successful and even harmed further Europeanization through the case of Iraq.
Dover also examines the acceleration of the Europeanization of arms production and trade in
recent years (see chapter 4).
Another case involving the UK shows how a Member State this time drew upon its
increasingly close relationship with the EU to supplement its own bilateral (an other
multilateral) efforts to achieve its foreign policy objectives167. It may qualify as an example
of convergence. In the case of Zimbabwe, Britain used the EU as a mechanism to advance
state interests and the promotion of human rights. Britain certainly took some bilateral
initiatives, including attempts to bring ZANU-PF delegations to London, but involved the EU
and other international organizations to impose targeted sanctions. The outcome has been a
strong signal sent to President Mugabe and showed a high degree of convergence between
the British government and the EU. Both the EU and Britain promote good, liberal
governance within Zimbabwe.
Finally, Irondelle brings up a scenario where Europeanization occurred without the
European Union. Irondelle analyses the impact of European integration on the transformation
of the French military policy between 1991 and 1996168. Irondelle shows that the integration
of the French military occurred without the European Union. The French elites and indirect
pressures led to the reform of the military. French elites wanted a development of the
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European defense and the 1996 reform was presented as a response to the European
integration challenge. Jacques Chirac declared at the time that ‘the European ambition affects
first and foremost, our conventional forces’.169 However, the Europeanization of French
military policy was paradoxical since defense was the least integrated of European policies in
1996 and France had implemented the most independent and nationalist military policies
within the EU, following a Gaullist tradition. In his case study, Irondelle analyses the
military reforms laid out in the 1994 Livre Blanc sur la Defense (White Paper on Defence)
and bases his analysis on the consultation of official and unofficial documents from working
groups on the topic and hundred of confidential interviews with French policy-makers and
high-ranking officials. Irondelle concludes that there has been a Europeanization in the
transformation of the French military in a normative way and not from a top-down
perspective proved by the non existence of a common European Security Defense Policy at
the time (between 1991 and 1996). But it qualifies as an example indirect adaptation pressure
to conform in advance to EU standards
To conclude, the issue raised is not what Europeanization is but how the term can be
useful for understanding the dynamics of the evolving European polity. That might help scholars to
give better accounts of the emergence, developments and impacts of a European, institutionallyordered system of governance. Olsen argues that the different conceptions of Europeanization
complement, rather than exclude each other. Olsen acknowledges that despite the empirical
complexity and conceptual confusion, scholars need to double their efforts in modeling the
dynamics of European change. One of ‘the immediate challenges is to develop partial, middlerange theoretical approaches that emphasize domains of application or scope conditions and that
are empirically testable. A long-term challenge is to provide a better understanding of how
169

Irondelle Bastien., .209

62

different processes of change interact and make institutions co-evolve through mutual
adaptation’.170 Bulmer and Radaelli explain the fact that Europeanization is a popular topic of
research because it is a model-building exercise171.

2.4 Policy Convergence
Policy convergence is a central concept in comparative public policy and closely linked
to Europeanization. Many studies emphasize the development of similar policies across countries
over time172. Knill argues that the booming research on globalization and Europeanization affects
the current research on convergence. ‘Does the strong growth of economic and institutional
interlinkages between nation states lead to increasingly similar policies across countries? Or is the
search for convergence emerging from the domestic impact of globalization and European
integration, as domestic responses to global or European challenges are strongly influenced by
existing domestic structures and institutions173? The accepted definition of policy convergence is
read as ‘the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures,
processes and performances’174. The literature on convergence and its related concepts offers a
broad range of causal factors in order to explain changes in the similarity of policies across
countries: first, the result of similar but independent responses of different countries to parallel
problem pressure; second the imposition of policies (from international organizations), third
harmonization of national policies through international or supranational law, fourth, regulatory
170
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competition emerging from the increasing economic integration of European and global markets,
finally, by transnational communication175. Knill also points out that there are facilitating factors
leading to convergence in terms of similarities between states, level of institutional similarity,
cultural and socio-economic similarities, and also the terms of the policy at stake: policies
involving high distributional conflicts among domestic actor coalitions will diffuse and hence
converge to a lesser extent that regulatory policies with comparatively small redistribution
consequences176.
Some argue that there has been ‘no significant convergence towards a common
institutional model, homogenizing the domestic structures of the European states177.
Europeanization does not mean a homogenization across boundaries, since varying state political
and cultural structures lead to different adaptations. Schmidt warns against the temptation to
believe that European Member States are all converging towards a single EU regime. European
policies have tended to follow domestic policies changes as much as lead them, with national
policies having shaped those of the EU as often as EU policies have shaped those of the Member
States. Especially when it comes to economic policies, adjustments are state specific and ‘path
dependent’. Member States have responded to the pressures of Europeanization at different times,
to different degrees, with different results argues Schmidt.178 Schmidt proposes to look at
adjustment pressures and mechanisms related to EU decisions: it includes vulnerability to global
and economic forces, and political institutional capacity to alter their policies and policy-making
institutions as necessary, the extent to which the proposed policies went against their policy
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legacies and preferences, and the discourse that may have enhanced their capacity to respond by
changing perceptions of vulnerabilities and legacies and, ultimately, therefore, preferences.
The enlargement literature seems however to show the opposite, arguing that
membership in the EU has led to the gradual transformation of nation-states from
‘autonomous actors in the international sphere to embedded actors within regional networks
of exchange’179. Those states undergo a process of transformation in which they adapt their
domestic institutions and policies to meet the EU requirements of membership.
Such convergence can be observed in more regionalization, more flexibility, strong
sectorization and high administrative coordination180. The most common approach that best
fits the new entrants is convergence for various reasons. First, since the democratic transition,
post-communist countries have undergone an ‘imitative transformation’, emulating Western
market economies. Second, the simultaneity of transformation in coping with the EU
requirements exerts high adaptation pressures on applicant countries. Third, the EU has a
strong bargaining position in the accession process, imposing EU rules and standards. It
forces the candidate countries to comply with the ‘acquis’ without a say in its negotiation181.
It goes back the to the main methodological challenges of our study: applying
Europeanization to foreign policy and dealing with a EU policy with a non-EU member
which started after the relationship among Member States and that non-EU member. In other
words, might we expect convergence in initiatives launched after 1975 (when the European
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Community started working with the PRC) or a conflict between existing bilateral
agreements (Member States-China) with EU-China agreements? Our next section looks into
this issue of adaptation and compliance.
Wong gives an interesting response: the impact of EU institutions on state foreign
policy behavior towards China was more significant than was commonly imagined or
admitted. Wong compared the positions of France, Britain, Germany and the Commission on
China in the three issue-areas of economics, political-strategic interests and human rights and
found that there was a more coordinated position on China in 2003 compared to 1985 in
those three areas. The policies of the three counties had undergone a significant level of
convergence182. Wong argued that convergence happened by default rather than design. First,
Europe’s influence in China had been on a steady and rapid decline after 1945. “On military
and political issues, only Britain and France have had some residual diplomatic influence in
the ‘grandes negociations politiques’ (major political negotiations)183. Second, the EU’s role
and presence in East Asia had grown, in contrast to the diminishing profiles of individual
member states and former colonial powers. From 1991, France and Britain were unable to act
as individual actors in there own right (witness their failure to obtain separate seats in the
ASEAN Regional Forum)184. One may argue that the EU policy toward China had been
‘Germanized’ in that Germany has succeeded in exporting its model of discreet diplomacy,
change through trade and non confrontation on human rights to the EU level. In other words,
Germany had ‘Europeanized’ what was originally a member state’s national policy in the
political-diplomatic field.
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2.5 Adaptation and policy misfits.
We just reviewed different kinds of Europeanization. There has been some research about
compliance and how well Member States adapt to EU law. The research focuses o on domestic
areas. In Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Chang, Cowles, Caporaso and
Risse explore the impact of European institutions on the domestic structures of the member states
by reviewing ten different issue areas185. The impacts of Europeanization have varied across
countries, because policy regimes and structural arrangements vary across national cultures and
issues.186. The authors found that all countries, including the big ones, encounter adaptational
pressures due to policy or structural incompatibility with the EU. The findings suggest that
structural convergence (convergence of basic domestic institutions) is modest as opposed to
policy convergence which takes place more frequently. Member States have leeway on how to
implement a particular objective. An example is EMU which has led to similar central bank
statutes but has not yet produced real convergence in fiscal policy.
One intriguing finding of the book is that partial convergence is taking place even in
situations where the EU does not dictate any targets or end goals. All member states engage
in some learning and tend to appropriate arrangements that seem to guarantee a good fit with
the EU goals. 187
It is worth describing thoroughly the Cowles et al. model since I will use its basic
premises as part of my methodology. Cowles et al. built a three-step approach model to
predict how a country would respond to a new EU policy.188 First, they identify the relevant
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Europeanization processes, formal and informal, norms, rules, regulations, procedures at the
European level189. The second step in the framework is to identify the “goodness of fit’
between the Europeanization processes and the institutional setting, in other words between
what Europeanization of China policy entails and the institutional setting of the member
state.

The degree of ‘fit’ constitutes what the authors call ‘adaptational pressures’. In

principle the degree of adaptational pressures determines the extent to which domestic
institutions would have to change in order to comply with European rules and policies.’190
The lower the compatibility fit between European institutions and national institutions, the
higher the adaptational pressures. Based on different political, economic legal and societal
institutional systems, the degree of adaptational pressures varies according to member states.
European rules can be easily incorporated because they match the domestic system of rules
and regulations or because the member states changed their settings before the setup of those
rule, which corresponds to the case of export regulations for weapons systems for instance. In
other cases, European norms and practices ran completely counter to national rules, practices
and administrative traditions. Finally, the degree of adaptational pressures also varies based
on the perception of the role of nation states within the process of European integration.
Finally, the third piece of the framework is the mediating institutions and actors’
practices to account for domestic change. The authors identify a series of mediating factors
which will determine adaptation or convergence:
1. Veto points in the domestic structure. The existence of veto points has been identified
as a major factor preventing structural adaptation. The more power is dispersed across the
political system and the more actors have a say in political decision making, the more
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difficult is to foster the domestic consensus or ‘winning coalition’ necessary to introduce
institutional changes in response to Europeanization pressures. For example, multiple veto
points in the Italian political system blocked the country’s structural adaptation to
Europeanization pressures in transportation policies. 191
2. Mediating formal institutions provide actors with material and ideational resources to
bring structural change. For instance, the British Equal Opportunities Commission was
crucial in providing women’s organizations with the means to use EU equal Pay and Equal
Treatment Directives in furthering gender quality. Multiple veto points and facilitating
institutions exert their effects on the capacity if actors to induce change in opposite
directions.192
3. A country’s organizational and policymaking cultures also affects whether domestic
actors can use adaptational pressures emanating from Europeanization to induce structural
change. A culture based on consensus for example would overcome veto points.
4. The differential empowerment of domestic actors and learning: Structural
changes lead to retribution of power capacities among the relevant actors in a political, social
and economic system. Milner and Rogowski argue that exposure to international trade and
increased economic interdependence leads to a shift in societal interest coalitions in favor of
export-oriented sectors. More generally, Cowles et al. argue that Europeanization leads to a
redistribution of power among whole range of actors: legislatures, courts, regional
governments to interest groups and companies.193
5. Learning: Differential empowerment enables actors to further given interests and
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to induce structural change. Learning that results in change of actors’ interests and identities
occurs rather rarely194. Elite learning however occurs especially when there have been
critical policy failures or in perceived crises when actors reassess their set of preferences.
The authors expect structural change in response to Europeanization to occur if and
when a) it generates significant adaptational pressures in the domestic environment: and b)
facilitating factors are present, enabling actors to induce or push through institutional
change.
The model would be applicable to our study as long as we identify different factors. I
will explain in the methodology section which factors might be suitable to predict adaptation
or convergence between EU sanction policy and the Member states.. situation.
Falkner et al. identify misfit between EU demands (application of directives in that
case) and member states as the main explanatory factor for implementation performance in
much of the Europeanization literature. The adapation to a EU directive should be smooth if it
entails only small changes at the domestic level.195A directive will be difficult to implement if
significant adjustment is necessary in the domestic structures. Falkner et al. recognize however
the methodological challenge of having to conceptualize potential misfits in such terms as to
allow a direct comparison to be made between countries, and even between different policies.
The authors argue that the misfit can be either substantive, i.e. content and policy
related, or be an issue of procedure. The misfit means that EU law differs from domestic law
gradually (the example of the duration of parental leave) or substantially (e.g. no parental
leave). Europeanization would be then either quantitative (strengthening or weakening of an
existing policy) or qualitative (creation of a policy). A high degree of misfit in the polity would
194
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occur when a crucial domestic institution is challenged196. Falkner et al.’s study applies to
social policy but seems suitable for our case. Member States had some rules as for the
procurement of weapons prior the 1989 embargo (existing policy) and the embargo was in
some cases not as rigorous as the domestic legislations. The cancellation of the policy and the
possible replacement by an upgrade of the Code of Conduct on Weapons sales represents an
innovation on the EU part.

2.6 Methodology
2.6.1 Introduction
To analyze the case of the lift of the arms embargo between 2003 and 2005, and to
measure the influence of Britain, France and Germany on the European Union China policy,
the study combines a questionnaire on China policy and sanction policy addressed to defense
and foreign affairs officials from the three member states and EU officials, press articles,
interviews and speeches from that period, the application of Tanja Börzel’s theory, who
recognizes three kinds of reactions from the member states to Europeanization: pace-setting,
foot-dragging and fence-sitting and finally the application of Cowles Caporaso Risse model
to understand the responses of Europeanization and explain the goodness of fit between the
three Member States and the EU policy.
2.6.2 The Questionnaire and the Interviews
A questionnaire on China policy and sanction policy addressed to defense and foreign
affairs officials from the three member states and EU officials was created. The questionnaire
was divided in four parts: general questions about the embargo, institutional questions about
the role of the EU institutions, role of EU member states in the debate, influence of the Big
196
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Three, impact of the bilateral relations and finally the perception of the place of China in the
international security sphere. The time frame is the 2003 to 2005 period, which corresponds
to the time of the debate on the lift of the arms embargo. The questionnaire was a useful tool
for data collection but above all an opportunity to lead a discussion. I understood that the
success of hearing back from busy government officials was slim but I wanted to guarantee
some sort of answer at minimum to an interview at best. To contact the respondents, I sent an
email to see whether we could set up a meeting to discuss the issue and go over the
questionnaire. An interview allowed a more open discussion and could include ‘off the
record’ comments. If the addressees were too busy, they might send some information about
the issue (speeches, press articles) or redirect me towards other possible contacts with
expertise on the issue. In the case of an interview, a recording device would be used unless
the respondent did not feel comfortable having his / her comments on tape and especially
since some respondents chose to have their identity kept confidential.
The email request and questionnaire were drafted in English, French and German.
Some of those respondents might have been contacted in one language but responded using
another. Here is a sample email sent to a member of the Defense Committee of the House of
Commons (The British Parliament)
More specifically, the questionnaire/information requests emails have been sent to the
following three groups:
France, Germany, Britain officials/advisors responsible for foreign and defense policy for
the 2003-2005 period (or afterwards of they had some perspective about the events). That
included, Premier Blair’s government, the Chirac Presidency, Chancellor Schröder’s and
Merkel’s administrations.
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France, Germany, Britain members of Parliament, sitting on Foreign Affairs, Defense and
European Affairs Committees.
 Questionnaires or Interviews with European Commission officials (Directorate General
Relex)
 Questionnaire or Interviews with European Council Officials (including CFSP)
 Questionnaires or Interviews with COREPER and Permanent Representations Officials
(the members of the representations constitute COREPER)
 Questionnaires or interviews with Members of the European Parliament sitting on Foreign
Affairs and Defense Committees.
Here is a summary of the response rate. In the appendix, the list of people contacted is
mentioned for each country.
Table 2.6.2: Positive respondents from the Three Member States and the EU
Case

Number of Respondents (interview or
correspondence)

France

7

Britain

7

Germany

13

EU

16

2.6.3 Press and journal articles, media interviews and speeches
A useful tool to trace the different steps of the debate is the press. The issue has been
followed in all the countries of the study, as well as in the US and China. I used predominantly
the archives of The Financial Times, a British newspaper that has an excellent coverage of
European Union issues and international issues in general. The keywords used in various
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combinations for the search were ‘embargo’, ‘arms ban’, ‘China’, ‘France’, ‘Britain’,
‘Germany’, ‘U.S.’ and the ‘EU’. I included other daily publications. As for speeches, I looked up
the websites of the executive branches’ offices, legislative branches and European Union
institutions. I also used some more scholarly work of folks who studied the EU-China
relationship among the Big Three and China and might have used the arms embargo as an
example.

3.3 Tweaking three theories to apply to our study.
The goal is to evaluate the overall pattern of the three Member States’ institutional
responses to Europeanization of China policy. In the literature review, I summed up the work
by Tanja BÖrzel on the three types of attitudes (pace-setter, fence-setter, foot-dragger) and
the research about EU laws adaptation misfits (Cowles et al., Falkner et al.). All of this
research is applied to domestic policies (competition, social policy, transportation…). I
would like to apply it to foreign policy and use those theories to test our hypotheses. The
Europeanization of a China policy means the development of European policy on China, the
enactment of legal procedures such as the embargo, the transfer of competences and the
creation of norms and identities at the EU level, in other words as the emergence of European
governance. What is the goodness of fit or the mismatch between the EU and the Member
States on China policy and do they respond?
First, I identify the relevant Europeanization processes and in this case I expect to see
bottom-up, top-down and horizontal Europeanization. The China policy implies a certain set
of processes including the arms embargo. These Europeanization processes necessitate some
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adjustments on the domestic level of the member states so that states can be in compliance
with EU rules (rules of weapons sales) or necessitate some EU adjustments coming from the
member states’ existing policies.
The second step in the framework is to identify the “goodness of fit’ between the
Europeanization processes and the institutional setting, in other words between what
Europeanization of China policy entails and the institutional setting of the member states.
The degree of ‘fit’ constitutes what we identify as ‘adaptation pressures’. We are trying to
explain whether there was adaptation or convergence; whether the French, the German or the
British would adopt the EU policy on China easily or not. The goal of the study is to show
how significant adaptation pressures are in the case of Europeanization of China policy at the
domestic level and at the EU level. When adaptation pressures are high, European
institutions challenge the identity, the constructive principles, core structures and practices of
national institutions. And when Member States create those pressures on European
institutions (to lift the embargo for example), the identity, principles, core structures and
practices of EU institutions are challenged (defense of human rights in the European
Parliament for instance). The institutional, material and cultural adaptations can be
challenging either for the Member States or the EU institutions.
In cases of high adaptation pressures, the presence or absence of mediating factors is
crucial for the degree to which domestic change adjusts to top-down Europeanization or EU
change adjusting to bottom-up Europeanization should be expected. I use five mediating
factors adapted to our case to predict whether reform will take place:
1. Veto points in the domestic structure. The existence of veto points has been
identified as a major factor preventing structural adaptation. The more power is dispersed

75

across the political system and the more actors have a say in political decision making, the
more difficult is to foster the domestic consensus or ‘winning coalition’ necessary to
introduce institutional changes in response to Europeanization pressures. In our case, we
might expect that coalition governments might have more difficulties to comply with a EU
policy versus a one party government. The public opinion might be another veto point
preventing a EU law to change.
2. A country’s organizational and policymaking cultures also affects whether
domestic actors can use adaptation pressures emanating from Europeanization to induce
structural change. A culture based on consensus for example would overcome veto points. A
head of State keen on expanding the relationship with China or who has been an influential in
EU-China relations will have an impact on the EU China policy. The leaders of the Big
Three all belong to that category.
3. The Human Rights issue is another defining issue in the relationship with the EU
and the Member States. Some Member States try to depoliticize human rights and dissociate
progress in that area with trade. The German and the French leadership seem to belong to
that category. However, for some countries, traditionally the Northern European Member
States or for some institutions, such as the European Parliament, human rights ought to be
considered as the primary policy under consideration when doing business with.
4. The trade issue could be considered as the ‘rival’ issue of human rights in terms of
importance in the EU-China and the three big States-China relationships. Trade has been the
original field of action for Member States and the European Community and now the
European Union. Trade between the two amounted to some €210 billion in 2005, with
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European exports to China valued at €52 billion and imports from China at €158 billion.197
Tapping the huge potential of the Chinese market represents a boon for sluggish European
economies.
5. The empowerment of external actors: Cowles et al. argue that Europeanization
leads to a redistribution of power among a whole range of actors outside the policy-making
process. In our case, the United States has been a determining influence in the debate and so
has China. The United States carefully watched the debate of the lift from its beginnings and
heavily lobbied Member States against it.
Using this mixed model allows us to explain the response of the Member States to the
Europeanization of China policy based on the mediating factors and attitudes which enabled
or disabled policy change.

2.6.5 Expected findings
Based on my understanding of Europeanization, the analysis of articles, speeches and
the questionnaire, the BÖrzel classification and the Cowles et al . and Falkner et al. theories,
we expect that France, Germany and Britain significantly affect the EU China sanction
policy. The issue of the arms embargo has not been resolved, but the three members have
been key players in putting and keeping the arms embargo on the top of the agenda one way
or another. I expect to find that France and Germany did upload their preferences and
influenced other member States to follow their policy choices. Britain was also influential in
the debate but more as swing state: originally in favor, but ended up switching positions. The
findings should also show that domestic factors (opposition parties, media, public opinion)
197
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and external factors (importance of the transatlantic relationship, influence of the US in Asia
and China’s attitude towards Taiwan) had a key impact on the outcome of the initiative and
empowered the will of the Big Member States.
The underlying premise of the debates on whether to lift the arms ban on China was
strategic, relating more to the implications for regional and in particular cross-Strait security
and stability. The US for instance worried as far as China’s intentions and capabilities to
make use of prospective arms imports following a lift. However, such concerns were likely to
be mitigated as continued and targeted U.S. pressure, compliance with the Wassenaar
Arrangement and the EU Code of Conduct, and supplier states’ own judgments in deciding
the types of armament and defense technologies for transfers would prevent sales of direct
lethal military significance. China’s own capabilities to absorb imported equipment and
technologies and integrate them into its own existing order of battle would also suggest that
the transformation effect will take years, if not decades, to materialize.198
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Chapter 3
The influence of France

3.0

Introduction
Although France does not have the same historical ties with China as does Britain or

the strong commercial ties as Germany does, France maintains a special political relationship
with China. As previously mentioned, France was the first country to establish full
diplomatic relations with the communist regime of China. President Jacques Chirac (19952007) always nourished a particular interest in China and during his political career
developed personal and warm relationships with the Chinese leadership199. France has always
been a pioneer or a pace-setter when it comes to EU China policy-making. In 1989, France
was one of the main architects of severe sanctions against China following the Tiananmen
Square massacre, and almost ten years later launched a bilateral ‘strategic partnership’ with
China ahead of the EU and other big member states. In the issue of the embargo, once again,
France seemed to spearhead the plans. First, I will review the track record of France in EU
Asia policy. Then I will focus on the embargo and explain the reasoning of the French
diplomacy based on the interviews. Then, in order to assess the French responses to
Europeanization of China policy, I will use the classification by Börzel 200 to establish that
France was a pace-setter by convincing the EU to put the issue on the agenda and then by
trying to convince its partners, and

then apply the three-step approach and domestic
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structural change from Caporaso, Risse and Cowles201 and show that there was no mismatch
between the EU policy on China and France policy on China, but a mismatch between France
and other member states.

3.1

France’s relations with China
Historically, France and China have always been close sharing similar views of the

world. France was the first Western country to exchange ambassadors with the PRC in 1964.
De Gaulle and Mao Zedong both wanted to free their nations from the constraints of the
bipolar world. Mao at the time talked about “intermediary zones”, comprised of developed
countries that can side with developing ones in order to isolate the two superpowers202. In the
1970s and 1980s, Sino French relations developed steadily as China was starting separating
itself from the Soviet Union. France then developed military relations with China (as the
United Kingdom and the United States also did) and started selling small quantities of
weapons and military equipment. After the cold shoulder following the Tiananmen Square
incident, France was the first major country to resume normal relations in 1991203.Despite the
development of military relations with Taiwan, France closely cooperated with China on
several international issues, including the settlement of the Cambodia question in 1991. The
end of the Cold War, the return to power of a neo-Gaullist majority in 1993, the acceleration
of economic reforms in China in 1992 and a French government pledge not to authorize
French companies to sell weapons to Taiwan anymore (after a severe decline in these
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relations) led to an unprecedented rapprochement starting in 1994204. In 1997, as President
Chirac was visiting China, both countries established a “comprehensive partnership”. This
was the second country to establish such a relationship after Russia (which in 1996
concluded a ‘strategic partnership’ with China), and the first Western state to do so. Again
one of the main points of agreement was a certain conception that following the collapse of
the Soviet Union, the world was unbalanced because it was overwhelmingly dominated by a
sole power.205 Since then, Paris and Beijing have shared similar stances on a large number of
issues such as Iraq, disarmament, non-proliferation, North Korea, promotion of
multilateralism, and most importantly, the sensitive Taiwan issue. Visiting China in April
2005, Premier Raffarin declared that the “anti-secession law” that the Chinese Parliament
had adopted a month earlier was compatible with France’s ‘one China’ policy and the ‘one
country, two systems’ formula was the most appropriate one for solving the Taiwan issue.
This close relationship has been institutionalized through regular bilateral meetings,
an alliance on many issues on the Security Council, and rich cultural exchanges. In 1997,
France became the first democratic nation to push to abandon attempts to condemn China in
the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva, opting instead for a “constructive dialogue
with the Chinese authorities on this delicate issue.” However, today, Paris and China have
been having a few difficulties on more recent issues such as Tibet, Iran, Sudan or more
generally Africa. Those difficulties have somewhat bridged the gap between Chirac’s neoGaullist policy and the EU’s common foreign and security policies. France, as a founding
member of the EU, has considerable influence on EU foreign and China policies, but it also
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must take into account the member states’ majority opinion on these matters, including on
China.
More generally, when it came to international relations in a post Cold War environment,
France and China believed that a multipolar and culturally plural world had already taken shape.
In addition, being both independent nuclear powers, ‘notably with second strike capability
against any bigger nuclear power (Russia or the US)’, Paris and Beijing believed that they have a
regional role to play that may, on occasions, conflict with American interests.206

3.2.

Track record of Europeanization of French China policy

Under Gaullist (conservative) leadership since 1993, the French used the EU quietly and
gradually to increase their presence in Asian political affairs through a process of discrete
diplomacy aimed at institution building. French policy makers such as former minister for
Foreign Affairs Hubert Védrine, recognized that ‘in this immense zone…where we are not
the principal partner, interlocutor or protagonist, we do our work with perseverance to make
links, create habits of consultation which did not exist before…and slowly but surely, I
expect that it will bear fruit.’207
The creation of the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM) was a classic example of bottom-up
Europeanization where France used the EU as a platform to advance its interests and cooperation
between the EU and Asia.

Following a tense period of relations between France and China

from 1989 to 1994, France started to develop a dense network of contacts between French
and Chinese leaders. This network not only included diplomatic contacts but also some in the
trade, defense and cultural cooperation sectors. The EU followed suit and also established a
206
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similar system of bilateral meetings. During his 1994 visit to France, President Jiang Zemin
proposed ‘four principles on Sino-European ties’: stable, long-term and friendly cooperation
for the 21st century, respect for each other and seeking common ground while putting aside
differences, engaging in complementary trade and economic cooperation, and consultation
and cooperation in international affairs.208 French Premier Balladur seized upon Singapore
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong’s proposal of a regular meeting between EU and Asian
leaders, based on the

APEC model. The French saw an opportunity to re-start their

relationship with the Chinese after five years of bilateral difficulties. The creation of the
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) institutionalized regular contacts with Chinese leaders in a
multilateral European framework without the US and Taiwan. France worked closely with
Singapore to convince its European partners to put the initiative on the EU agenda, working
through its EU presidency in the first half of 1995 and through its presence in the troika in
the second half of 1995. Despite an initial lukewarm response from the British and German
governments, France used the offices of former European Commission President FrancoisXavier Ortoli (President of the European Communities in 1973) and the 1995 French EU
presidency to push the idea in European circles.209 It managed to use EU institutions to build
a coalition of support from the other member states and the Commission towards the idea,
which led the way to the inaugural ASEM meeting (a summit of EU and East Asian countries
in ASEAN plus China, Japan and South Korea) in Bangkok in March 1996.210 The ASEM
has been a success in facilitating contacts between European and Chinese leaders. The 1998
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ASEM II allowed Chinese Premier Zhu Ronghi to make his first visit abroad in London and
Paris. The first EU-China summit was held in London immediately after ASEM II211.
During the same period France also pushed for increased political dialogue with
China under the EU framework. In 1996, for instance, France established a high-level
strategic dialogue involving defense ministers and senior officials.212 The 1997 France-China
Declaration on a Global Partnership inspired the 1998 EU Commission’s ‘Comprehensive
Partnership with China’. Based on the French template, the Commission initiative laid out
the principles of a comprehensive partnership, including political consultation, annual
summits, dialogue on human rights, support for China’s access to WTO, and the promotion
of bilateral trade and investment.
In terms of human rights, France followed different models of Europeanization. Three
different periods can be distinguished in this rollercoaster on human rights. After the
crackdown on the 1989 Tiananmen protests, the socialist French government vigorously
pushed for sanctions and led the EU into doing so. With a Gaullist majority voted into office
in 1993, France became much softer on human rights and successfully convinced some of its
partners (horizontal Europeanization) to boycott the 1997 UNCHR resolution. France’s lead
was decisive in reaching a consensus the following year on a common EU position on the
resolution, but still had to fall in line with the general EU position (combination top down
and horizontal Europeanizations.)
With the 1989 Tiananmen crisis, France played a leading role internationally in
supporting the student demonstrations and condemning the Chinese government. Until that
point, France had not been too interested in human rights in China except when that involved
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its own citizens. The French Socialist government strongly reacted to the crackdown and
infuriated the Chinese government by offering political asylum to the dissident student
leaders and gave them a special place in the bicentennial Bastille Day parade. 213 The French
authorities even authorized the dissidents to create an organization, the Federation for
Democracy in China.214 France initiated the Madrid’s European Council sanctions at the EC
level and held China accountable in international forums such as the CHR. France had
become the leader in the human rights improvement crusade on behalf of the EC.
With a change of majority in 1993, the human rights issue became a secondary one, a
culturally relative one. The Balladur government was more interested in catching up on the
trade relationship, following the German and Japanese model, (where the bilateral
relationship rests above all on trade).215 It certainly did not happen overnight and as early as
1991, France had breached EC sanctions on financial aid. With the election of Jacques
Chirac, a connoisseur of Asian civilization, this ‘semantic-philosophical’ approach became
established foreign policy. Responding to a question on the French Senate floor, Hervé de
Charette, Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time characterized it as ‘constructive and
dynamic, preferring constructive dialogue to confrontation’ .216 It did not take long for the
Chinese government to realize that there was a window of opportunity. At the ASEM
Inaugural summit in March 1996, Prime Minister Li Peng urged Chancellor Kohl and
President Chirac to drop the annual United Nations Commission on Human Rights resolution
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criticizing China’s human rights record, a resolution the European Community had sponsored
six times since 1990.217
In 1997, one month before a state visit of President Chirac to China, France broke
ranks with the EU practice of sponsoring the human rights resolution on China at the
Commission on Human Rights. This reversal was quite stunning, based on the fact that
France was the key player in sanctioning the Chinese following Tiananmen. However, the
reversal might have been anticipated through different declarations on both sides before the
French President’s visit. Unsuccessful in convincing its EU partners and the Dutch
presidency to drop the resolution criticizing China, France decided to withdraw from the
traditional EU support of the resolution and led the ‘Airbus Group’, including (Germany,
Italy and Spain) in defecting from the common position. With the split in EU ranks, the
resolution did not pass. Many Western governments criticized French leadership on
sabotaging the resolution: according to its partners, France had put short-term economic
interests before long-term EU interests, therefore undermining the EU’s credibility. During
the state visit of President Chirac, the common declaration stated that both parties would
‘respect diversity’ and take into account the ‘particularities of both sides.”218
The following year, EU Member States agreed upon a common position: the EU
would ‘neither propose nor endorse, either by the organization as a whole or by individual
member states, any resolution criticizing China’. The French position had won the day and
the ‘hardliners’ found themselves trapped in a position projected by France. Since 1998, the
EU has systematically not cosponsored the resolution. The 1998 position represented an
intergovernmental compromise, reconciling various preferences into a common position that
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was not altogether coherent. France brought change to the EU’s CHR policy of China, and
France had Europeanized its human rights on not confronting China policy by a process of
‘exporting its national policy model, ideas and details to the EU’219. However, France was
also affected by some top down Europeanization (from Brussels) or horizontal (from some
other members) and had to coordinate and harmonize its position with the other member
states in favor of a resolution. The French stance helped resume dialogue on human rights
between China and the EU: the dialogue had been interrupted with the CHR resolution, and,
following the French coup and the newly defined EU position, the Chinese deemed
acceptable to restart the discussion220.
How was the case of the lift of the arms embargo unique compared to other instances
of Europeanization of French policy in China? France probably thought it had the necessary
influence to see the lift go through based on a successful track record of recent French
initiatives in EU-Asia relations.

3.3

The Reasoning of the French diplomacy to lift the arms embargo
In the next two sections, I will justify the position of the French diplomacy and establish

the French response to the Europeanization of the China policy. I contacted representatives
from the executive and legislative branches, based on the timeline but also sometimes though
recommendations and…chance.
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The French case to lift the embargo rested on four points: the flaws of the embargo,
the tightening of current export rules, the transformation of China and finally the economic
potential.
First of all, the current system was not satisfactory. The 1989 recommendation did
not constitute an embargo per se since armament licenses exclusively depended on domestic
legislation and state authorities.221 When the EU arms embargo was announced in 1989, the
European Community had no formal foreign and security policy. The decision was taken,
along with other temporary steps, such as suspending bilateral ministerial contacts and
reducing scientific and cultural cooperation. There was no formal mechanism to govern the
embargo enforced by member states until 1998, when the EU introduced a Code of Conduct
to regulate its arms sales to the rest of the world. The EU never agreed to make the Code of
Conduct legally binding. Instead the rationale was that the increased transparency it
established for member states’ arms sales would ensure they abided by its other provisions,
such as taking into account human rights, the security of friends and allies, and regional
stability.222 Despite the initial purpose, the embargo did not stop the exportation of weapons
or sensitive technologies to China, since it did not cover dual-use technologies (civilian and
military). The embargo, which only covered lethal weapons, was incomplete in any case, and
its lift would have minor consequences on the transfer of sensitive technologies. Dual-use
technology was already under strict national controls, and the European Union had proposed
tightening its code of conduct on sensitive exports if it lifts the embargo against China.223
Other countries such as Canada and Australia did not apply or no longer applied such
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restrictive measures and did lift their embargo in 1992. Ultimately, the export license refusal
depended on the national export control regime and dual use technology was already under
strict state controls.224
The second reason motivating a lift was a strengthening of export modalities: the
1998 Code of Conduct was to be tightened, including a revision of the tool box, revision of
the military list of the EU, the inclusion of brokering operations, transit and transfer of
intangible goods,

the mandatory publication of a government report, and specific

transparency measures set for countries coming out of the embargo such as notification to the
rest of the EU member states of the exports from the last five years, reexamination of the
refusal of licenses during the embargo and

reporting once every three months of the

delivered items). The 1998 EU law was a great guarantee of earnest regulations. The
argument was that the EU arms business remained tightly controlled under the code barring
the sale of equipment that could be used in regional conflicts or domestic repression, which
would still be enforceable on sales to China.225
Since the

1996 Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms

and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, listing which equipment should be controlled
through export control lists,
regulated. Indeed, the

practices had been refined and French exports were strictly

Wassenaar list was only a minimal common standard which could be

interpreted differently in country lists of controlled exports.

French diplomacy thought there

was a misunderstanding of their strategic reasoning: despite the lift, high tech products would not
be exported, since there might be an issue of counterfeiting the technology: there was a robust
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internal ruling at both the state and EU level.

“Lifting

the embargo doesn't mean at all that

we are going to sell more arms to China," declared Michelle Alliot-Marie, French Minister of
Defense from 2002 to 2007.227 As China continued to direct some 450-plus missiles at
Taiwan, there is little chance that any long-range missile technology could be sold to the
country. The French and other proponents of the Code argued that this code would provide a
safety net to the easing of the embargo -- that would prevent the sale of any technology that
could be used to threaten another state.228 The embargo was largely symbolic and the same
effect could be obtained with strict export controls.229
The third argument from France was that China had changed a lot since 1989: there
was new leadership and a genuine willingness to integrate with the international community.
The French noted Beijing’s inclusion in the World Trade Organization and help bring North
Korea to the negotiating table. These efforts had thawed relations and reintegrated China in
the international order. China was very different from the other embargoed countries such as
Sudan, Zimbabwe or Burma. The relationship was from one major power to another230.
China was also more inclined to perceive this measure as discriminatory, especially since
Iran and North Korea were not included. The French government noted some positive
developments in the Chinese stance vis-à-vis international standards in nonproliferation. The
implementation of Chinese policy in terms of import control of weapons had been
strengthened, and France was pleased with Chinese efforts to comply with the existing
norms. French diplomacy saw the embargo as anachronistic as relations between Europe and
226
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China improved, Beijing was a privileged partner and a responsible one.231 Defense Minister
Alliot-Marie, among others in the French leadership, argued that it was unfair to maintain an
embargo that sent a powerful negative signal. She said that denying weapons sales to China
could even accelerate the country's own weapons programs.232The embargo became a
stumbling bloc to normalization. French officials were constantly harangued by the Chinese
on the issue at almost every bilateral meeting.233
The French certainly recognized that there was room for improvement as far as
human rights were concerned. France, however, noted some positive progress from the
Chinese authorities such as the inscription of human rights in the Chinese constitution and
the recent creation of a working group in charge of preparing the ratification of a United
Nations pact on political and civil rights. Furthermore, the EU continued a dialogue with
China on human rights, which helped to make progress. France did not believe that
maintaining the embargo was an effective solution to sustain progress on the human rights
issue: it was more a political issue than a trade one. The Chinese did not necessarily need the
French to build a tank or a missile, but they were not as advanced as far as helicopter
technology, for instance. It was not through the embargo that progress could be obtained in
terms of human rights, argued the French.234
A non-official reason to lift the embargo was an expansion of the commercial and
industrial relationship between the EU and China in a variety of non-defense related sectors
that would automatically benefit the French. This was in view of the very significant political
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weight that such a decision would carry in Chinese eyes, and the lifting of the embargo
would actually lead to a string of major Chinese purchases of European products.235
According to the European Union, French export licenses for armament to China were valued
at $228 million in 2003, the most of any member country, and up from $140 million in 2002.
236

At almost every bilateral meeting, purchase agreements were discussed. When President

Chirac argued strongly in favor of the lift of the embargo and an EU recognition of market
economy status (MES) to China during his 2004 trip to China, he knew that internal divisions
within the EU were too deep to reach a quick decision. Yet, by telling his Chinese
counterparts what they wanted to hear, he generated $4-5 billion worth of business contracts.
During the visit of Prime Minister Raffarin in China in April 2005, forty purchase
agreements were signed237.

3.4

The French response to Europeanization of China policy in the case of the arms

embargo
The French EU policy decision making pattern238 theoretically includes four aspects:
the EU’s inner decision-making patterns, France’s domestic policy patterns, a process of
interest conciliation with other member states, and a process of conciliation between the
national and the Community levels. The formulation of French national interest is multilayered and the decision process is more diffuse and under Commission and European Court
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of Justice scrutiny, since EU law supersedes domestic law (mostly in pillar I domain). The
EU’s policy formulation is then often the result of a cumulative process of micronegotiations and micro-decisions by countless actors, public and private over which the
central government has little control. However, in the case of foreign policy this does not
hold true and in the specific issue of the arms embargo, the top of the leadership formulated
and tried to have the policy implemented. The French Parliament does not have much
authority when it comes to foreign policy despite a special commission dealing with
European Union issues and could only request hearings with government members and EU
officials as for China sanction policies.
The goal is to evaluate the overall pattern of French institutional responses to
Europeanization, which is defined as the development of European policy on China, the
enactment of legal procedures such as the embargo, the transfer of competences and the
creation of norms and identities, in other words as the emergence of European governance.
What is the goodness of fit or the mismatch between the EU and France on China policy? In
previous chapters, we identified the relevant Europeanization processes, formal and informal,
norms, rules, regulations, procedures at the European level for member states. The China
policy implies a certain set of processes including the arms embargo. They necessitate some
adjustments on the domestic level of the member states so that states can be in compliance
with EU norms, rules and procedures. Whether these policy adjustments (transposing EU
rules into domestic law) lead to domestic structural change is our central research question.
We use Börzel’s classification of the three types of responses from member states to EU
policy on China. I argue there is no mismatch between France and the EU China policy
especially in the case of the lift of the arms embargo on China since France has been a pace-

93

setter and did upload its preferences at the EU level. We then review the five mediating
factors to explain France’s adaptation pattern.
It is ironic to see that France has been a pace-setter on the embargo policy in general:
from the set-up of the arms embargo on China to the lift. We explained earlier that France
has been a pace-setter on several episodes of the EU China policy and profoundly shaped EU
China relations. France has been an instigator of a push to lift the embargo as early as 1997.
The issue was first discussed by Robin Cook, the British Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and
Hubert Védrine, his French counterpart239. The issue was never brought on the agenda by the
army or the defense industry. It always has been at head of state level: a defense matter could
be discussed within the Defense Council level (composed of the President, the Prime
Minister, the Defense Minister, Foreign Affairs Minister, and the Minister for the Economy)
or between the SGDN (Secrétariat Général de la Défense Nationale_General Secretariat of
National Defense) and the President.240 The issue came back to the fore on 30 June 2003,
when the French Defense Minister Michele Alliot-Marie visited Beijing and publicly
declared a willingness to urge the EU to relax arms restrictions on China. At the time, her
comments passed largely unnoticed, as the move was widely perceived as a general attempt
to increase French-Chinese trade in all areas, only possibly including arms sales.241 A few
months later, both leaders of France and Germany declared their intention to lift the embargo.
France and other proponents of the lift used different ways to promote their agenda: public

239

Hubert Védrine, Former French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Interview by Vivien Exartier, Washington
D.C., , November 14, 2007.
240
Griffin Christopher and Raffaello Pantucci. A treacherous triangle? China and the transatlantic alliance.
SAIS Review Vol XXVII no 1 (Winter-Spring 2007)
241
Kreutz Joakim. “Reviewing the arms embargo on China: the clash between value and rationale in the
European Security Strategy”. Perspectives: The Central European Review of International Affairs 22, (Summer
2004): 43-58, 45

94

speeches, press conferences, interviews in newspapers, requests to discuss it in Brussels
meetings, and, of course, private meetings.
While visiting Beijing in December 2003, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder
told Premier Wen Jiabao that “the time had come” to lift the embargo. On December 12 and
13 at an EU summit, French President Jacques Chirac led European leaders in referring the
issue to their respective foreign ministers, urging them “to re-examine the question of the
embargo on the sale of arms to China. The foreign ministers would reexamine it in January
2004.242 On December 17, the European Parliament rejected such a proposal in a landslide.
China’s continued human rights abuses were a valid reason not to lift the ban for the
European Parliament. The European Parliament has only a consultative role in foreign policy
matters, but the strong reaction against the proposal which gathered the support of all of the
Parliament’s party groups, would probably influence the foreign ministers. 243
At the first EU General Affairs and External Relations Council meeting of the year in
Brussels on January 26, 2004, France suggested that the embargo should be lifted at the next
EU Council meeting in March. Foreign Affairs minister Villepin declared: ‘Our feeling is
that the embargo is out of date as relations between Europe and China improve’. However,
Villepin recognized that a lift was not possible yet without further discussion, especially in
the area of human rights.244 As expected, EU foreign ministers failed to reach an agreement
after discussing the issue. They asked two working groups under the European Council, the
Committee of Permanent Representatives and the Political and Security Committee, to
examine the matter further. The day after the ministerial meeting, President Chirac, at a joint
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conference with visiting Chinese President Hu Jintao to kick off the celebrations of the year
of China, publicly called for the lifting of the arms embargo on China.”245 Chirac qualified it
as ‘outdated’ and that such an embargo did not make any sense today. Chirac said he hoped
the ban on Beijing would be scrapped in the coming months. It is interesting to note that
there was not necessarily a consensus within French political class at the time. During
President Jintao's speech at the French National Assembly, almost half of the delegates
boycotted the event and some were involved in demonstrations with human rights activists
outside.
At the EU level though, it appeared at the time that the vast majority of members
favored lifting the arms embargo, arguing that China does not belong in the same category as
Myanmar, Sudan and Zimbabwe – the three other countries against whom there is an EU
arms embargo. Even the Netherlands, which had been reluctant to act, indicated in late
January that it was willing to go along if the majority of EU members were in favor of ending
the embargo246 On February 4, Javier Solana, the E.U. foreign policy chief, was quoted in the
Geneva newspaper ‘Le Temps’ as saying, "It seems to me, after discussions we had a few
days ago … [that] the E.U. is ready to do it."247 During the spring, on March 20, as an early
result of the aspiration for closer military cooperation with China, the first participation of a
European state (France) in joint maneuvers with the Chinese navy took place. That was the
largest exercise with a foreign navy in the history of the People’s Republic.248
By the fall of 2004, France had about half of the members on its side. EU officials
estimate that 16 of the 25 member states favored lifting the embargo (led by France, Italy,
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Spain, and Germany), while Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Ireland, Portugal, Poland and
perhaps one or two other new Eastern European members opposed lifting it. France had
planned on having the embargo lifted before the accession of ten new members in March249
and that not being the case complicated the campaign. In September, the UK and the
Netherlands were studiously neutral on the issue although both were key actors to swinging
the balance, given Britain’s prestige and the fact that the Dutch held the presidency of the
EU. All European states seemed to agree that the embargo was anachronistic, given the
overall health of Sino-European relations and the agreement on a ‘strategic partnership’.250
While conducting an October 2004 state visit to Beijing, President Chirac declared that he
would personally strive to end the embargo, the continuation of which was “motivated purely
and simply by hostility.” Now, expectations were high both on the Chinese and much of the
European side that the ban would be lifted by December 8, when EU and Chinese leaders
would hold an annual summit in The Hague.251
A couple of days before the crucial EU-China summit at The Hague, France came to
the fore with its arguments. Through the voice of the Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, Cecile
Pozzo di Borgio, French diplomacy repeated that the embargo no longer corresponded to the
reality of the European-Chinese strategic partnership, that member states of the EU agreed on
this and that the discussions were focused on the time table and the modalities for the lifting
of the embargo.252
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At the expected seventh EU-China summit on December 8, 2004, in the Hague, the
E.U. “confirmed its political will to continue to work towards lifting the embargo.”253 During
the summit, France and Germany pushed for and achieved in principle an agreement for the
EU towards lifting the partial arms embargo. The agreement, however, did not specify the
timeframe. The chance to see the issue resolved by the end of the Luxembourg presidency
(first semester 2005) were null, and even the following UK presidency (second semester
2005) was exceedingly unlikely to bring about a firm commitment. Some pessimistic voices
contemplated the next window of opportunity as early as mid-2006.254 Two weeks later,
though, the Council of the European Union approved the Joint Statement and called on the
E.U. presidency to “finalize the well-advanced work in order to allow for a decision [on the
embargo]” and “underlined that the result of any decision should not be an increase of arms
exports from E.U. Member States to China, neither in quantitative nor qualitative terms.”255
The Council further stressed that the E.U. should move to adopt a revised Code of Conduct
on arms exports and a new instrument on exports to post embargo countries, known to as the
“Toolbox.” Sensing a window of opportunity to advance the French agenda, President Chirac
had strong words on the issue during his State visit in China right after the summit. On
December 10 in Hong-Kong, President Chirac again characterized the embargo as ‘totally
obsolete’ and that, based on Chinese military production, nothing justified it. Chirac saw the
question as somewhat symbolic and thought it was absurd to maintain it. ‘I think this is
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becoming the majority feeling in Europe and, in the next few months, I think the matter will
be settled, at the European Union level.’256
February 2005 marked the visit of both Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and
President George W. Bush to Europe. The visit was supposed to help mend fences after the
Iraq crisis and following President Bush’s reelection. The US was strongly opposed to the lift
of the embargo. The visits were a good opportunity for French officials once again publicly
to call for the lift. The French minister of Defense, Michelle Alliot Marie, in an interview
with ‘The Financial Times’, before a trip to the US to try to persuade the US partners, stated
that since China’s domestic military industry will be capable of producing ‘exactly the same
arms’ that France has within five years, maintaining the embargo is pointless and ‘lifting it
could be better protection for us than maintaining it.’257 President Chirac also took into
account US concerns by beefing up security guarantees. 258 The Head of State always worded
it in a way that Europe intends to lift the ban, not just France: “Vis-a-vis China, Europe
intends to lift the last obstacles to its relations with this great power of the 21st century, in a
spirit of responsibility and transparence with its allies’’259Mr. Chirac called China “a
strategic partner” of the European Union and the arms embargo “unjustifiable”. President
Chirac pledged that the embargo would be lifted in such a way that both Europe and the
United States could be assured that the strategic balance would be preserved.260
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The EU summit in Brussels on March 22-24, 2005, showed a shift of the coalition.
The embargo issue was not on the formal agenda for the two-day EU, but the issue was
discussed in private sessions and at news conferences.261 France and Germany used the EU
summit to reassert their credentials as the leading proponents of lifting the embargo. ‘There
is no reason to think that there has been a change in this area,” said Chirac, the French
president.262 While Chirac remained committed to resuming weapons sales, EU officials said
the leaders of Britain and several other European countries were backing away from making
an immediate decision. The EU consensus had fallen apart under increasing pressure from
the United States, a new Chinese threat to Taiwan, and intensified criticism at home from the
opposition socialist party and the media. French officials believed that the UK had used the
controversy over China’s anti-secession law as a pretext for meeting US demands.263 EU
leaders, however, emphasized that they still wanted to lift the bloc’s arms embargo on China,
while avoiding giving any guarantees on when the controversial move would take place. At
the end of the summit, the prospect of a lift of the embargo during the first half of the year, as
once planned, seemed out of reach.
Following this failure, the French politicians did not give up. April saw more
lobbying from the French to win over reluctant partners. When on the road, Michel Barnier,
Minister for Foreign Affairs, always brought up the issue either with his counterparts or
during press conferences. In April, Barnier publicly stressed the importance of Europe's
burgeoning relationship with China, hoping to see the EU return to the issue in June. "We
will continue to work for a lifting of the ban. It is an important element in our relations with
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China.264" A few days later, Barnier met with Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moller to
discuss several issues, including the lift of the arms embargo. On the eve of a visit to
Washington, Barnier made the argument that the EU had a different understanding of the
way in which China was evolving on the international stage.” There is a real, fundamental
difference of perception that we have about China on both sides of the Atlantic, and it gets
back to the classic argument that one cannot treat China like Zimbabwe."265 The US
opposition had a déjà vu reminiscent of the rift caused by the invasion of Iraq, with Barnier
in the front line rebuffing US criticisms of the European Union's plans to lift its arms
embargo on China saying that "warnings or threats" were not "useful" at a time when both
sides were trying to improve transatlantic relations.
The French had two difficulties to overcome: not only did they have to win the
argument within the EU but they also needed to deliver the lift to the Chinese. As mentioned
earlier, the issue was brought up at every Franco-Sino bilateral meeting. During those
meetings, government officials needed to remind the Chinese of their commitment to this
issue and their dedication to succeed. Such commitment also contributed towards furthering
the trade relationship. On a visit to China to sign commercial deals, including the purchase of
four Airbus super jumbos worth of $4Bn, Prime Minister Raffarin reaffirmed to Chinese
Premier Wen Jiabao his support for the lift. Raffarin characterized the embargo as
“anachronistic, wrongfully discriminatory and in complete contradiction of the current state
of the strategic partnership between Europe and China”266. France seemed to lose patience
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over the non-resolution of the issue; Premier Raffarin’s words showed certain astonishment
in the slowness of the process: “France continues to require the lifting of the embargo and
does not see what could lead the European Council to change its position on the subject”267
The French suffered a severe blow to their credibility as an EU leader in the fiasco of
the French population’s rejection of the EU Constitution project through a referendum in
May 2005. There was a vacancy of leadership in the weeks following this astonishing defeat
when diplomats and the military were waiting for the instructions from the President on the
topic. Some personnel was also starting having second thoughts. At the Defense ministry,
there was the feeling that persisting in that direction was not such a good idea. The US could
set some retaliatory measures against French manufacturers (major and middle sized
ones).268The situation with Germany and Britain also evolved: Chancellor Schröder was
getting involved with the general elections, Premier Blair, before the European Parliament,
on June 23, 2005, did not mention the issue and did not seem willing to deal with it either
during upcoming Britain EU presidency (second semester 2005).
December 2005 saw the first visit of Wen Jiabao to France as Prime Minister. It
concluded an exceptional series of exchanges between both countries. Two thousand and
four was the year of China in France and 2005 was the year of France in China. Both visits of
President Chirac in China and President Hu in France contributed to the launch of the
strategic partnership between the two countries. The strategic partnership certainly helped to
deepen the political dialogue and further cooperation in several domains. The visit was a new
chance to renew the call for a lift of the embargo. Prime Minister Villepin stated that
France’s position was well known and had not changed. ‘We consider the arms embargo an
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anachronism and that it doesn’t reflect the real state of relations between China and the
international community…We will continue to work for it to be lifted.’269 France was,
however, more isolated on the EU stage since Britain disengaged from the debate and that
there was new leadership in Germany that was not so sympathetic to French views on the
issue. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Philippe Douste-Blazy, detailed again the French
position in a press conference and recognized the difficulties to further a strategic partnership
on the one hand and to maintain an arms embargo on the other. The French case rested on the
conclusions adopted by the European Council in December 2004. There was not so much
optimism on the issue, however, even if France wished to continue working on this question
in order to reach a European decision despite the difficulties. The important point that
France constantly repeated, as mentioned in the conclusions of the European Council, was
that a lift would not lead to an increase in arms exports to China, quantitatively nor
qualitatively. This was stressed repeatedly both at the national level, through the French
interministerial committee on the exports of sensitive materials, and at the European level in
the European Code of Conduct which defined a number of principles and then an addendum
added to the Code of Conduct for countries emerging from the embargo. Douste-Blazy
summed up the argument by saying that there was above all a political will to lift the
embargo which does not reflect the real state of relations between China and the international
community, but at the same time a responsible attitude in not increasing increase arms
exports by maintaining very strict control over these exports. ‘270
The issue was not brought up again until the ninth China-European Union summit in
September 2006, when the Chinese Premier received a pledge that Europe would continue
269
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efforts towards lifting the embargo. One month later, French President Chirac declared his
opposition to the embargo in a joint communiqué: “The moment has come for the EU to
make the most of the expanding partnership between the EU and China, most notably by
lifting the arms embargo which is no longer pertinent to the present situation.”271
A couple of months later, at the External Relations Council on December 11, 2006
France linked the lifting of the arms embargo with an update of the European code of
conduct, recalling that it had been decided to update the European Code of Conduct in order
to put an end to the sanctions against China. Catherine Colonna, the Minister for European
Affairs insisted that the Code could not be adopted until the embargo had been lifted. At this
meeting, a large majority of member states were still opposed to lifting the embargo. 272
Two thousand and seven saw a vacancy in the champions of the lift and gave a coup
de grâce to the initiative. Following Chancellor Schröder’s departure from office, President
Chirac ended his term in May and did not seek reelection. His potential replacements on the
French side publicly declared their opposition to the lift273. These contrasted to the repeated
calls once again by Minister Alliot-Marie on a final trip to Asia. The new team in Germany
also publicly opposed the lift through the voice of the new Defense Minister Jung on a visit
to Japan. When Nicolas Sarkozy took office, the official position from the French diplomacy
was the same as under Chirac except that the issue is no longer a priority274.
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4.5

Goodness of Fit
The Cowles, Risse and Caporaso theoretical model aims at explaining adaptation or

convergence275. The model does look into the presence or absence of mediating factors to
predict whether reform is going to take place and how much domestic change adjusting to
Europeanization should be expected.

Based on Cowles Risse and Caporaso original

mediating factors, the questionnaire and the response of France to the EU China policy, I
identified the following factors: veto points, the country’s organizational and policymaking
culture, the human rights issue, the trade issue and the empowerment of external actors. At
this stage, we already established that there was no mismatch between EU policy and French
policy on the embargo policy and that French and EU policies converged. However, in the
end of the day, the lift did not go through and it is interesting to review those mediating
factors to understand the goodness of fit between French and EU aspirations, but the
mismatch with other member states.
The existence of ‘veto points’ in the domestic structure has been identified as a major
factor preventing structural adaptation276. The more power is dispersed across the political
system and the more actors have a say in political decision making, the more difficult is to
foster the domestic consensus or ‘winning coalition’ necessary to introduce institutional
changes in response to Europeanization pressures. In the case of the lift of the arms embargo,
the French lobbying was led by the Presidency and the government. There is in the French
system a traditional division of labor where the Presidency is the main agenda-setter and
decision-maker in foreign policy, and the government mostly in charge of domestic politics.
The dynamic of the initiative was successful because the agenda was exclusively controlled
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by the Presidency and not really questioned within the political framework. The initiative did
however fail and did not reach the necessary majority to go through at the EU level. The veto
points become then the other member states who blocked the initiative in the European
Council.
‘The country’s organizational and policymaking cultures’, seen as a third mediating
factor, also affects whether domestic actors can use adaptation pressures emanating from
Europeanization to induce structural change. A culture based on consensus, for example,
would overcome veto points. The French organizational and policymaking cultures favored a
pro-Chinese policy but did not serve it well vis-a-vis its partners. Gaullist France has been
historically close to the PRC since the beginnings: President de Gaulle was the one who first
recognized the PRC in 1964. When the Gaullist party won by a large majority in the
parliamentary election in 1993, there was quite a reversal on China policy and a much more
favorable attitude vis-a-vis the PRC, considering the tougher stance under Socialist President
Mitterrand (including the setup of the embargo following the Tiananmen Square massacre).
President Chirac gave his full attention to the relationship with the PRC as soon as he was
elected in 1995 and had been cultivating ties with the Chinese leadership in his precedent
positions. President Chirac’s conception of a multipolar world implied that China be treated
as a peer with its own political and democratic values, with no expectation to follow a
Western society model. The French political culture and conception of China’s role however
did not necessarily match its partners’. There is traditionally a wide range of opinions within
EU members when it comes to the relationship with China because it is a multiple-faceted
one. In terms of the Franco-Chinese relationship, President Chirac had emphasized a
partnership with China based on the economic potential but also for geopolitical reasons.
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Both China and France agreed on the concept of multipolarity to constrain US influence
through the establishment of alternatives poles of power. Their joint opposition to the 2003
Iraq War strengthened their ties, and President Chirac was often seen as the most proChinese among European leaders. For some other Europeans, China is a huge threat because
it does not comply with social and environmental criteria, intellectual property rights, and of
course human rights. “The very positive point of view of Chirac did not suffice to convince
the other Europeans to reach a consensus” according to French former Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Hubert Védrine. Védrine estimated that the idea of a strategic partnership was mostly
words and premature, and translated more as aspirations than anything else. A partnership
had been signed but that did not prevent China from increasing its military spending. A
consulting mechanism to discuss these questions was essential to set up, but China can
certainly not be called as a partner yet.277
The stance on human rights was a key factor to determine whether a country would
follow the EU policy. The issue separated the pros and cons of a closer relationship with the
PRC and ultimately of a lift of the embargo. The French could not obtain consensus within
their partners, despite numerous attempts to distinguish between the embargo and the human
rights issues. To French diplomacy, these were not questions of the same order. When
questioned on the topic, the French leadership always asserted its commitment to the defense
of human rights. Chirac, during his visit in China, even called it as a “personal point of
pride”. The French were probably not as confrontational as other European powers on the
issue, and they believed that it helped them in deepening their relationship with China.
France was always encouraged by small steps in the right direction rather than look at a
grimmer general situation. President Chirac much appreciated the fact that it was at the
277
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French National Assembly that President Hu Jintao chose to elaborate on his ideas about the
development of human rights in China. “It was a very strong gesture by this great old nation
of China, whose culture is different from ours and where any developments naturally take
time”. Likewise, France was truly pleased to see that China included the recognition of
human rights in her Constitution. From this point of view, the cooperation initiated between
specialists in French and Chinese law – French legal experts, professors and technical experts
working constantly with their Chinese colleagues to draw up legislation, reforms, codes –was
by far the most positive way of moving forward. The French leadership always believed that
it was through dialogue, certainly not confrontation, that changes which ‘seem desirable for
tomorrow’s world” would occur.278 The embargo was a political question related to the state
of relations between China and the international community, and then there was the issue of
human rights, but that separation was invisible to the most of the EU members. Chirac’s
approach to human rights in China was pragmatic and accommodated the Chinese
government for cultural relativism.279
The trade motivation is essential to understand why France would respond positively
to further Europeanization of China policy. Despite a strong showing in the armament market
at the time_ French export licenses for armament to China were valued at $228 million in
2003, the most of any member country, and up from $140 million in 2002_
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the French

economic presence was still lagging behind Britain and Germany. Three sets of factors
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explained this lackluster performance. First, traditionally, attempts to increase economic
presence were driven by large scale ‘grands contrats’ signed by the French and Chinese
governments. The French had failed to coax small and medium sized enterprises. Unlike their
British and German counterparts, French businesses were unconvinced of making China a
priority in their strategy281. France’s Foreign Ministry qualified the trade relationship as
‘modest and imbalanced’. French companies only supplied 1.4% of Chinese imports, and the
share had shrunk in recent years. The trade deficit with China had been France’s largest
deficit. Second, French economic initiatives in China tended to shadow policies spearheaded
by Germany and to a lesser extent Britain and the European Commission. French
governments made a strong political push to catch up with the Germans and tried copying the
German model of strong political and economic relations with China. That might explain this
unexpected common Franco-German front on the issue of the embargo. Unlike in Germany,
however, the social effects of French companies relocations, and human rights questions
championed by the French intelligentsia, prevented large scale transfer of French production
to China. Third, French economic policies were hamstrung by domestic politics and
competing industrial interests. This is no doubt true of French economic strategies in the rest
of Asia, but they were worsened in the case of China as a result of especially strong pressures
on French government exerted by high-tech military industries, which found a lucrative
market in Taiwan, and the demands of aerospace, infrastructure and communication
industries, which found in China their most important potential market.282
Fourth,

the ‘differential empowerment of external actors and learning’ mattered,

whereas Cowles, Caporaso and Risse considered the domestic level only. Structural changes
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lead to a redistribution of power capacities among the relevant actors with interests in this
policy. The possibility of the lift empowered first the USA who strongly opposed the
initiative. The general context was certainly not favorable to a lift,283 especially based on the
nature of the transatlantic relationship at that time due to the Iraq issue. The American
misgiving towards the proposed lifting of the embargo had been well known in official
circles ever since France and Germany started the process in late 2003, but it blew up to a
major crisis between the US and Europe in February 2005, on the eve of the official visits to
Europe by Secretary of State Rice and President Bush. The explosion should be blamed
squarely to the appalling ineptitude and inefficiency of the respective bureaucracies and
diplomacies, which could have seen the approaching storm well in advance and navigate
their political authorities well clear of it.284 The American reaction was also rather emotional,
preferring threats over a rational analysis of the issues. The Chinese diplomacy also lacked
finesse and turned out to be counterproductive, giving extra ammunition to the opponents285.
The potential rift was too reminiscent of the Iraq crisis and created cracks in the coalition.
The U.S. opposition rested on two arguments. On the one hand, Congress feared that
American soldiers serving in the region might one day find themselves facing European
weaponry in a showdown over Taiwan, while on the other, there was the fear that American
technology or weaponry sold to Europe could leak out and end up again facing American
forces in the Asia Pacific region. In February 2005, the U.S. House of Representatives
adopted a resolution stating that it deplored increased E.U. sales and moves to lift the
embargo, and declaring that those moves “place European security policy in direct conflict
with U.S. security interests.” The resolution, which passed by a vote of 411-3, further warned
283
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that, if Europe did not change course, the Congress would have to consider “limitations and
constraints” on transatlantic defense-industrial ties. Britain looked at their commercial
interests and cooperation programs and would rapidly abandon the ship. But even within the
French armament industry, some officials were sympathetic to the Bush administration’s
concern about the transfer of technology to China. Most of the European defense firms that
were doing business with the Pentagon would lose more than they would gain from selling to
the Chinese.
The Chinese also involuntarily tanked the initiative when the March 2005 session of
the National People’s Congress passed the China’s new anti-secession law. The law certainly
called for peaceful solutions to the Taiwan question. But it also included a ‘trigger
mechanism’ that would lead to the use of military force if Taiwan took steps towards
independence. The British Foreign Minister at the time warned that the law created a
‘difficult political environment’ while his German counterpart Joschka Fisher talked about a
setback in EU-China relations286. It fueled the US rhetoric that arming China would have
serious consequences for the cross-strait security of the island. The US had been instrumental
in building Taiwan’s defense and was committed to defending it in case of an attack.
Geopolitically, the US was also opposed to see China challenge the distribution of power in a
region that the U.S. currently controls with an accompanying fear that

the effects of a

potential realignment could occur around the world.’287
There was no mismatch between France and the EU when it came to a policy to lift
the arms embargo. The French weapons export system was compliant and well regulated.
France had been a pace-setter in China policy for years and the lift of the embargo followed
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that trend. The French leadership was a key actor in setting the agenda for a EU policy, as the
successful outcome of the 2004 The Hague summit showed. Germany

was

also a heavy

weight in the debate as well as some other member states (Italy and Spain) but not to the
extent of France, and this partly due to the personal commitment of President Chirac.
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There was more of a mismatch between the French and other member states’ aspirations. The
failure of the initiative was not an issue of effectiveness on the account of the French or the
EU, but more of timing, sensitivity and some clumsiness on the part of the Chinese
diplomacy. The context prevented a prompt resolution due to a fragile transatlantic
relationship, an unconvincing human rights record, and the antisecession law on Taiwan.
France was certainly effective in the way the government used every possible means to
communicate about the benefit of lifting the embargo: press conferences at bilateral
meetings, interviews, agenda-setting in EU meetings (at the Council level and COREPER).
Indeed, the initial discussions took place in December 2003 and went on for almost three
years without a clear resolution even if it got close to reaching a consensus in several
instances. A drawn-out process harmed the French and the Germans, who originally wanted
the EU to take action before the 2004 March entrance of ten new members289. France
probably promised the Chinese that the lift would not be an issue and that it would easily
convince its partners, but France did not have the expected influence on the outcomes.
France’s credibility suffered and showed the Chinese that France did not have the leadership
and expected influence within the European Union.
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hesitations from undecided members but also suffered several blows. The anti-Taiwan
secession law and the swift and vigorous American campaign crippled the initiative in the
Spring 2005291. By March 2005, most of the members were having second thoughts about
ending the embargo by June as initially planned and a loyal US ally, the United Kingdom,
would not put the issue on the agenda for their presidency in the second half of the year.
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Chapter 4
The influence of Britain

4.0

Introduction

Among the three European States, Britain probably has the most developed
and extensive ties with China. Britain was in disagreement with the US isolation
policy of the PRC between 1949 and 1971 and was the first Western country to
recognize the PRC in 1950 (although ambassadors were not exchanged until March
1972292. In the UK’s relationship with China, the colonial past in the form of Hong
Kong-still looms large. The ‘other elephant in the room’ is the US: London’s close
ties with Washington have at times complicated its relationship with China. The issue
of the embargo is a perfect illustration: the UK initially supported the Franco-German
initiative but started delaying it when US opposition emerged. I argue there is a not
necessarily a mismatch between the UK and the EU China policy but more a lack of
consistency. The UK would have had the means to comply with the ban but,
politically, switched its mind: the UK was a fence-sitter, then a follower and then a
foot dragger on the issue by taking the lead on delaying the initiative. Just as for
France and Germany, we will review first UK-PRC relations and the track record of
the Europeanization of UK China policy, then examine the reasoning of the British
diplomacy in the issue of the embargo before we examine the specific response and
finally analyze the goodness of fit between EU and China policy.
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4.1

Relations with the PRC and Track record of the Europeanization of UK-

China policy
Hong Kong was historically the most important political issue between London
and Beijing. The return of Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty dominated the bilateral
relations between 1979 and 1997. The Joint Declaration on the question of Hong
Kong signed by the two governments on 19 December 1984 ushered in a period of
sound development in Sino-British relations, as evidenced by important two-way
visits and many agreements signed for cooperation in various fields293. However, the
fallout from the Tiananmen incident and the appointment of a British activist
governor, Chris Patten, in Hong Kong in 1992, disrupted smooth relations otherwise.
Following the 1997 handover, the relationship improved since the UK294 received
guarantees from China that Hong Kong would keep a large degree of autonomy and a
high level of democratic freedom under the ‘one country, two systems’ principle, as a
Special Administrative Unit. The UK watched closely developments in Hong Kong
despite an increased EU involvement in China-UK relations295: the future of Hong
Kong has increasingly become a EU issue rather than solely a member state one.
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But the British often criticize China for the state of the democracy in Hong Kong,
which resulted in heated exchanges in 2004. To this day, every semester, the British
Foreign Office sends update to the British Parliament and every time, the Chinese
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protest it is an interference in their internal affairs297. The British worked hard to win
assurances from China that basic democratic freedoms and rights would be respected
after Hong Kong was transferred to Chinese sovereignty in July 1997.
While the UK government is still more likely to speak out about democratic
shortcomings in Hong Kong than one other EU governments, it does not make too
much of an issue about human rights in China. The foreign office website states that
‘the human rights situation in China continues to be a matter of serious concern” and
it expresses particular concern about the treatment of Falun Gong members (a small
handful of whom set up a permanent vigil outside the Chinese embassy in London.)
But when Premier Blair visited with his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao in May
2004, human rights were not included in the agenda. In its political dialogue with
China, the UK has been trying to engage Beijing specifically on African
development, climate change, and non-proliferation.298
It seemed that ensuring a good relationship with the Chinese partner was a
priority in the Blair years, 1997 through 2007. Under Blair’s leadership, there was a
significant effort to deepen the relationship between these countries through regular
consultation and exchange at the leadership level. A comprehensive agreement was
signed between prime ministers Zhu and Blair in 1998 to intensify their political and
military dialogues and to work together towards a more peaceful and secure world. In
October 2003, Chinese Vice-Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo met with William
Geoffrey Eheman, director general of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office
and pledged efforts to develop a "comprehensive strategic partnership" to benefit
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both countries. The goal of such a partnership was to establish a consultation
mechanism on strategic security conducive to exchanges and cooperation in security
and arms control and, ultimately, to promote bilateral relations.299
A year later, at a 2004 December UK -China summit in London, both
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao and British Prime Minister Tony Blair reaffirmed their
ties and their common interests in working together on bilateral, multilateral, and
global issues and also pledged to develop a "comprehensive strategic partnership". At
the time, both countries saw the relationship as a top international priority. Progress
had been made since the original discussions in 2003 with the establishment of task
forces, aimed at stepping up the development of bilateral relations, which had
produced new proposals in trade and investment, finance, energy, education, science
and technology, environment and sustainable development during a Blair visit to
China in July 2004. In order to consolidate the bilateral relationship and to reinforce
and extend political co-operation in fields such as strategic security and nonproliferation, both leaderships agreed to step up the exchange of annual visits. For
instance, the UK was pleased with the leadership role taken on by China in the SixParty Talks on Korea. At the same summit, both governments also agreed to stick to
the "One Country, Two Systems" principle and the Basic Law concerning Hong
Kong and Taiwan. The UK’s position on Taiwan had been consistent since the ChinaUK Communiqué of 1972, in which the UK acknowledged that Taiwan was a
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province of the People's Republic of China and recognized the Government of the
People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China," 300
As for France and Germany, trade had also been an important issue that
influenced the British approach. In terms of trade with China, the UK ranked behind
Germany, some way behind the Netherlands, and about the same as France. In 2004,
the UK imported four times more from China than it exported there (£10.6 vs. 2.4
billion). The UK remained however one of the most important foreign investors in
China ($19 billion) at the end of 2002.301 It has been even argued in the literature that
the key actors in UK-China relations since 1997 are non-state economic ones. In
developing a framework for relations with China since 1997, official UK policy
towards China has had two main aims: to develop commercial opportunities for UK
companies and to promote 'positive' social and political change in China302.

In

theory, economic engagement should create a dense network of transnational
interactions that would generate political change in China as it becomes deeply
enmeshed in the global economy. In order to achieve this goal, the UK government
has transferred much of the power from traditional diplomatic agencies to
governmental economic agencies. More important, individual companies, whilst
pursuing their own commercial activities, are effectively carrying out government
policy in relation to China. Thus, the key actors in post-diplomatic relations with
China are increasingly non-state economic actors303.
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The aftermath of the case of the embargo is an example of an ambivalent
British leadership: was Britain totally innocent in trying to clarify the scope of the
embargo or was it purely based on trade appeal? The UK was the first one to give a
clarification of its interpretation of the arms embargo.

304

The manner in which the

embargo has been interpreted at the state level had always been less than full scope,
because the EU embargo was not legally binding, each member state had been free to
interpret its scope differently. In June 1995, under the Major administration, the UK
decided to enforce an embargo on the sale to China of “weapons, and equipment
which could be used for internal repression”305. The UK then identified the kinds of
items for which licenses would be denied, including the following categories: lethal
weapons such as machine guns, large calibers weapons, bombs, torpedoes, rockets
and missiles; specially designed components of the above, and ammunition; military
aircraft and helicopters, vessels of war, armored fighting vehicles and other such
platforms: any equipment likely to be used for internal repression.
The 1998 Code of Conduct introduced by Robin Cook, the British foreign
Secretary was part of the Labour government's "ethical foreign policy"306. The Code
of Conduct prohibited EU partners from selling arms to countries that may use them
for internal repression, in places where there have been serious human rights
violations, and for provoking or prolonging conflicts.307 The UK would not permit the
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export of goods “if there was a clear risk that they could be used for..external
repression or to introduce new capabilities in the region”.308
While the UK blocked the transfer of lethal items and major weapon
platforms, license applications to export other defense articles and services as well as
dual-use goods and technologies intended for military applications were considered
on a case-by-case basis against the CoC criteria309. Under this policy, the UK export
control authorities approved exports of equipment which could serve commercial as
well as military purposes.310 Britain’s interpretation of the embargo would not extend
to avionics and radars.311The UK has reportedly supplied China Rcal / Thales
Skymaster airborne early warning radars and Spey jet engines for the Chinese JH-7
fighter bombers, Searchwater, an airborne early warning radar system, which is
produced in the UK, while the University of Surrey has cooperated with China in
micro-satellite technology that could be used in anti-satellite weapons. 312,313. France,
Italy and the UK continued to be the leading arms exporters to China whereas other
EU states interpreted the embargo more strictly. In 2002, the UK sold arms to China
worth of 79.5 million Euros out of a total for the EU of 209.8 and in 2003, 112.46
million Euros out of a total of 461.2 millions314
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4.2

Reasoning of the British Diplomacy

In the next two sections, I will present the position of the British diplomacy and establish the
British response to the Europeanization of the China policy.. As I mentioned in our
methodology chapter, I contacted representatives from the executive and legislative branches,
based on the timeline but also sometimes though recommendations and obtained eight
positive responses. (See APPENDIX).
The reasoning of British diplomacy used French and German arguments but
also developed its own. Similar to the French position, the UK believed that China
could not be treated the same as Zimbabwe and Burma since China was an important
partner. Technically, the embargo did not have the force of law, unlike EU embargoes
on Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burma, Zimbabwe and Bosnia315.
The embargo was obsolete and ineffective because of the noncompliance issue and
also based on the fact that the EU Code of Conduct governing arms exports was a
better instrument for arms control than the current ban. Like the Germans, the British
argued that since the CoC would stop arms transfers anyway, a review of the embargo
should take place. But mainly, the British were more interested in modernizing the
embargo rather than removing it and did show some sensitivity to possible US
reactions to the process316 The reinforcement of the Code of Conduct became the key
argument of the British diplomacy. EU experts agreed to a series of steps to
strengthen the code, as well as special transitional measures to increase transparency
about arms sales to countries previously the subject of embargoes. Among the
changes were controls on the resale of arms, as well as on software that could be used
315
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for weapons. The two outstanding decisions concerned whether to make the code
legally binding and the duration of the transitional regime.317
In early January 2005, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw told a Commons Select
committee on Human Rights that the embargo was likely to be lifted in the following
six months, despite his personal concerns on human rights and US objections. Straw
thought that it was wrong to put China under the same embargo as countries such as
Zimbabwe and Burma. Straw testified before the Joint Committee on Strategic Export
Controls” "I have long understood China's argument, that to lump them in with, say,
Burma and Zimbabwe is not appropriate and I don't think it is,". At the time, Straw
foresaw a likely lift of the ban before the beginning of the British presidency of the
EU in July 2005. The point of view of Britain was that a strengthened EU Code of
Conduct would prevent an increase in the number of arms being exported to China
and that the arms control regime would be as effective as it was at the time. The
embargo did not cover the sort of high-tech defense equipment that the Chinese
military was seeking to acquire. Export of those technologies was controlled by the
EU Code of Conduct (COC) on conventional arms, which is the primary means of
controlling arms sales. Since May 2004, the COC has had the status of binding
statutory guidance in the United Kingdom under EU law. All United Kingdom export
licenses were considered strictly on a case-by-case basis against the COC’s criteria
and the United Kingdom would not permit the export of goods if there was a clear
risk that they could be used for internal repression, external aggression or to introduce
new capabilities into the region. The United Kingdom did take very seriously the
concerns that the United States government had about the effectiveness of the EU’s
317
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system of arms control and shared the aspiration for continued stability in the East
Asian region.318
British diplomacy clearly pushed for an upgrade of the Code of Conduct.
British diplomats believed that the arms embargo was clearly ineffective in
preventing arms sales to China and that a revamped Code of Conduct would take care
of the transparency issue. In the UK, more export licenses were refused under the
existing European Union arms code than under the embargo. The new Code of
Conduct, which was also non-binding, had almost been agreed the year before and
included provisions on arms-brokering and intangible transfers of technology319 "The
code of conduct is much more effective, it's a more powerful tool of and we intend to
strengthen it as a pre-condition of lifting the embargo with China," mentioned Straw.
320

Mr. Straw believed that many of the objections from the US, a major opponent to

the lift, were based on a "lack of information and understanding" of how export
control guidelines worked in EU countries.321The only reason why the new Code of
Conduct not formally approved was because the UK wanted to wait until a
transitional post-embargo export regime for China, which was also almost ready. 322
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4.3

British Response to the Europeanization of China policy: the case of the

arms embargo

Britain never opposed the principle as long as the Code of Conduct was
reinforced, that the situation on human rights was improving, and that the timing was
right. The US knew they could pressure the UK to oppose the lift. In the beginning of
2004, the UK was slightly reluctant to nail its colors to the mast and just wanted to
ensure to ‘get the policy and the timing right’. There was agreement that the embargo
needed to be reviewed but that was as far as British diplomacy would go for the
present.

323

The possible British interest to lift the embargo raised some concerns in

the Bush administration as early as April 2004. The administration expected Britain
to block the initiative and was alarmed by the fact that, to the contrary, they supported
a review of the lift. The US expressed unease at what it viewed as Britain's
equivocation.324 In September 2004, Britain was still cautious. At the time, EU
officials estimated that 16 out of 25 member states favored lifting the embargo (led by
France, Italy, Spain and Germany), while Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Ireland,
Portugal, Poland and perhaps the Czech Republic opposed lifting it. The UK and the
Netherlands were the most watched countries since their impetus might tip the scale
in favor or against the decision. For Britain, it was due to its prestige and influence,
for the Dutch, it was due to the fact they were scheduled to hold the rotating
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presidency of the EU in the second half of 2004325 and therefore become agendasetters on behalf of the EU.
During the lead-up to the European Council meeting in June 2004, signals
were increasingly coming from the UK that they were in favor of a removal of the
embargo but wanted to postpone the decision until after the US Presidential elections
later in 2004.The UK insisted on two key arguments before moving forward.

The

EU Code of Conduct on arms exports needed to be upgraded and improvements to
China's record on human rights had to be noticeable. "We are not in any sense against
the lifting of the embargo, but it has got to be done in a proper and sensible way… As
agreed by the whole of the EU," declared Jack Straw, the British Foreign Secretary at
the time. At a private lunchtime discussion with other ministers, he added it was
"likely" that most of the arms exports currently prohibited by the embargo would be
caught by the Code of Conduct.326
The human rights situation was an obstacle to going forward. An influential
report by Britain's Foreign Office published in the fall voiced "serious concerns"
about China's record on human rights. The report supported the British argument that
improvements on China’s human rights were necessary, but in the light of those
announcements, Mr. Straw sidestepped questions at a press conference on whether he
wanted the embargo lifted, saying it was under EU discussion.327
But the most vibrant opposition came from the US. Once the Hague European
Council summit decided to review the lift, the US started applying greater pressure on
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their British ally. The US began threatening to withhold military technology
considered crucial to the health of the UK defense industry followed by an expected
powerful reaction, particularly in Congress, if the embargo were to be removed.
Defense officials said that the most likely reaction would be a withdrawal of Bush
administration backing for new measures to improve military technology transfers to
European allies and acknowledged that recent efforts made to widen and deepen
transatlantic defense industrial trade were going to be circumscribed. The
consequences for the British military could have been significant due to its close ties
with the American defense sector: BAE Systems and Rolls-Royce happened to be the
biggest Pentagon suppliers. In September 2004, Britain had also won congressional
backing for special preferred status when applying to gain access to US military
technologies, a status that could have been rescinded. Facing those possible sanctions,
the UK decided to mount a diplomatic offensive aimed at convincing Washington that
lifting the embargo would not lead to a flood of new exports to Beijing. The effort
included a three-person UK mission to Washington to explain the British rationale
and was part of an effort to take account of a variety of views and ensure important
concerns were considered. The standoff had once again put the UK in the awkward
role of transatlantic intermediary, a reminder of the Iraqi crisis. British officials
argued that US backing for a transparent export control regime would stymie French
efforts to make weapons sales more opaque. Discussions with US State Department
officials and National Security Council regarding the upgrade of the Code of Conduct
certainly helped but the strongest opposition came from the Department of Defense,
where top officials believed China would use European technologies to upgrade
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capabilities along the Taiwan straits.328Pentagon opponents said the UK-backed
measures were inadequate, and criticized the British for siding with the Europeans on
this issue.
However, despite the tensions with the US on the issue, the British
government was officially on board in early January 2005. UK Foreign Secretary,
Jack Straw told a parliamentary committee that it was "more likely than not" that the
lifting of the 15-year-old embargo would happen before the end of the current
Luxembourg presidency (June 2005), that “intense discussions" were taking place
with US officials to convince them it was the right thing to do,

329

and that London,

Brussels and Washington would have to "manage those differences" in the next few
months.”330
Straw acknowledged that the US had a "legitimate and understandable"
interest in the effectiveness of European arms control practices and reiterated that a
revision of the current EU Code of Conduct would prevent either a qualitative or
quantitative increase in the number of arms exported to China.331 An upgraded regime
would be "stronger than the embargo because it would have force of law and would
ensure transparency among EU partners not just on denials but also approvals".332 To
Straw, the arms embargo was merely a presentational problem and that many of
Washington's objections were based on a "lack of information and understanding" of
328
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how export control guidelines worked in EU countries.

333

According to Straw, the

Americans had not yet understood that the cure could be better than the current state
of affairs.334
Britain which had shared US reservations about lifting the embargo, had
finally gotten on board and was determined that British business should not lose
out.335On an official visit to China in January 2005, Straw was expected to push
commercial interests and to assure the Chinese of British support to ending the arms
embargo on China, in addition to discuss Hong Kong and China's part in the talks on
North Korea”336 . A month later, Gordon Brown, UK Chancellor of the Exchequer
,also publicly supported the lift. 337
However, opposition to the British stance was not only felt in the US but also
on the domestic stage. There was debate on the floor of the House of Commons
questioning the ethical basis for removing the ban in the face of China's poor human
rights record and its missile deployment targeting Taiwan. A Commons' Foreign
Affairs committee in March 2005 said the Chinese should first give "strong
undertakings" to address human rights concerns before any change of policy was
implemented: "The raising of the EU arms embargo on China would send the wrong
signal at this time, in the absence of strong undertakings from the Chinese
government to address human rights issues." A group which drew together MPs from
four Commons select committees concerned with arms sales also raised concerns
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about lifting that embargo. It said such a move threatened "major EU-US trade
repercussions" and that was also a risk "EU member states enhance China's military capacity
in a worrying way" and arms exported from Europe could be used for internal repression or
re-exported to the world arms market”.

338

The MPS wanted a guarantee from European

Union member states that there would be no increase in arms exports to China if the EU's
arms embargo were lifted, The group report warned of "major EU-US trade repercussions"
from an arms export drive to China. The committee was also critical of government cuts to
the Export Control Organization, which assesses applications to export weapons and
technology.339 Leaders of human rights organizations charged the British government

of being forgetful of the Tiananmen Square events. The British Government's
response to this was to assure the opposition that Britain continued to be concerned
about the human rights situation in China and would like to see more progress on this
issue.340
The Opposition Conservative party, through the voice of Shadow Foreign
Secretary Michael Ancram also criticized the move, arguing that it could undermine
NATO as it severely damaged relations with the US and that the British Government
was caving in to French and German pressures. Michael Howard, leader of the
Conservative Party, also spoke out against the move to lift the embargo on arms
exports to China, accusing Prime Minister Blair to appeal to his EU partners at the
expense of Britain's national interests. The Tory leader attacked the Prime Minister
for his "obsession" with the EU, said lifting the embargo could jeopardize British jobs
in the defense industry, and called for the government to adopt an unambiguous
338
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stance on the issue. Howard’s animated message was not necessarily the most
genuine, it was a way to mend fences with the US since he had criticized the Bush
administration on the war on Iraq, but it was still heavily publicized and echoed the
concerns for potential repercussions on the British defense sector.341
The armament industry also started raising concerns. The U.S. campaign to
lift the embargo specifically targeted the suppliers for whom the US was an important
customer. U.S. government officials, as well as Congress, had made clear that
retaliation against European companies would follow if the ban were to be lifted,
changing the contracting and procurement environment in America.342 British
companies were not too keen on upsetting U.S. lawmakers since they had been more
successful in the U.S. defense market than their European counterparts. BAE Systems
CEO Mike Turner stressed at the time that his company would not do anything to
jeopardize its lucrative U.S. business.

343

It is interesting to note however that some

companies favored lifting the embargo on the grounds that it would not alter the
military balance. In a letter to British defense officials, the Society of British
Aerospace Companies, the trade association, argued that the UK was not making any
change to policy with regard to technology transfer to China and was using effective
domestic controls to restrict the export of sensitive technologies. Some of those
companies saw US opposition to the embargo as intended solely to prevent China

341

Newman Cathy “Howard attacks moves to lift China arms ban” The Financial Times, March 31, 2005
Defense Industry Daily, “China Arms Embargo Controversy Will Have Domestic Ripples”, February 28,
2005
343
Ibid p.2
342

130

becoming as much of a military challenge to US predominance in the region as it was
an economic one 344
During the spring, an intense lobbying campaign took place to woo the US
ally. In March 2005, British Ambassador to the U.S. David Manning headed a
delegation to Washington, composed of parliamentary defense committee members
and representatives of the Confederation of British Industry. US interlocutors were
frankly opposed to the policy except for a few legislators including the influential
chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, John W. Warner (R-Va.), who
wanted to avoid another transatlantic rift in the field of defense.345But at the end of
the month, the British diplomacy operated a spectacular 360 degrees turn. On the 20th
of March, Straw declared on TV that human rights problems and the Taiwan issue
become ‘more difficult rather than less difficult’. A spokesman for Premier Blair
added the same week that the anti-secession law that could authorize the use of force
against Taiwan: “Inevitably…soured the atmosphere somewhat”. The leadership still
thought that US objections could be met by a strengthened EU Code of Conduct on
arms sales to third countries. The British government said it continued to support in
principle but had insisted upon updating a code of conduct which would help regulate
the kinds of weapons and technology China would receive. It seemed that at that
moment, the scale was tipping and there were more countries in the anti-lift group
right now than in the pro-lift group.346
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From that point on, the UK reallocated its resources to convince its European
partners, starting with Italy, to postpone the lift, possibly until 2006. Straw was now
arguing in front of his colleagues for a postponement in particular to Gianfranco Fini,
his Italian counterpart. Sweden as well as Belgium was also lobbying to delay the
embargo's lifting.347All of British diplomacy was changing its tune, claiming now
that the UK had never been "enthusiastic" about lifting the ban, according to Bill
Rammell, a junior foreign office minister during a visit in Washington. "We have
certainly not been leading the pack on this," he said. Despite the change of heart of
the British, the EU did not budge but recognized that the issue was now more difficult
and more complex, both in substance and as regards the timeline."348 Christina
Gallach, spokesperson for High Representative Solana also declared that the EU
position had not changed but added that the anti-secession law made the process of
decision-making more complex. In terms of human rights, the EU had hoped for a
gesture by Beijing in this area, such as ratifying the UN’s International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.
France, which had lobbied hardest for the lifting of the embargo, was still
campaigning for a decision by June, but was beginning to realize that a postponement
might be necessary. France suspected that the UK was using the anti-secession law
controversy over China as a ‘pretext’ for meeting the US demands.349But other EU
members with close defense ties to the US were leaning towards a delay beyond the
previously agreed timetable of the first half of this year. The Netherlands, the Czech
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Republic, Scandinavian countries, and Luxembourg are among the countries that
were having second thoughts about lifting the embargo. There was little enthusiasm
for lifting the embargo because of hostile public opinion in these countries, and they
would not be opposed to a lengthy delay. A senior Swedish official said China's
passing of the anti-secession law aimed at Taiwan had changed EU sentiment.”350
Western diplomats did, however, play down suggestions that a decision on lifting the
ban would be delayed until 2006. There was no evidence that the UK government
would seek to shelve discussion on the issue during the presidency of the EU in the
second half of the year. The UK was now a bridge between the French approach and
the US demands. On the EU side, Britain wanted member states to notify Brussels
three months after an export license had been granted. This system would last for 10
years. France wanted a five-year period. The United States was asking for an "early
warning system" to be written into the Code of Conduct. This would mean that
countries intending to sell weapons to China would be required to consult with the
United States. European diplomats agreed that it was difficult to see how a sovereign
state should ask permission from the United States to sell weapons.
Britain also proposed the establishment of a regular strategic dialogue with the
United States over China and the region, which the French supported. The United
States kept applying pressure on Britain in the belief that Blair would use his veto to
stop the embargo from being lifted if the issue was put to the vote among the 25
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member states. Britain, however, claimed that it would not veto any EU decision to
lift the embargo, despite pressure by Congress. 351
The initiative seemed to bear fruit since member states failed to agree at a
European Council on April 7, 2005, in Luxembourg on lifting the embargo. Britain,
the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden wanted to retain the arms embargo because of
China’s shaky human rights record.352 Mr. Solana insisted that the EU still planned to
lift the ban.353 In a series of councils and summits, no mention of the embargo was
made, whether it was in June in a EU Council meeting or at the EU China summit in
September.
In November, during his three-country European tour, President Jintao
brought up the issue again but was told by Premier Blair that the timing was not right,
and he was expected to be told by German Chancellor elect Merkel that she would
reverse her predecessor’s position. Interestingly enough, there were no economic
repercussions for Britain and a series of agreements worth 1.1 billion Euros was
signed.354 The fact that the embargo had moved off the agenda was at the time was a
diplomatic victory for the Americans.355 Britain agreed not to raise the issue during its
current presidency of the EU and the upcoming Austrian presidency agreed to steer
well clear of the issue, emphasizing the lack of progress on human rights.356
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4.4

Goodness of fit
The goal is to evaluate the overall pattern of British institutional responses to

the Europeanization of China policy, the enactment of legal procedures such as the
embargo, the transfer of competences and the creation of norms and identities, in
other words as the emergence of European governance and see which stance the UK
adopted using the Börzel, Falkner et al. and Cowles et al. theories. What is the
goodness of fit or the mismatch between the EU and the UK on China sanction
policy and how did the UK respond to it? Based on Cowles et al original mediating
factors, the questionnaire and the response of UK officials to the EU China policy, I
identified the following factors: veto points, the country’s organizational and
policymaking culture, human rights, the trade issue and the empowerment of external
actors. I argue there is a not necessarily a mismatch between the UK and the EU
China policy but it was not consistent in the case of the lift of the arms embargo. The
UK could have applied the lift since its weapons sales are extremely regulated.
Applying Börzel’s theory, I determine that the UK was a fence-sitter, then a follower
and then a foot-dragger on the issue by taking the lead on delaying the initiative. We
shall review the five mediating factors to explain UK’s adaptation pattern.
The existence of ‘veto points’ in the domestic structure has been identified as
a major factor preventing structural adaptation357. The main veto point on the issue of
the embargo actually came from the defense industry. Since the early 2000s, several
British companies had acquired U.S defense companies. BAE Systems, for example
was at the time the sixth-largest defense contractor in the United States. A number of
U.S companies had holdings in British defense industry, including Raytheon,
357
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Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics. BAE Systems Chief Executive Mike Turner
was the ‘spokesman’ against the lift. BAE business in the US is was valued at more
than £4 Billion. In March 2005, the acquisition of United Defense Technologies of
the US was announced but there were concerns that the issue of the embargo might
lead the US government to block the takeover .To reassure US officials and
lawmakers, Mr. Turner has made clear BAE would not be expanding in China even if
the ban were lifted. And the opposition from British companies also had an impact on
other European multinational armament corporations who had big stakes in the UK
and were seeking to expand in the US such EADS, the Franco-German group, Thales
of France and Finmeccanica of Italy.
‘The country’s organizational and policymaking cultures’ also affects whether
domestic actors can use adaptation pressures emanating from Europeanization to
induce structural change. The decision-making regarding the embargo was affected
by reorganization under the Blair administration and by more structural features of
British foreign policy. Regarding EU matters, the New Labor’s foreign policy was
made through the Prime Minister’s office, the FCO and its relevant ministers, the UK
Permanent Representation (UKREP) in Brussels, the European Secretariat within the
Cabinet Office (Defence and Overseas Policy DOP and the Subcommittee on
European Issues).358 In 2001, Premier Blair took major steps to enhance the role of
Downing Street over both EU policy and foreign policy towards the rest of the world.
He moved two of the Cabinet Office Secretariats (dealing with overseas and security
and with the EU) under the control of his two foreign policy advisors, Sir Stephen
Wall ex head of UKREP and Sir David Manning, ex head of the UK delegation.
358

Williams Paul. “Who’s making UK foreign policy?” International Affairs 80, 5 (2004): 909-919, 915

136

Moving those secretariats under Downing Street authority ratcheted up the role
played by the prime minister in foreign affairs and his ‘presidential style’. At the
same time, it reflected changing patterns in EU policy with the growing number and
importance of EU summits, the growing political link among European political
parties, and the need to address European issues at a central level. The FCO has been
then been sidelined on a number of issues such as the Iraq war, the EU Constitution,
relations with Washington, and the general overall strategy and justifications behind
British foreign policy.359
UK foreign policy had been shaped in large part by a number of aims that had
the potential to be both contradictory and complementary. On one hand, Britain has
been supporting the USA and guaranteed the “special transatlantic relationship”. On
the other, Britain had actively encouraged and engaged in the construction of a
European foreign policy provided that it remained based on the consensual
coordination of the foreign policies of the EU member states.

360

Although British

positions on numerous foreign policy issues show evidence of adaptation to a
European norm, Britain on a number of occasions refused to be bound by European
positions while nevertheless doing its utmost to maintain European solidarity over
issue areas, such as the Middle East, where it calculates that British influence can be
enhanced by collective European action. As a result there can be no clear or
consistent sequence to the process by which Europeanization has occurred361. Allen
and Oliver believe that the nature of CFSP and ESDP makes it possible for national
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foreign policies to show signs of both accommodating and resisting Europeanization
at the same time. There are examples of what has been Europeanized in UK foreign
policy-making: the increasing numbers of staff dealing with CFSP, the increased
sharing of information through the Correspondent European (COREU) network, the
regular meetings of Political Directors and their ambassadorial deputies in Brussels
and the development of the Permanent Political and Security Committee (PSC)362.
However, respondents to the questionnaire and the sequence, of events showed that
the Big Three still were able to control the extent, sequence and pace of the uploading
dimension of Europeanization363, not only in the case of the embargo but in general.
The Anglo-French St Malo declaration was an example of this, representing an
uploading of British and French foreign policy interests. One of the goals was to
further engage Germany on foreign and defense issues by using the framework to
effectively ‘crossload’ foreign policy concerns.’364
The trade motivation was the key factor to predict that, even if in the first
place, the UK was interested in lifting the embargo, it would ultimately abide by the
US position. It stems from a contradiction inherent to every member state. The arms
trade is both the’ fast and slow track’ of Europeanization argues Dover365. Whilst the
European Commission and arms manufacturers are at the forefront of an increasingly
Europeanized arms trade, central governments are concerned with protecting
economic interests that are now anything but state-centered because of the
internationalization of defense industries through mergers, acquisitions and projects.
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The legal arms trade in Britain was viewed by government officials as being a core
function of the state and an indispensable part of the British economy. Moreover, the
legal arms trade has foreign policy implications. The British government’s view was
that they could expand their influence across the world. Sales to Saudi Arabia since
the eighties were justified on the grounds of being able to influence a strategically
important government in the Middle East.366
The UK uploaded its preferences to the supranational level through the
establishment of the European Defence Agency, which provides the EU with an
ability to influence the development of technology and, by inference, the procurement
and sale of these materials. It was no coincidence that the first Chief Executive of the
EDA was British (and a former MOD and FCO official). Arms manufacturers had a
large role in the working groups that designed the EDA: high ranking European
Commission officials sat with representatives of BAE Systems and EADS as well as
the President of the European Defense Industries Group to advice on how the new
institution should operate, providing great access to manufacturers. However, with
this new diplomatic tool came the tension inherent in individual arms programs. How
to promote weapons manufacturers on one hand and make sure that human rights are
respected on the other? The Code of Conduct, aimed at making the trade more
transparent and less open to claims of corruption, was certainly a great safeguard
against questionable deals367. But, the primary concern was not whether China was a
questionable partner, but what other partners might think. That explained how BAE
Systems and other British companies with large interests in the US declared that they
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would not sell military equipment to China regardless of the EU position because
they wanted to keep the US happy. This demonstrated the influence of British arms
manufacturers on state policy-making and the effect on the European stage, with the
ban on exports to China remaining.368
Fourth, the ‘differential empowerment of external actors and learning’
mattered, while Cowles et al. and Falknet et al. considered the domestic level only.
The possibility of the lift empowered the USA, who strongly opposed the initiative.
The close relationship between the US and the UK certainly gave a great deal of
influence to the US. Premier Tony Blair had this view that he and Britain had a
unique role to serve as a bridge between Europe and the United States. An ambitious
form of internationalism was developing in Blair’s outlook, whereby he wished to
reconnect Britain to its European destiny, to help modernize the EU so it would be fit
for an era of globalization (a Blair mantra), and above all to stay close to the United
States, as the ultimate guarantor of British security369. Blair in March 2001 declared:
“I have been as pro-America as Prime Minister as it is possible to have. There is no
single issue I can think of in which we have not stood foursquare with America”370.
At the time, it was said that Robin Cook was replaced as the head of FCO by Jack
Straw for being too European and not enough pro-American. Mr. Blair was already
insouciant about opening up a distance between himself and his French or German
colleagues over foreign policy questions. In part, this was because of the enormous
self-confidence that the Prime Minister had in his ability to make a personal
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difference on some of the great international issues. Almost by definition, this implied
that he would be in competition with his peers, President Chirac of France and
Chancellor Schroeder of Germany. Bush and Putin in Blair’s mind represented real
power in the unsafe world outside the ‘postmodern’ European Union, and Blair
sought to accommodate and to charm them371.
Just like many prime ministers in the post-war era, Tony Blair became
increasingly preoccupied with trying to be a mediator between the United States and
Europe, committed to a multilateral international order and determined to play a
major positive role in the European and international affairs whilst trying to preserve
the illusion of Britain as a major power, even if both the European and American
dimensions of British foreign policy continued to lack domestic support372.
Behind the ideological rhetoric, the UK was fearful of US repercussions
especially for its armament industry, and a possible lift gave the US a golden stick to
punish the British partner. The UK government was stung once by Congress's refusal
to waive certain requirements of its International Traffic in Arms Regulations for the
export licensing of certain unclassified military exports from the United States to
Britain. Lifting the waiver would have helped with interoperability - since shared
systems by different armies would make it easier for them to fight together373. The
Americans feared that a China armed with weapon technologies from Europe facing
American forces in the South China Sea would change the post Cold War geopolitical
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order.374 Members of the US Congress had warned they would respond to a lifting of
the embargo by passing legislation restricting US technology transfers to European
defense companies.
Condoleezza Rice, the U.S. Secretary of State, ratcheted up the US rhetorical
opposition on several occasions, including one trip in China, where she stressed that
lifting the European Arms embargo could “change the equilibrium” in Asia.375
Ultimately, the British government had no choice to be a go between the EU and the
US, and therefore postpone the debate, certainly not wanting to upset the US376.

4.5 Conclusion
The attitude of the United Kingdom in the case of the China arms embargo
reflected the deep attachment to one of the most important premises of British foreign
policy: a commitment to serve as a bridge the US and Europe, and ultimately ensure
the satisfaction of the US partner. The transatlantic bond overcame aspirations for
political and economic power in China. Britain could have been a pace-setter on the
issue, given its powerful arms industry looking for markets, the attachment to Hong
Kong, and the ambition to be a major defense player in the EU. Instead, Britain sat on
the fence and witnessed France and Germany taking the lead on the issue. Britain
then jumped on the bandwagon till the US, using a carrot and stick policy, threatened
the UK to retaliate by cancelling some defense contracts. Britain then switched outfits
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again to, this time, use its influence to reverse the process and convince other
members through horizontal Europeanization that the lift was not a reasonable policy.
The foot-dragging attitude was at its paroxysm when the UK decided not to put the
embargo issue on the agenda of the second half of 2005.
The successful pressure applied by the United States on the United Kingdom
checked the hypothesis according to which a EU sanction policy could not be
modified unless the US approves it. What makes the UK case interesting is the fact
that the UK used its influence to block the initiative rather than promote it. The UK
used horizontal Europeanization by convincing other members to delay the initiative
and as EU President used top-down Europeanization by not putting the issue on the
agenda.
The empowerment of external actors such as the United States prevented the
UK to adopt the lift and the impact of the US overpowered the influence of other
mediating factors that could have led to the adoption of the lift. Trade could have
predicted the outcome either way: on one hand, the UK sold dual-use equipment
goods to China and would have certainly benefited from the opening of the market;
on the other hand, the UK defense market was heavily dependent on the US one. As
for human rights, the issue was not dramatic enough n=in British public opinion to
impact the outcome, one way or another.
In terms of safeguards for weapons exports, there was no misfit between the
UK and the EU, and the UK could have easily adopted the ban, based on the
regulation of its defense export market. By reversing itself, the UK diplomacy
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appeared to have misled the Chinese into complacency and left them wavered in the
wind.377
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CHAPTER 5
The influence of Germany

5.0

Introduction
While commercial ties have flourished, political ties between China and

Germany have remained underdeveloped. Most Chinese still see Germany as an
economic partner. Germany has traditionally tied its foreign policies close to those of
its fellow EU members. Germany became a model for many member states in the
1990s with its pragmatic economic approach, outlined in the German Asia Concept in
1993. The model rested on three principles: silent diplomacy (i.e. avoiding open
human rights accusations), change through trade “Wandel durch Handel”, (i.e.
encouraging political liberalization in China through economic development), and
last, the application of a strict “One China” policy378. Chancellor Schröder (19982002) fully followed this model and visited China more often than any other non-EU
country during his tenure. Germany’s China policy is a rather odd combination of
trade promotion, foreign aid – increasingly shaped as trade promotion, too – and a
certain support for social modernization. Schröder’s strong involvement in the
German-Franco initiative to lift the EU weapons embargo came under fire from the
political opposition, the media, the Federal Parliament (Bundestag) and human rights
activists. The arms embargo issue also caused divisions within the ruling coalition,
with the Green party vehemently opposed to it, other EU member states and the
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United States379. First, I will review the track record of the relations between
Germany and China and Germany’s influence on in EU Asia policy. Then I shall
focus on the embargo and explain the reasoning of the German diplomacy based on
the interviews. Equally important, in order to assess the German responses to
Europeanization of China policy, I will use the classification by Börzel 380 to establish
that Germany was a pace-setter by convincing the EU to put the issue on the agenda,
by trying to convince its partners, and then apply the Cowles et al. and Falkner et al.
theories to show that there was no mismatch between the EU and German sanction
policy on China but that there many veto points within Germany’s domestic level
that weakened the German bid.
5.1

Relations with the PRC and Track record of Europeanization of China

policy
Germany’s relations with China have been far steadier than those of Britain
and France. Germany, based on its defeat in World War II, had no colonies and never
had any ties with Taiwan either381. On the international stage, Germany did not take
diplomatic initiatives and tended to follow cues from its major Western allies, such as
the recognition of the PRC in 1972 following the Nixon visit. China had been
primarily dealing with East Germany since the mid-fifties, from which it imported
industrial equipment (East Germany was the most important communist trading
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partner of China. To East Germany, China represented an alternative model to the
Soviet Union and the two shared a struggle for international recognition382.
Trade with West Germany represented the backbone of the relationship. The
Federal Republic opened its first trade office in 1955, despite the “Hallstein doctrine”
banning diplomatic recognition to all states that recognized East Germany 383. Even
today, the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs primarily promotes economic
relations, which are developing with breathtaking speed into a success story. The
PRC has become Germany's most important export market in Asia. Germany is
China's greatest European trading partner and, lately, has also become the greatest
European investor in the PRC.384 Chancellor Kohl was the architect of the German
success throughout the 1980s and the 1990s during which he adopted a policy of
“silent diplomacy” focusing on trade and ignoring the human rights issues. Under
Helmut Kohl, the focus on economics and the neglect of human rights or Beijing’s
policy vis-à-vis Taiwan caused criticism from opposition leaders. The so called
“dialogue behind closed doors” on politically sensitive issues was seen as a way to
save the Chinese leadership from open criticism and to satisfy German public. In
general, bilateral relations between Germany and the PRC had intensified during the
government of Helmut Kohl. Although it supported the EU Council’s sanctions
policy following the Tiananmen incident, Germany under Kohl resumed trade
cooperation six months later and never really stopped high-level contacts, breaking
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away from the economic sanctions before they were officially lifted in September
1990.
Germany was always very cautious on issues dealing with sovereignty and
national unity, unlike the British handling of Hong Kong and the French stance over
Taiwan. Germany did not maintain diplomatic relations with Taiwan on account of
the ‘One China Policy’ pursued by Germany, along with all the other EU Member
States. Germany is in favor of Beijing and Taipei coming to a peaceful resolution of
all the issues of concern385. For example, Chancellor Kohl refused to approve the sale
of ten submarines and ten frigates to Taiwan in January 1993 and reaffirmed
Germany’s ‘one China’ stance386. Three principles of German China policy were
drawn during the Kohl years: silent diplomacy (hence no human rights
confrontation); change through trade (encouraging political liberalization in China via
economic development); and a strict “one-China” policy.
Vis-à-vis the EU, Germany seemed to have a slightly different approach
compared to France and Britain with the idea of influencing EU policy rather than
adopting a unilateral approach. The assumption was that regional and security policy
developments in Asia were now having a greater impact on European foreign and
security policy. “Where developments in Asia generate a global impact, that is to say
directly affect our own interests, we must exercise our influence nationally, within the
EU framework”387. For instance, German officials are deeply committed to the AsiaEurope Meeting (ASEM) process. Germany also stresses the importance of
385
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multilateral frameworks such as the G7 or the United Nations and other international
organizations. Germany has been keen on supporting the ASEAN Regional ForumARF) to improve security and confidence building in the region, for example on the
basis of experiences in the CSCE/OSCE. One of the main tools advocated by
Germany in its China policy is confidence building and détente in a dialogue on
security policy rooted in cooperation in the field of military policy, including a
discussion of arms control policy issues. More generally, the major foreign policy
concern is to integrate China into the International Community. It is essential to
convince China that as a rising regional power and member of the Security Council, it
bears increasing responsibility for world peace, for stability in the Asia-Pacific region
and for global concerns, including a peaceful resolution of all the differences arising
on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait388.
To Germany, cooperation is inherently linked to the improvement of the
human rights situation. Relations with the PRC cooled down in 1996 in the aftermath
of an all-party Bundestag resolution on Tibet accusing China of trying to eradicate
Tibet's cultural identity389. A planned visit to China by Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel
was postponed and the matter was not resolved until late September of that year,
when Kinkel and his Chinese counterpart Qian Qichen met in New York390. To this
end, Germany has engaged bilaterally and within the EU in a dialogue on human
rights with the Chinese government at expert level. Human rights issues are an
important part of a political dialogue at Foreign Ministerial level, and in talks
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between the Commissioner for Human Rights and Chinese Government officials.391
Human rights also have been an important issue for the German media, the public
opinion and most prominently the Green Party which was a junior partner in the post1998 coalition government.392 In September 1998, Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher
declared that there would be “no further kowtow towards the ‘Beijing dictatorship’”.
As a symbolic but strong gesture, Chancellor Schröder invited a prominent Chinese
dissident to Germany and upset the Beijing leadership. The appointment of a Human
Rights Representative further emphasized the greater role human rights were
supposed to play in dealing with the Chinese leadership. In 1999, the Red-Green
government initiated a “Dialogue on the Rule of Law” at the bilateral level and within
the EU framework.
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The Dialogue on the Rule of Law was meant to offer a long-

term approach to building a state based on the rule of law and implementing human
rights in China394. It consisted of specific projects to improve legal and judicial
practices in China. The Dialogue combined elements of careful public criticism, open
talk behind closed doors, and pragmatic cooperation at the bilateral and the EuropeanChinese level.
The “Dialogue on the Rule of Law” has often been hailed as one of the major
innovations of the Red-Green Asia policy, although there had been various similar
programs in place under the Kohl administration. Most of the cooperation projects
implemented by state actors as well as by private actors had actually already been
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under way before the establishment of the Dialogue. Officially arranged symposia
were the only new element introduced as an additional venue for German-Chinese
cooperation in the field of law. However, the symposia did not provide an appropriate
framework for discussing sensitive issues related to human rights and the rule of law
since they were conducted in a formal, decidedly non-controversial atmosphere. In
essence, the Dialogue thus only integrated already existing governmental and private
legal cooperation initiatives under a common heading and a symbolic umbrella.
The main function of the Dialogue was not a practical, but a politicalsymbolic one. Prior to Dialogue, the German government’s handling of human would
consist of articulating individual objections, handing over lists of political prisoners
and asking for their release. In the course of the 1990s, this approach was increasingly
felt to be humiliating to the Chinese side, politically ineffective and potentially
damaging to economic exchanges. By initiating the Dialogue, it became possible to
delegate discussion of the PRC’s human rights record from the official diplomatic
sphere to the working level involved with legal cooperation programs. With a view to
appealing to public sentiment in Germany, the German government could present the
Dialogue as a comprehensive human rights strategy directed towards the Chinese
government. The Dialogue thus became a valuable symbolic tool in the hands of the
German coalition government for deflecting human rights sensitivities among its
electorate and preventing human rights controversies from disturbing the rapid
expansion of economic relations with China.395
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The prioritization of domains has been the key of the German China policy
and certainly inspired other Member States as well as the European Union in general.
European states did not develop a unified position towards the PRC despite early
moves by the UK, France, and the Netherlands to set up diplomatic relations in the
1950s and 1960s. Attempts by other countries such as Germany and Ireland to create
individual China policies were quickly abandoned. In 1993, Germany took a
leadership role by inserting a new programmatic dimension to EU China policies by
developing the first ‘Asia- Concept’. Germany was a pace-setter and uploaded its
policy preferences at the EU level in a positive way. It served as a blueprint for the
first Asia policy program of the European Union which improved the coordination of
national policies towards PRC. In general, ‘bilateral’ relations between the EU states
and Asia were conducted within the framework of state-related programs or
cooperation agreements of the so-called ‘third generation’.396
The first German Asia Strategy was clearly dominated by the 1990s discourse
on a potential Asian hegemony due to the rise of Japan, the Asian Tigers and China.
However, the Kohl and the Schröder governments took some criticism from the
public opinion and opposition parties for neglecting human rights and systematically
depoliticizing economic relations with China397. Germany grasped the importance of
Asian new markets when EC trade with East Asia overtook EC-US trade for the first
time in 1992, and therefore took the lead in formulating its ‘Asian policy’. The central
ideas of Germany’s Asian policy were to strengthen economic relations with the
largest growth region in the world, restore high level visits to Beijing and stop
396
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applying pressure on human rights. In December 1993, Chancellor Kohl returned
from a visit to China with a pile of contracts and letters of intent.398 A few months
later, Bonn was the first Western capital to host a visit by Chinese Premier Li Peng, in
spite of Li’s close association and responsibility for the Tiananmen crackdown.
Germany continued to assume a leadership position, along with France, in influencing
EU Asia policy and pushed for stronger involvement in the region.
The success of the German model prompted other member states in particular
Britain and France (each had issues with Beijing, over Hong Kong and Taiwan) to
rethink their post-Tiananmen policies and to also depoliticize a more aggressive
economic relationship. In the mid-1990s, Germany alone accounted for nearly 40% of
total EU trade with China, over twice as much as Britain’s. Besides the
depoliticization, the role of the private sector has been the key factor in German
economic success. In other member states, the government was the initiator of
business dealings.

In Germany, the private sector was the initiator and the

government served as a facilitator.399 Following the German model, French and
British government delegations to China systematically started inviting business
leaders. Michael Heseltine, the British Secretary for Trade and Industry visited China
in 1994 accompanied by 130 businessmen400. The German model also influenced
French willingness to deal pragmatically with China. Following an era where the
French socialist government distanced itself from the Chinese regime based on
human rights records, France-China relations were normalized and a joint France-
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China communiqué was issued in January 1994 during Prime Minister Balladur’s
visit.
Germany and France were then the first member states to begin to normalize
relations with China after the Tiananmen Square crackdown. They went so far as to
violate EU restrictions on aid and loans to China several months before these
sanctions were collectively ended.401 This pragmatic stance also impacted the way the
embargo on weapons was observed, and Germany, like other Member States
breached it several times.
The largest share of its 2003 license approvals for China were specialized
military training equipment or simulators (€528 thousand), electronic military
equipment (€433.1 thousand), and software items (€134.4 million)402. For example,
MTU, a DaimlerChrysler subsidiary, built diesel engines, which were not subject to
licensing requirements and therefore were sold to the Chinese and used in their SongA submarines. Chinese Naval war ships were also equipped with MTU engines. Other
companies such as Deutz built engines used in Chinese tanks. But as mentioned in the
chapters about France and Britain, the other big two also sold parts that could be used
in military equipment. Britain's Rolls Royce Spey jet engines are used in Chinese JH7 fighter jets and the French Racal long-range airborne radar systems are used by the
Chinese Navy Aircraft.403 404
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5.2

Reasoning of the German diplomacy
In the next two sections, I will justify the position of the German diplomacy and

establish the German response to the Europeanization of the China policy. It seems
appropriate to list here the officials who have been contacted to help in this endeavor.
As I mentioned in our methodology chapter, I contacted representatives from the
executive and legislative branches, based on the timeline and recommendations.
Under Chancellor Schröder’s guidance, the priority in Germany’s policy
towards the PRC was firmly established: trade promotion first, foreign aid, second
and issues of human rights and democratization a distant third. Publishing its three
regional concepts for East Asia, South East Asia and South Asia in May 2002,
German diplomacy made it official that it had fallen in line with the tradition set by
its predecessor. The global economic and political integration of the PRC gained
highest priority while political change and social modernization were moved on to
various arenas of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.405 The position of the German
government echoed the French one. The major difference, however, was that the
position was articulated at the top and at the top only. In the French case, President
Chirac was certainly a big promoter but was followed by his cabinet, whereas in the
German case, some of the cabinet members did not necessarily agree with the
Chancellor, including the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Joshka Fisher.
Chancellor Schröder stated that China had changed significantly during the
last fifteen years and no longer resembled the China of 1989. In the Chancellor’s
view, political and legal change within China continued to be positively promoted by
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the “German-Chinese Rule of Law Dialogue” that was initiated in 1999. This
Dialogue was presented as a substantial and continuous effort at improving the human
rights situation in China and as proof for the German government’s political and
moral dedication in its China policy.406 Germany acknowledged the human rights
deficiencies in China, from freedom of opinion to minority rights and death sentences
but saw its role more as a supporter of the positive trends rather than a denunciator.
German diplomacy based its reasoning on the increasing number of concrete cases
and the legislative initiatives under way in terms of civil and political rights and
thought that their supportive stance had something to do with such progress.407
Increasing sales of weapons was never part of the argument: Germany’s
national regulations on arms exports were stricter than in most of the EU members
including France and the United Kingdom.

408

Domestic law prevented most direct

arms sales to China due to foreign trade law which prohibited the selling of defense
goods into areas of crisis or potential crisis. At the EU level, the Code of Conduct
would also prevent sales of high-technology weapons sales to states with repressive
regimes.409 Ultimately, argued German diplomacy, if the embargo would have been
lifted, Germany would not have profited very much from it since the sales of goods
with potential defense use would have been inconsequential.410
There were also a few geopolitical reasons to justify the lift of the embargo.
According to German diplomacy, regional and security policy developments in the
406
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Asian region also generated a global impact, affected German interests and therefore
impacted the European foreign and security policy. The Germans must use their
influence as a state within the EU framework, internationally as in the Asia Europe
Meeting (ASEM), multilaterally through the UN and the G7 and the G8.411
During the long period of East-West bipolarity, Asia as a whole and its large
sub-regions did not identify themselves permanently with either of the two politicomilitary blocs.412 China, France and Germany agreed on the concept of multipolarity
to constrain US influence through the establishment of alternative poles of power,
such as China, all opposed to a unipolar world. A European pole would mean greater
influence for Germany and France and both countries shared views when it came to
defense and foreign policy issues. Moreover, the joint opposition to the 2003 Iraq
War strengthened France and Germany ties.413 Chancellor Schröder and President
Chirac had become close and there was a sense in German diplomacy circles that “if
the French were for it, then the Germans were for it too…” 414
Finally, regionally, there had been a push by the German diplomacy to
solidify military policy cooperation with China and India through a trilateral defense
dialogue. In 1994, consultations had been initiated as a “German-Indian defense
dialogue" by the Konrad Adenauer foundation of the Christian Democratic Union
(CDU) in cooperation with India's leading defense policy think tank, the Institute for
Strategic Studies and Analyses (IDSA) and, since 1997, China. Every year, the
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discussion partners coordinated the views of Beijing, Delhi and Berlin concerning
strategic developments in Asia and discussed contingencies for cooperation on the
continents “defense problems". 415
But the main reason behind the desired lift of the embargo was trade
expansion. France, Germany and Spain had certainly pushed for the lift of the ban
based on economic considerations. Increasing trade with China at all levels was an
important part of stimulating economic growth 416. The trade promotion was part of
Chancellor Schröder’s platform since he had made the economy and employment the
center of his governing program. The Chancellor systematically tied the economy to
foreign policy and therefore could not turn down the huge opportunities of the
Chinese market .417The trade relationship between Germany and China was
characterized by impressive numbers. Within Europe, Germany was China’s leading
trade partner, accounting for around 30% of total E.U.-China trade418. Bilateral trade
between China and Germany reached some € 33,5 billion in 2004 (+31% over 2003),
and was projected to double again by 2010, Some 2,000 German companies,
including major banks, operated in China. BASF and Bayer, for instance, were the
largest chemical firms in China, Volkswagen controlled 30% of the Chinese car
market, and in 2004 it produced more cars in China than in Germany with Chinese
sales accounting for 1/3rd of the company's net profits. Germany was also by far the
largest EU exporter to China, accounting for 44% of the total of its exports. Between
1997 and 2005 German exports to China increased by almost 300 percent. According
415
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to the German Engineering Association, in 2004 China became Germany’s ' secondbiggest export market after the US, taking France’s spot.

419

German investment in

China also increased ten-fold from just € 800 million in 1995 to € 7.9 billion in 2003,
making Germany China's seventh largest foreign investor, continues to rise, and
Germany is the leader among EU member states in terms of foreign direct investment
(FDI) in China. France also witnessed significant Foreign Direct Investment growth;
by 2004 these two countries accounted for approximately 40% of EU foreign direct
investment in China.420The quality of this economic relationship has also been
strengthened by Germany’s willingness to provide soft loans to China as well as
export subsidies for companies doing business in the Chinese market.421 Finally,
Germany has been the most generous donor to China. In the second half of the 90s,
Germany alone accounted for more than half of the EU aid to China (at the time 15
member states), mostly in legal reforms, environmental protection and transport
infrastructure projects.422 The depth of the economic relationship certainly justifies
Chancellor Schroeder's enthusiasm for lifting the arms embargo.
The importance of maintaining a capable and robust defense industry across
Europe was shared both by President Jacques Chirac and the German Chancellor
Gerhard Schröder. Under normal circumstances, Kogan argued that no top-level
political leaders would stick their neck out and take a personal commitment to ensure
the lifting of the embargo, for the sole purpose of actively fostering arms exports423.
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Rather, what really motivated France and Germany were the consequences that a
decision to lift the arms embargo might have. It would have led to an expanded
commercial and industrial relationship between the EU and China in a variety of nondefense related sectors.

5.3

German response to the Europeanization of German policy: the case of the

embargo

In early December 2003 on a visit to China, Chancellor Schröder declared that
China was now considered a responsible partner in world affairs that had little in
common with the 1989 leadership, implying that the arms embargo could be
removed. The Chancellor was confident that he could obtain an EU majority to lift an
arms embargo against China.
On the same trip, the Chancellor also announced his support for a Chinese
request to buy a nuclear plant from the Siemens AG in spite of the technology’s
military potential. Touching upon the nerves of a growing number of Green party
members this initiative in addition to the attempt by the Chancellot to lift he EU ban
on arms sales met considerable public opposition. The idea of exporting nuclear
technology was strongly disapproved by the Green Party, member of the governing
coalition, with its strong antinuclear tradition, but also by the opposition. The Greens
were not too keen on lifting the embargo, based on the poor human rights record of
China but they eventually understood that even if the embargo were to be lifted,
German export restrictions and the Code on Arms Conduct would still prevent arms
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sales to China. The issue of the lift would need some explaining but seemed
winnable. The Chancellor certainly did not expect however, that in a rare case of
successful involvement in foreign policy-making, the parliamentary fractions of the
Social Democrats (SPD) and the Green Party would threaten to block the
government’s export permission of plutonium.424
In January 2004, Foreign Affairs Minister Fisher, a Green Party member,
argued that more discussions with the Chinese were necessary concerning human
rights and the Taiwanese question, but declared that he supported the review as long
as the Code of Conduct was updated. Later in the spring, the plutonium deal was
postponed indefinitely, following more domestic criticism in Germany.425
A few months later, there were still reservations among the members of the
junior partner of the coalition. In an interview on television, Minister Fischer
recognized that there had been great progress in China, but there were still reasons for
having considerable reservations on lifting the embargo based on human rights
abuses: excessive use of the death penalty, administrative detention, Tibet and the
right to political freedom, but also the conflict with Taiwan. Fisher mentioned that he
stood for the one China policy and at the same time believed the Taiwan question
should be resolved peacefully. However, Germany was very active in holding
discussions with the EU regarding the lifting of the arms embargo and wanted to
make sure that a consensus was reached before this move.426 The press was not
favorable to the lift and characterized the move as opportunistic and as an attempt to
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“pick up lucrative Chinese contracts for German business in the pinch of a stagnant
economy’427
In October 2004, the parliamentary majority was still not convinced about the
benefits of the lift and rebuked the chancellor by rejecting his efforts to lift the
European Union's arms embargo against China. In October 28, the German
Parliament, including the vast majority of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's own Social
Democrats and virtually all of Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's Greens, passed a
resolution which called on the German government to make any relaxation of the 15year arms trade ban conditional on these measures.

428

On November 19, the

European Parliament passed a similar resolution 572 votes against 72. And on March
11, leaders of the four German political parties representing Germany in the European
Parliament sent an open letter to Schröder urging him to abandon his support for
China arms sales.429 In the same month, the Bundesrat also adopted a motion urging
China to ratify a United Nations' treaty on human and political rights, speed up the
implementation of recent civil rights reforms and grant ethnic minorities additional
autonomy.
In December 2004, before the Hague summit, Chancellor Schröder went to
China for the sixth time with 35 business leaders, on a trip largely dedicated to solicit
business. More than 150 companies had applied to go.430 A €1bn deal to sell 23
Airbus aircraft was finalized and Siemens, the engineering group, had already secured
427
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a €360m deal on the sale of 180 locomotives. Once again, on the home front,
Chancellor Schröder’s mercantile approach to foreign policy was criticized,
especially because he put human rights concerns on the backburner.

431

This was his

conviction that his country’s economic interests came first, leading him to believe
that the Tiananmen Square events were a thing of the past.”432
At the expected seventh EU-China summit on December 8, 2004, in the
Hague, the E.U. “confirmed its political will to continue to work towards lifting the
embargo.”433 During the summit, France and Germany pushed for and achieved in
principle an agreement for the EU towards lifting the partial arms embargo.434 Once
the Hague Summit decided to review the lift, the US started to voice their opposition
but mostly pressured the UK as a traditional transatlantic bridge. During the spring of
2005, both Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and President George W. Bush
visited Europe. The visit was supposed to help mend fences after the Iraq crisis
following President Bush’s reelection. Not to throw oil on the fire, the U.S. President
and the German Chancellor graciously overlooked the China arms issue as well as
any rows over Iran's nuclear plans. "We have the same goals," the president said,
putting on a good show. In Berlin, advisors to Chancellor Schröder believed the
whole commotion in Washington was being exaggerated since President Bush had
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not brought up the issue.

435

On the other hand, the German Chancellor did not want

get in another argument with President Bush or with the American Congress.436
In the meantime, the European Union consensus had seemed to fall apart and
what was supposed to be a formality turned out to be more complicated. While
France was still committed to the embargo, the leaders of Britain and several other
European countries were backing away from making an immediate decision. The
position of Germany was unclear. The embargo was not on the formal agenda of the
two-day summit in Brussels; however, it was discussed in private sessions. In
Germany, domestic opposition kept rising in the Parliament ranks. In April, EU
foreign ministers met in Luxembourg and could not reach a consensus on the issue
despite an intense lobbying campaign to convince the US partner. Officials said
privately, that the issue might be put off until at least 2006. Britain was scheduled to
hold the EU presidency in the second half of 2005 and had just reversed its position,
and was now opposing the lift. Despite the stunning British reversal, German
leadership was still cohesive. Foreign Minister Fischer at the time declared that
ending the ban depended largely "on movement by Beijing, especially on the question
of human rights and a peaceful resolution" of its conflict with Taiwan. Before the
German Parliament, Fischer testified that the ban hindered Europe's efforts to boost
trade with China and that a greater Chinese commitment to human rights would help
forge an EU consensus on lifting the embargo.437
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It seemed that the German leadership was involuntarily losing control of the
issue. The media, the public opinion and the parties were expressing their strong
feelings against the lift. 438 The Chancellor was not in a comfortable position since the
Chinese were keeping the pressure on. In an interview, the Chinese ambassador to
Germany, Mr. Ma, called the embargo “embarrassing’ and “discriminating”.
Ambassador Ma clearly stated that the lift would give an impulse to China EU
relations, but until then, the relationship could not be normal. Ambassador Ma had
spent much time meeting German politicians from all the political parties in an effort
to convince them that keeping the embargo served no practical purpose. 439
In June, some polls showed the Conservative Party, the CDU, well ahead of
the leading government, the Social Democrats, suggesting a possible change of ruling
party in the fall. Wolfgang Schäuble, CDU foreign affairs spokesman, told
Bloomberg that if his party took office after the elections expected in September it
would not end the ban without US consent. The CDU rejected the approach according
to which Europe should be a counterweight to the US. Schauble believed that stronger
co-operation between the large centers was the alternative and only then Germany
would be more accountable to all of its partners."
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The CDU was pressuring on

having a vote at the Bundestag, but Schröder had declared that he would disregard
any vote because certain foreign policy issues could only be decided by the
Chancellor.441
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The general election and change of leadership at the Chancellery in November
2005 gave the last blow to the initiative. Both major parties had to form a grand
coalition. The coalition pact between the CDU led by Angela Merkel and outgoing .
Schroder's Social Democrats agreed to pursue a "long-term strategy of partnership"
with China, but stated that the "dialogue on democracy and human rights would be
intensified". Ms. Merkel, the upcoming Chancellor, refused to support the lift of the
embargo until human rights significantly improved and had criticized Mr. Schröder
for placing too much emphasis on the expansion of business ties with China. Ms.
Merkel did not even discuss it when Chinese President Hu visited Germany during
the transition period. Even on the SPD part, there were increasing concerns about the
trade imbalance between China and Germany. The CDU seemed to have won the
backing of their partner in the coalition. Wolfgang Clement, outgoing Economics
Minister in the Schröder cabinet, told his Chinese counterpart that while bilateral
trade had expanded rapidly in recent years - reaching € 53bn ($ 62bn) in 2004, the
balance "was becoming somewhat distorted", with Chinese exports to Germany
expanding by 26 percent this year, but trade in the opposition direction shrinking 5
per cent and called on China to open its markets more fully, intensify efforts to end
product piracy and stop abuses of intellectual property rights. Hu also held talks with
Schröder who told him, much to the anger of Merkel's Conservatives, that he believed
the European Union would find a "sensible solution" to its arms embargo on China,
that his opinion on the arms embargo had not changed, and that Germany would
work with France on this issue."442
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Furthermore, the rifts between the incumbent and previous governments
within the new coalition were highlighted when the CDU drafted a new strategy
defining Asia’s rise as a strategic challenge and potential opportunity for Germany
and Europe. It emphasized several issues with China such as copyrights, economic
espionage and disadvantages in monetary joint ventures, and called for a shift in
attention from China to India. This change was not necessarily welcome by the
minister of Foreign Affairs, a SPD member, who favored the traditional approach of
Mrs. Merkel’s predecessors Helmut Kohl and Gerhard Schröder. The Chinese
reaction to this new approach was also harsh. Given the uneasiness of the situation,
the government publicly emphasized the continuity element in its policies but still left
aside the embargo.443

5.4 Goodness of fit between EU and German China sanction policy
The goal is to evaluate the overall pattern of German institutional responses to
the Europeanization of the European China policy. What is the goodness of fit or the
mismatch between the EU and the Germany on China sanction policy? Once again, I
apply the Börzel, Cowles et al. and Falkner et al. models to explain the German
adaptation444. At this stage, it is already established that there was no mismatch
between EU policy and German policy on the embargo policy and that German and
EU policies converged. Germany had no issue reversing the ban and arms export
regulations were stricter than the Code of Conduct. Using Börzel’s classification and
based on the previous sections of the chapter, I can also now establish that Germany
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was a pace-setter along with France. Chancellor Schröder was influential and not just
a follower of President Chirac. Schröder had at a certain time considered to make a
proposal to the relevant EU bodies to lift the embargo445. Regarding mediating
factors, to be able to compare with the other two countries, Britain and France, I used
the same factors: veto points, the country’s organizational and policymaking culture,
the human rights issue, the trade issue and the empowerment of external actors.
The weight of the veto points was crucial in harming the effectiveness of the
German leadership and its campaign towards a lift of the ban. The existence of ‘veto
points’ in the domestic structure has been identified as a major factor preventing
structural adaptation according to Cowles et al446. The more power is dispersed across
the political system and the more actors have a say in political decision making, the
more difficult is to foster the domestic consensus or ‘winning coalition’ necessary to
introduce institutional changes in response to Europeanization pressures. There had
been a great deal of domestic debate and opposition, given public opinion, Green
party and CDU’s objections to perceived ongoing human rights abuses in China.
447

The timing of the issue was also under scrutiny since the lift was not a decisive

issue for the economic prosperity of the country but certainly a divisive one based on
the different political leanings within the German government.448The question of
lifting the EU arms ban has turned into an animated power struggle between the
Schröder government and members of the coalition. That made the German case
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unique since there were no such disagreements in the ruling coalitions of France and
Britain.
Schröder’s argument, according to which lifting the embargo had nothing to
do with selling weapons but a lot to do with normalizing relations 16 years after the
Tiananmen crackdown, ruffled some feathers in the governing coalition but also in
the opposition.449The strong reaction to the possible sale of a nuclear plant to the PRC
was an illustration of the perception of China within the German polity. The German
Social Democrats' junior coalition partner, the Greens, adamantly opposed lifting the
embargo, as did the opposition Christian Democrats. Party leader Claudia Roth
demanded that the government reconsider its position and criticized the Chancellor
for putting a strain on the cohesion of the EU. To the Greens, the Chinese record for
human rights showed more shortcomings than improvements, and the passage of the
anti-secession law did not serve the Chinese cause. As a possible remedy, one of the
Greens’ demands was to beef up the Code of Conduct by making it politically and
legally binding450. The position of the Greens was, however, made difficult by the
fact that one of their high profile members was actually the Minister for Foreign
Affairs, Joshka Fischer. Fischer’s position was not entirely clear. On one hand, he
told his party he would try to convince the Chancellor to reconsider and on the other
hand was still supporting the initiative451. Fischer was not recognized as the
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spokesperson for its party by other party members452. The criticism towards Fischer
was not necessarily fair. Firstly, he could not publicly disapprove the Chancellor and
secondly ,he himself half-heartedly supported the initiative, declared in several
instances that he had an increasingly skeptical attitude,453 and that the embargo
should only be lifted if Beijing "moves" on human rights concerns and on relations
with Taiwan.454 The pragmatic approach of the Chancellor did not necessarily match
the agenda of the Greens. Could the party or the voters put up with a German foreign
policy that ran counter to the Green agenda, but was connected with the party's most
well-known figure? This split between ideals and realpolitik could not be good for the
party in the long term.455
For the CDU, the lift would have sent the wrong signal. The human rights
situation in China had improved but not enough to justify a change of course, and the
passage of the anti-secession law was another issue456. The CDU did not believe in a
multipolar world and did not want to alienate the U.S. non-governmental human
rights groups who were also displeased by the idea.457
The press denounced the contradictions of the rationale for a lift and raised
some questions about the place of China in the world. Would the lift really further the
integration of China into the international community or contribute to stability in East
Asia? The press was particularly adamant on the Taiwanese issue and the blatant
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human rights abuses in China.458 Minister Fisher’s ambivalent position on the subject
also got literally lots of bad press. The media played a role of ‘watchdog’ by pointing
out the cracks in the foreign policy-making of the governing German coalition foreign
policy, especially with upcoming elections.
The country’s organizational and policymaking culture, seen as a third
mediating factor, also affects whether domestic actors can use adaptation pressures
emanating from Europeanization to induce structural change. The episode of the
debate of the lift of the arms embargo highlighted the predominance of the Chancellor
in foreign policy-making. It is interesting to note that the German Basic Law does not
stipulate who or what is the vehicle for the conduct of foreign policy in the German
polity. The only stipulation is that “the Federation shall have exclusive legislative
jurisdiction in respect of foreign affairs” (article 73). Consequently, the controversy
over whether foreign policy is to be regarded as the sole responsibility of the
executive or as a competence to be jointly exercised both by the executive and
parliament is raised often459. The extent to which the Chancellor exercises his
constitutional authority and uses it for conducting a consistent foreign policy depends
on many factors, ranging from his personality and his ministerial appointments to
coalition maintenance and party cohesion. For several years, Germany’s China policy
had been the Chancellor’s task where the influence of the Foreign Ministry’s
influence had been reduced and was focusing on economic cooperation.

The fast

pace of modernization of China and the personality of then Chinese Prime Minister
Zhu Rongji impressed the German Chancellor who soon established his office as the
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strategic actor in Germany’s policy vis-à-vis China. The Foreign Ministry did not
obstruct the ambitions of the Chancellor, and certainly did not mind leaving the
Chancellor responsible for the tricky relationship with the PRC. Bilateral relations
have thus reached a great level of political and personal closeness; Schröder visited
China six times during his incumbency. Under Schröder leadership, the office of the
Chancellor became the main promoter of German trade and left other members of the
cabinet with the displeasure of criticizing China for poor human rights records.460
Throughout the debate, Chancellor Schröder argued the case that lifting the
embargo would economically benefit Germany and went over the objections of his
coalition partners; he became a bully by persistently promoting the line to lift the
embargo, positioned himself against his own Social Democratic Party (SPD) and
against Joschka Fischer, the Foreign Minister and the leader of the junior coalition
partner, the Greens. Schröder insisted on several occasions on the predominance of
the Chancellor and that irrespective of any voting in the Bundestag, the final authority
of foreign policy making laid with the federal government. This kind of stance by
Schröder was often termed by the German opposition as Alleingang (go-it-alone
policy).461 Critics even dubbed Schröder the "Panzer Kanzler" (or "tank chancellor")
for his eagerness on the issue.462Schröder’s authoritarian style of leadership was
decisive to override partners in the governing coalition and within his own party463.
His assertive personality helped him in international negotiations as he was conscious
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of the role that a unified and fully sovereign that Germany was playing on the
European stage and on the world stage and differently than the early Germany.
The stance on human rights was a key factor to determine how a country
would react to the embargo. In the case of Germany, the issue fluctuated between the
background or in the forefront. Human rights never seemed the priority of the
Chancellor but improving the human rights situation in East Asia was officially a
central concern of the Federal Government. Like his predecessor, Schröder claimed
that his government was conducting the Human Rights Dialogue with China behind
closed doors, rather than in public. Germany continued to voice at the UN Human
Rights Commission HR concerns over human rights abuses in China almost on an
annual basis.464 Joschka Fischer, in his speech to the 61st Session of the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in March 2005, depicted the
human rights situation in China as a source of concern.465 But this strategy seemed to
have had very limited success beyond the symbolic release of a small number of
political prisoners by the Chinese leadership in advance of state visits. This limited
record explained the constant pressure by the Green Party, the opposition and the
media towards better results and the general opposition to the lift of the embargo.
Even within the Chancellor’s own party, there was a consensus that the embargo
should be lifted only if the human rights situation improved. The vote to uphold the
embargo was initiated by the parliamentary groups that supported Schröder.466 The
debate in Germany was much more centered on symbolic issues such as human rights
464
465
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and the timing of the issue. How could Germany have clear conscience selling
weapons to China, who had made so little progress inhuman rights? The tone of the
debate was not so much about the factual outcome of lifting the embargo. Such a
decision would require preparing the public for at least five or six years argued Andre
Brie, a German member of European Parliament.
The trade motivation remained the principal explanation to Germany’s
positive response to further Europeanization of China policy. The pragmatic trade
relationship clearly distinguished itself from the political one. In practice it meant
avoiding controversies and downplaying criticism of China’s human record. Germany
always regarded the PRC as economically and politically more important then and
therefore did not want to risk its good relations to Beijing by undermining the OneChina principle or being too critical on human rights. Trade has been a defining issue
of Sino-German relations but to public opinion and to other parties, the trade ambition
had to have limits boundaries. And in the case of the Hanau nuclear plant and the
arms embargo, political parties and public opinion had a clear impact on Schröder’s
ambitious trade promotion agenda. The sale of a plutonium plant was not acceptable
and neither was the lift of the arms embargo.
Fourth,

the empowerment of external actors and learning mattered. The

possibility of the lift empowered the USA who strongly opposed the initiative. The
general context was certainly not favorable to a lift,467 especially based on the nature
of the transatlantic relationship at that time due to the Iraq issue. We exposed in
previous chapters the reasons why the U.S. opposed the lift of the embargo so
vehemently. On the one hand, Congress feared that a better equipped China would
467
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threaten the safety of Taiwan, and on the other hand, there was the fear that American
technology or weaponry sold to Europe could leak out and end up again facing
American forces in the Asia Pacific region. In February 2005, the U.S. House of
Representatives adopted a resolution stating that it deplored increased E.U. sales and
moves to lift the embargo, and declaring that those moves “place European security
policy in direct conflict with U.S. security interests.” The resolution passed by a vote
of 411-3. It warned that, if Europe did not change course, Congress would have to
consider “limitations and constraints” on transatlantic defense-industrial ties.
The US lobbying offensive was at its peak in 2005 but originated mostly from
Congress rather than the administration. Despite the reservations of the Bundestag
about the lift of the embargo, there was a consensus in German diplomacy that there
was a lack of understanding in the U.S. about what the arms embargo was about and
that there was a certain degree of hypocrisy at play, when the U.S. delivered sensitive
technology to China through presidential waivers.
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The U.S. became part of the

debate but did not necessarily tip the scale in Germany. 469
Germany was a pace-setter of Europeanization of China policy for almost
forty years but Germany’s success in China was mostly trade related and the realities
of German-Chinese relations often did not live up to the expectations created by the
ambitious rhetoric of the German government. The German trade promotion crusade
managed to keep human rights critics at bay by allowing policies such as the
Dialogue on Human Rights, the creation of the office of a Human Rights
Representative that had little effect. Every German policy vis-à-vis China could be
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perceived as a way to improve bilateral trade, even foreign cultural affairs. The lift of
the embargo fitted that ambition and was the gateway to a more strategic dimension
to the relationship. The role of Chancellor Schröder was decisive in bringing the issue
to the fore, given a close relationship with the other ‘leader’ on the initiative,
President Chirac of France, and with the Chinese President.

5.5 Conclusion
Germany had been a pace-setter of Europeanization of China policy for
almost forty years but Germany’s success in China was mostly trade related and the
realities of German-Chinese relations often did not live up to the expectations created
by the ambitious rhetoric of the German government. The German trade promotion
crusade managed to keep human rights critics at bay by allowing policies such as the
Dialogue on Human Rights, the creation of the office of a Human Rights
Representative that had little effect. Every German policy vis-à-vis China could be
perceived as a way to improve bilateral trade, even foreign cultural affairs. The lift of
the embargo fitted that ambition and was the gateway to a more strategic dimension
to the relationship. The role of Chancellor Schröder was decisive in bringing the issue
to the fore, given a close relationship with the other ‘leader’ on the initiative,
President Chirac of France, and with the Chinese President. One may argue that
traded its habits of pace-setter in the trade area to a more political outfit. The German
diplomacy was active in convincing their European partners and the might of the
Franco-German engine was expected to conquer. The Franco-German alliance had
been successful in major integration initiatives including some foreign policy related
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ones (creation of Franco-German brigade Eurocorps in 1991 or creation of European
Council summits in 1974 on the initiative of the French President and the German
Chancellor). There was no misfit between a change in EU policy and Germany.
The wheels of the ‘Panzer Kanzler’ were however, blocked by a strong
opposition not only within government coalition ranks, but also by the Conservative
Party (in the opposition), the press and public opinion. Despite his supremacy on
foreign policy-making, the Chancellor underestimated the diversity of foreign policy
within the coalition and in the opposition. There were too many differences and it was
then impossible to reach a consensus. The domestic struggle was the Achilles’ heel of
the German attempt. The more the issue was dragging, the less likely it would be
resolved. The year 2005, with the anti-secession law on Taiwan and the pressure by
the United States to withdraw the initiative, combined with an election campaign
witnessed the slow death of the initiative. Germany had been successful in clearly
communicating about preferences uploading at the EU level but neglected the impact
of the domestic level.
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Chapter 6

Conclusion: Was there any European China Policy in the case of the embargo?

6.0

Introduction
To sum up our findings and conclude on the significance of our research, we did need

the point of view of the EU institutions themselves. I contacted representatives from the
European Council, the European Commission and Members of Parliament (see Appendix): I
obtained thirteen positive responses and ten were interviews. I organized the review of the
findings and the significance of our study in the following fashion: how did the hypotheses 2
and 3 checked and how significant the influence of the Big Three on EU sanction policy was;
how well the theories about domestic responses to Europeanization on community method
policies (formerly Pillar 1) by Börzel, Falkner et al. and Cowles et al. applied to foreign
policy by reviewing the various veto points.
In a similar fashion as Germany, the EU has experienced a less problematic
relationship with China than had Britain and France470. Since an EC delegation was
established in Beijing in 1988, a political dialogue was started in 1994, and an annual summit
began in 1998 (meetings at the ministerial level started in 1995), the EU as an actor began to
challenge the traditional dominance of London, Berlin and Paris in Europe’s relations with
China471. Initially though, the development of China-EU relations was progressive. One can
identify three periods in EU-China relations472. The first period, from 1975 to 1988 is
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motivated by business cooperation; the second period 1989-1995, with 1989 as a milestone in
the relationship when Europeans strongly condemned the Tiananmen massacre and
suspended dialogue with China. Since 1990, the EU has sponsored resolutions critical of the
PRC in the UN’s Geneva Human Rights Commission. From 1995, the relation shifted from
an only economic relation with criticism on political matters to a much more comprehensive
and elaborate cooperation. Nineteen Ninety-five marked the beginning of the real European
policy towards China.
The Chinese were actually the ones who pointed to the difficulties the government in
Beijing had in dealings with the EU and individual member states at the same time. While
China was seeking to establish itself as a global and coherent foreign policy power, the EU’s
foreign policy agenda did not necessarily follow those of its individual member states. There
were areas in which the EU was not yet a coherent actor in foreign and security policy, which
made it difficult for Brussels to formulate and implement a common position and common
policies. Beijing was faced with the dilemma of balancing its policies towards the EU and
towards the individual member states.
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6.1 The case of the embargo: an aberrant or normal issue for EU foreign policy?
The debate over a common approach to the rise of China has become one of the most
controversial and contested issues across the Atlantic and within Europe itself.

473

The lift of

the arms embargo was at the core of it. One may wonder why the issue would provoke so
much passion and intrigue whereas the measure itself never had a solid basis in EU law. The
embargo was based on a political Declaration on China made by the European Council
meeting in Madrid on 26 and 27 June 1989 and was never legally binding. This embargo
occurred before the creation of the European Union and before its Common Foreign and
Security Policy, which would establish policy later on legal instruments giving expression to
CFSP decisions, including embargoes. The arms ban on China then was an ‘empty shell’,
only a political declaration, and there was never a decision to revise its form.474 All other
sanction measures that pre-dated the creation of new EU legal instruments have either been
discontinued or have been renewed and given a different legal form.475
The arms embargo on China is unique in this regard. Since it was a political decision,
it never fell into the Commission sanctions portfolio. The European Council was the one
deciding to review it, not the Commission, which traditionally oversaw the application of
sanctions by working with the Council476. In its essence, the China sanction policy could only
be affected by Member States themselves. From this it can be argued that from a legal
perspective there is not one arms embargo against China but a series of member state
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embargoes established under country laws and regulations.477 It ultimately comes down to
the fact that once again the Member States have the last word when it comes to foreign
policy. The Europeanization of foreign policy regarding China remains more bottom-up and
horizontal than top-down. France and Germany, and at some point the UK, based on their
close ties with the PRC and their commercial and strategic interests in the region, pushed for
the lift, by setting the agenda and influencing other member states. The issue was ,moreover,
symbolic and major European countries wanted to send a symbol to return to normalcy to
Beijing by lifting the weapons embargo. The lift of the embargo fitted a bigger EU plan visà-vis China. The EU wanted to be China’s main partner and supply this huge market with
commercial goods and participate in infrastructure projects, such as high-speed trains, civil
engineering projects, and the construction of nuclear power plants. 478

6.2

Response to the embargo by other member states
Some member states did not know how to react when the issue was brought up by

France and Germany and were certainly not keen on lifting the ban479. The Netherlands,
Finland, Belgium, Portugal and Sweden voiced concerns over lifting the embargo without
significant improvements in China’s human rights. Despite the concerns, the Netherlands and
Denmark demonstrated willingness to agree to lift the of the weapons embargo if it was the
will of the majority. The opposition parties and public opinion in Northern European
countries were strongly opposed to the lift but could bear it as long as significant human
rights improvements were noticeable. In January 2004, Prime Minister Blackened, while the
Netherlands was the six-month acting EU President, stated that it would be detrimental for
477
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‘political and diplomatic relations for the Netherlands’ upcoming presidency if they were the
only country in favor of maintaining the embargo.480 The consensus was that to upgrade the
Common Position and beef up the Code of Conduct.481
When the U.S. started expressing their opposition to the measure, some member states
did start revising their position. The United Kingdom was the first to do so, based on its
special relationship with the United States. The new member states, also loyal to the United
States and grateful to have joined NATO, would follow.482 The creation of the strategic
dialogue on Asia between the United States and the EU did not soften the US stance.

6.3 Comparison of the influence and responses of the Big Three and their impact of
bilateral relations.
Throughout history, while the EU-PRC relationship was evolving, the Big Three the
uploaded their policy preferences to promoted their own relationship with China: a the trade
relationship for Germany, a political one for France, and the issue of Hong-Kong for the
United Kingdom,483 no matter what was happening at the EU level.
Although the UK became a foot-dragger on the issue of the embargo, by not putting the issue
on the agenda of its EU presidency in the second half of September 2005, the UK still used
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the Presidency medium to hold bilateral meetings between British and Chinese ministry
delegations…
In the questionnaire, I asked whether the bilateral relations helped or harmed in
developing a coherent EU China policy. It was established in the previous chapters that big
Member States pursued their own interests rather than a EU one. The UK made the choice to
abandon the ship, in order not to upset the US and lose them as a partner in its defense sector.
Did the French and Germans pursue the greater good, that is the EU one? The vision of a
multipolar world fits the aspirations of the EU to become a stronger political player. There
was no misfit between the German and French policies on one hand and with the proposed
EU policy on the other. The French and the German had a heavily regulated weapons sales
export system and a removal of the lift coincided with French ,German and EU interests.
Both countries qualified as pace-setters in their readiness for the policy but above all were
pace-setters in setting the agenda, formulating the policy and convincing other member
states. The greater good was to improve the China EU relationship, which fitted the vision of
a multipolar word; the short-term interest for France, Germany and their followers (Italy and
Spain were big proponents) was to increase their market share in China.484 Since there was
no true single common foreign policy, it was easier for member states to upload their state
interests through the EU, as Williams illustrated it with Zimbabwe485 and Britain or in the
case of Chad and France486. The British position was very fluid and did impact the outcome.
Britain contributed to confirm the second hypothesis that the Big Three had an influence on
EU sanction policy. Britain had an influence in maintaining the status quo and favoring the
484
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transatlantic bond over rising China and a coherent EU policy. Britain as a big power had the
capacity to tip the scale though very discreet and limited lobbying.
Germany, France and the UK undoubtedly played an important role in agenda setting,
policy formulation, exchange of ideas with Member States.487 The three Member States were
key players in the debate and exerted strong influence, but other countries such as Italy were
part of that group as well. Its Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi, spoke against the embargo
on several occasions.488
The influence of the Big Three was naturally more important at the European
Council level since the EU sanction policy on China was intergovernmental. One of the
questionnaire interviewees at the European Parliament, Silvestro Latella, political advisor
PSE-secretariat China delegation (group of European socialist parties), estimated that
sanction policy was intergovernmental in strategic issues but supranational for economic
issues.489 As suggested in the introductory chapter, the arms embargo did not qualify as a
sanction per se, since it was a declaration, loophole which needed to be addressed by an
updated sanction policy vis-à-vis China.490
Based on the fact that the decision emanated from the Council and was not legally
binding, there was some resentment even within European institutions about repealing the
embargo. The European Commission, originally, seemed divided over the review decision. It
appeared that the office of Commission President Romano Prodi was more in favor of lifting
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the embargo than the Commissioner for External Relations Chris Patten. Following the China
summit in October 2003, President Prodi declared that the Chinese request for removing the
embargo had a great chance of success, and when the decision about the review of the
embargo was taken in December 2003, Prodi officially supported the measure.491During the
early months of 2004, Commissioner Pattern and the External Relations office got on board
and concluded that the Code of Conduct might be a better method of restricting arms sales to
China.492
The European Parliament was much more vehement on its opposition. In that case,
there was a mismatch with France and Germany. The only democratically elected body never
supported the decision to lift the embargo and passed several resolutions stating its
opposition; the EP’s stance reflected frustration in domestic opposition parties and in the
public opinion as already mentioned in Chapter 2, The European Parliament always had a
strong human rights culture493. The Members of the European Parliament had an issue with
the fact that the Code of Conduct was not legally binding and therefore did not really make
countries comply with human rights obligations. 494

6.4

The place of China in the world and the aspirations of the EU as a global actor
The last question in the interview was about International Relations and asked about

possible increasing role of China in the international security sphere. Annalisa Giannella,
Personal representative of the High Representative on Non Proliferation at the European
Council, stated that, on her ‘campaign’ trip in Washington D.C. to convince the US partners,
491
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the embargo was an issue of adequacy in terms of the relationship with the PRC495. The
European Union wanted to develop a true partnership, and scrapping the restriction would
symbolize the increasingly positive tone of EU-China relations and the role of China in the
world. The rapid growth of Sino-European trade has coincided with the development of the
European Political union and of a common European political identity. The draft European
Security Strategy Paper stated that “a stronger Europe with a common strategic vision is also
a Europe capable of consolidating relationships with the other great partners” like China, as
“a pillar of the organization of the new world”496. Europe was trying to raise its profile in the
region and saw Beijing as an essential counterweight to US dominance in world affairs.’497
The relationship is also simplified by the fact that China is neither a military threat
nor geographically adjacent to Europe.498From the Chinese point of view, the European
diplomacy is not confrontational on human rights and respects national sovereignty. Thus,
the security concerns that dominate China’s relations with Washington do not hinder China’s
dealings with Europe.499 David Shambaugh goes further by identifying the Sino-European
relationship as an emerging “axis” in international relations based on three pillars: engaging
China through multilateral institutions that enhance its participation in international affairs;
intensifying bilateral Sino-European ties; and improving China’s “domestic capacity” to
govern.500 Both the EU and China aspire to play a greater role in international affairs, and
both promote a multipolar world, each representing one pole.
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The debate about the lift coincided with the ‘upgrade’ in EU-China relations to a
‘strategic partnership’. The concept implied a smooth relationship and an cooperation in an
increasing number of domains, including strategic ones501. Over time and especially since
1995, both EU and China agreed that their relation had not only expanded but also deepened
The EU Council’s secretary-general/high representative Javier Solana added that, as partners,
the EU and China had ‘significant global strengths, capabilities and responsibilities’. To
Solana, China was rapidly emerging as a world leader and positive actor on the global
stage’.502
The strategic partnership entailed that global solutions could not be found without
China. The PRC should play a more important role in international security. It is a global
player, member of the UN Security Council and there have been convergences on non
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and on Darfur, Burma or North Korea503. The
EU believed that by treating China as a respected interlocutor, it could encourage Beijing to
act as a partner on issues of global governance. The Chinese, though, saw the embargo as
discrimination, and it seemed difficult to expect leadership from China with an EU embargo.
The EU also expected Beijing to ratify the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, one of the main United Nations human rights treaties, in the near future.”504 China
could not be treated like pariah states such as Burma, Sudan and Zimbabwe, the only other
countries subject to EU arms embargoes. The EU leadership admitted there has not been
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enough progress on human rights but they maintain that China today is a more liberal country
than it was in 1989.505
In the words of EU External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner: “Both
the EU and China have changed beyond recognition in 30 years and so has our relationship.
Our existing trade and economic cooperation agreement simply does not live up to the
dynamism of today’s partnership. It’s time to reflect the vibrancy of our relations with an
ambitious new agreement that will help us move to a fully-fledged strategic partnership.”506 It
was agreed that the meaning of strategic would have to go beyond the traditional definition and
encompass a comprehensive partnership including economic and trade relations, civil society
exchanges and political relations.
However, despite the fact that the term “strategic partnership” was not defined by the
European Union, yet few have questioned the decision to include China as a strategic partner.
The EU’s objective should be to help China to be a peaceful, stable democratic (although not
necessarily in the full Western sense), internationally responsible country, internally consensus
seeking and externally multilateral, sharing broadly similar values and goals. The
intensification of bilateral ties between EU and China_ as well as between China and
individual member states _does not mean either the weakening of EU-US relations or the
guarantee that both want to establish a multipolar world.507
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6.5

Applicability of adaptation theories on foreign policy

The methodology was innovative by applying theories of adaptation to
Europeanization used for community method policies (formerly Pillar 1) to foreign policy.
Using Börzel, Falkner et al., and Cowles et al. theories, I intended to see how the three
member states of our study would respond to EU rule. The approach was challenging since
when it comes to foreign policy, member states are the ultimate decision-makers versus
community method policies where member states must comply. The members states
influence then the policy formulation at the EU level by uploading their policy preferences.
Using Börzel turned out to be easy to transpose to a foreign policy issue given the changing
attitude of Britain for example. Britain was first a fence-sitter, “watching” France and
Germany take the lead on the issue, wondering if it would correspond to its interests, before
it decided to jump on the bandwagon. Then, based on the strong reaction from the United
States, Britain became a foot-dragger and ended up tanking the initiative by convincing
other member states in the spring 2005 that the timing was not right and by not putting the
issue on the agenda of its EU presidency in the second half of 2005. France and Germany
were pace-setters from the beginning to the end, and even after 2005, French diplomacy
would still bring up the issue while traveling to the region Börzel’s classification could
apply to other foreign policy cases and translates how member states might change their
opinion as an opinion evolves.
The Cowles et al. and Falkner et al. theories were more difficult to transpose to
foreign policy since foreign policy does not only follow one type of Europeanization but
several. I had to adjust their models to my needs. Mismatch or misfit meant that there was
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either disagreement between a member state and the EU or unreadiness as for pursuing a
certain option. Match or fit meant that there was agreement between the Member State policy
and the EU proposed policy and readiness (export control regime) to adapt to the new policy.
I adjusted the mediating factors to predict and explain the responses of the member states to
Europeanization of EU China policy. Their models were complementary to my
questionnaire: the importance of external actors was not mentioned in the questionnaire but
was brought during interviews and turned out to be an important mediating factor. The model
was also a noteworthy tool to test the hypothesis of the influence of the ultimate impact of
external factors (H4).
As for future applications in foreign policy, with a reinforced High Representative,
We may see more top-down Europeanization of foreign policy and a stronger grip from
Brussels. Reinforced European foreign policy institutions will certainly require adjustments
in national political and administrative structures. In addition, this ‘national adaptation’
might well be supplemented by a process of ‘identity reconstruction’. The mere presence of
the high representative and his service are likely to increase expectations of a common EU
policy, thus constraining national policy choices and further enhancing the ‘coordination
reflex’ among capitals. This will matter all the more since the coordination process will
henceforth be led by genuine European actors rather than member state Council
presidencies508. Then, adaptation models such as Falkner et al. or Cowles et al. should be
easier to transpose. Let us now review three mediating factors that struck out and were
decisive in making the issue fail.
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6.6 The empowerment of external actors
6.6.1 The impact of the United States
The involvement of the US was decisive in sabotaging the initiative of the lift and
was another mediating factor to explain the goodness of fit with the policy. The pro-active
stance of the US, we might even call the US as an ‘external’ foot-dragger, confirmed the
hypothesis that any policy initiative changing the EU sanction policy on China needs to be
approved by the US, whether the lobbying for the proposal was successful or not.
The US animosity was probably underestimated by the Europeans and not necessarily
understandable given the US record regarding weapon sales to China. Indeed, the U.S.
previously sold both dual use technologies and arms to China509. The frenzy about a potential
conflict in the Taiwan Strait puzzled the Europeans. The PRC would not engage Taiwan in a
war while the island was one of the largest foreign investors in the Chinese economy. The
issue seemed more a turf brawl where the US might feel threatened by the emerging SinoEuropean Axis and by the economic and geopolitical rise of China, which might threaten the
ability of the U.S. to act as a unique balancing power in the region and marginalizing its
regional influence.510
Although the arms embargo issue introduced yet another serious dispute into U.S.European relations, it led to the creation of dialogue between the U.S. and Europe to
coordinate their policies in Asia and have a strategic discussion about how China
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development can contribute to international security.511The EU was the initiator of those
forums with a view to avoid further misunderstandings about policies. These dialogues were
conducted by the so-called troika, consisting of the senior official in charge of East Asia at
the foreign ministry of the incumbent presidency and the ones of the previous and the next
presidency. Their interlocutor on the US side was the assistant-secretary of state for AsiaPacific Affairs, Chris Hill. Main themes on the agenda were global issues such as the Middle
East, Iran, North Korea, terrorism etc., where the US and the EU have common concerns.
The focus was no longer on the lifting of the arms embargo: the proposal had been removed
from the EU agenda due to a lack of consensus within the Union.512
6.6.2 Taiwan
The EU’s official policy with regard to Taiwan was consistent with that of the
Chinese government’s “one-China” principle. On Taiwan, there is no mismatch between
France, Germany, Britain, and the EU: they all recognize the government of the People’s
Republic of China to be the sole legal government of China, they do not acknowledge
Taiwan as a sovereign country, and they have no established diplomatic relations with the
island. On the other hand, as the EU’s third largest trading partner in Asia, Taiwan is an
important economic partner; therefore, its interests cannot be completely ignored. The EU’s
main objective in managing these relationships has been to try balancing economic relations
with Taiwan while maintaining good political relations with Beijing. For the most part, the
EU has employed a cautious approach toward Taiwan that has caused little friction, but has
not been completely without controversy. Following passage by the Chinese government of
an anti-secession law directed at Taiwan, the EU Commission voiced its concern over an
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explicit reference that was made to the use of “non-peaceful means” to resolve the issue and
warned against unilateral action. The Commission stressed that “any arrangement between
Beijing and Taipei could only be achieved on a mutually acceptable basis, with reference
also to the wishes of the Taiwanese population” (Commission of the European Communities
2005).513 The EU; however, did not associate the anti-Secession Law issue with the lift of the
arms embargo, unlike the United States. Given the poor record on human rights, the timing of
the Chinese was disastrous and showed that the Chinese authorities did not make any
connections between the two, and as expected, the Taiwan issue remained more important to
the US than EU-China relations, even when it comes to arms sales. Secondly, it is worth
noticing that the EU and Member States do no seem too alarmed by the security
considerations in the region of Asia when they conceive of their relations with China, since
they are not directly involved, which might have explained the neutral reaction at the
announcement.514 This attitude differs with the US which is involved in the region.515

6.7 A main veto point: The weight of domestic opposition
Domestic opposition was the other main veto point that tipped the scale in several
countries. It seemed that there was almost a consensus among the Member States’
governments that the embargo should be reviewed and possibly removed, while the national
political oppositions in most of the member states were against the process regardless of
political affiliation. For the Big Three, the level of opposition was the most vociferous in
Germany, then followed by the UK and somehow under control in France since there was not
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so much of a public debate. Even though this opened up a chance for debate on EU foreign
policy, this divide between those in power (on the "inside") and those in opposition (on the
"outside") created a strange political landscape and reinforced the idea of ‘democratic deficit’
where national voters and citizens had no control whatsoever about the decisions made in
Brussels. This criticism was not necessarily fair since most of those decisions were actually
taken by Member States themselves and specifically by the Executive Branch. The European
Parliament, as the only democratically elected European body could only reject the decision
affecting the outcome of the policy since it only had a consultative role in foreign policy. In a
sense, the consequence of insider-outsider politics is that the EU acquired a foreign policy
but not a debate on foreign politics. This might create a lack of confidence in the EU as a
security provider, both among the member states and among the citizens, which would make
it harder to implement some of the objectives in the European Security Strategy.516

6.8 The thorny issue of human rights
The status of human rights was a scale-tipping issue not only within the EU but of
course outside the EU. Human rights were a mediating factor that prevented the proponents
of the repeal to succeed in their enterprise. The EU showed some progress made by the PRC
on this issue, as far as permanent dialogue, participation in some conventions and other
benchmarks. Giannella insisted though that ‘the West’ was expecting some strong signals
such as the release of political prisoners from the Tiananmen events, which never
materialized517.
516
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The issue was that the embargo has been ineffective in improving human rights. In
response, European Member States have ceased to link political and human rights dialogues
to possible sanctions on trade or security issues.518 The EU has not reached consensus on
those issues, whether it is between member states or between institutions. Bilateral relations
have then gained ground in the recent period.
Tibet is just one key example key issue that has poisoned political relations between
the EU and China. The EU regularly raises the issue of Tibet in its bilateral dialogues with
China and has asked for a Chinese ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) as part of the solution. The ratification of the ICCPR and its
application to Tibet, and elsewhere in China, is viewed as an important benchmark of
progress in the EU-China dialogue. However, despite years of pressure on this issue, the
Chinese government has not ratified the covenant, and the EU continues to voice its concerns
over religious freedom, cultural rights, and what has been called “ethnic dilution” in Tibet.
6.9

Conclusion and agenda for future research
The debate surrounding the arms embargo on China highlighted some important

problems regarding the development of EU foreign policy. It also revealed some indication
of the potential the EU carries as a political actor. The EU seemed to have a hard time to find
a right balance between its economic and security interests in its China policy and struggled
to define its own identity, often overshadowed by the Big Three. The Big Three significantly
Europeanized the EU China policy through uploading their preferences. At the same time it
appears that European countries have not, either individually or collectively, made a
systematic assessment about China, or despite their influence on EU institutions, strived to
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develop a coherent China policy. Thinking about China has been driven by political and
commercial considerations rather than an evaluation of the security environment in East Asia
and China’s place within it.519
The Member States of the EU must also recognize the critical importance of speaking
with one voice on China. Their habit of focusing on short-term interests has to be questioned.
EU Member States, acting together, can play a vital role in bringing progress to China and
other developing nations. The Union’s soft-power “toolbox” (trade, finance, technical
assistance, etc.) should be used to demonstrate to Beijing the importance of regional
cooperation and the fact that a strategic partnership with the EU should be a clear “win-win”
for both sides.520
Furthermore, the European Security Strategy states that strategic concerns and human
rights are important objectives for EU foreign and security policy. There is, however, no
indication as to which of these two is considered more important. It seems that the EU as a
political entity should be able to bring some leadership on conflicting issues characterizing
foreign policy, without waiting on indications coming from Member States. Continuing to
link the lifting of the arms ban to progress in China’s human rights improvement for instance,
will be increasingly difficult to sustain and indeed may become an irritation as the EU begins
to implement its comprehensive strategic partnership with China. There is an opportunity,
entirely novel that the EU should seize. The fact that the High Representative for Foreign and
Security Policy is now the Commissioner for External Relations should indicate how human
rights, trade and strategic interests will affect one another.
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Finally, it would be interesting look at other regions to see whether the EU sided with
human rights or trade, or whether the EU chose a pioneering road. In the case of EU
leadership in sanctions, it could be interesting to expand our case to others and assess the
status of member states’ sanctions legislation, investigations and prosecution of alleged noncompliance and enforcement.
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APPENDIX
Questionnaire

General Questions
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Neutral

Should the
European Union lift
the arms embargo
on China?
Does any EU
Member State
influence EU China
sanction policy?
Would you agree
that the arms
embargo on China
is a necessary
policy?
Is the expression
‘strategic partner’
a good
characterization to
qualify the EU
partnership with
China?
Would you agree
that when it comes
to defense and
security issues,
Britain, France and
Germany have the
reputation to play
a significant role in
moving issues in
the European
Union?
Would you agree
that the leadership
of one or more
heads of states
within the EU has
been determinant
in the debate to lift
of the arms
embargo on China?
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Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

No Opinion /
Do not Know

2. Institutional Questions
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

No opinion /
Do not know

Generally would you
say that the EU
sanction policy is
more supranational
than
intergovernmental?
Would you say that
there has been
influence coming
from both Brussels
and the Member
States regarding EU
sanction policy vis-àvis China?

3. Role of EU Member States

Please answer from your office's official perspective.

Very
Significant

Significant

What kind of
influence does
Britain, France or
Germany have on
EU China sanction
policy?
What kind of
influence does
Britain, France or
Germany have on
EU Sanction
policy?
What role has
Britain, France or
Germany
generally played
in the debate of
the lift of the arms
embargo in China?
What level of
success has
Britain, France or
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Neutral

Insignificant

Very
Insignificant

Don't
know

Germany obtained
in having its views
on EU sanction
policy adopted at
the EU level?
What level of
success has the
European Union
obtained in having
its views adopted
at the Member
States’ level
regarding China
sanction policy?
What level of
success has
Britain, France or
Germany obtained
in communicating
or sharing ideas
with other
Member States
regarding EU
China sanction
policy?
What role did
Britain, France or
Germany play in
helping formulate
policies at the EU
level regarding
China sanction
policy?
How significant
has Britain, France
or Germany's
leadership been in
the debate
regarding sanction
policy vis-à-vis
China?
How significant
has the leadership
of Britain, France
or Germany's
head of state been
in the debate to
lift the arms
embargo on
China?

4. Would you agree that France, Britain and Germany have been key players played in the debate
to lift the arms embargo on China?
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Strongly Agree

Agree

Neutral

Disagree

Strongly Disagree

5. If you agree, in which capacity did those states play a significant role?

I do not agree with Question #4.
formulation

Agenda-setting

Policy

Exchange of ideas with other Member States

6. Bilateral Relations
Strongly
Agree

Agree

Would you agree that
the bilateral relations
of Britain, France or
Germany with China
helped the EU
develop a unified
policy on the PRC?
Would you agree that
Britain, France or
Germany has a
special relationship
with the PRC?
Would you agree that
China should play a
more important role
in international
security?
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Neutral

Disagree

Strongly
Disagree

EU Declaration on China Arms embargo - European Council: Madrid, 26-27 June 1989
The European Council, recalling the declaration of the twelve of June 6, strongly condemns the brutal
repression taking place in China. It expresses its dismay at the pursuit of executions in spite of all the
appeals of the international community. It solemnly requests the Chinese authorities to stop the
executions and to put an end to the repressive actions against those who legitimately claim their
democratic rights.
The European Council requests the Chinese authorities to respect human rights and to take into
account the hopes for freedom and democracy deeply felt by the population. It underlines that this is
an essential element for the pursuit of the policy of reforms and openness that has been supported by
the European Community and its member states.
The twelve are aware that the recent events have caused great anxiety in Hong Kong.
In the present circumstances the European Council thinks it necessary to adopt the following
measures:


raising the issue of human rights in China in the appropriate international fora: asking for
the admittance of independent observers to attend the trials and to visit the prisons,



interruption by the member states of the community of military cooperation and an embargo
on trade in arms with China,



suspension of bilateral Ministerial and High Level contacts,



postponement by the community and its member states of new cooperation projects,



reduction of programmes of cultural, scientific and technical cooperation to only those
activities that might maintain a meaning in the present circumstances,



prolongation by the member states of visas to Chinese students who wish it.
Taking into account the climate of uncertainty created in the economic field by the present policy of
the Chinese authorities, the European Council advocates the postponement of the examination of new
requests for credit insurance and the postponement of the examination of new credits of the World
Bank.
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Table Contacts United Kingdom
The color code corresponds the following: green means a positive response (correspondence, documents or interview), yellow means a
suggestion to another contact, red means not available or not competent, blank means no response.

UNITED
KINGDOM
Name

Position / Affiliation

Status

yrossr@parliament.uk

British MEP / Com Foreign Affairs

stuartg@parliament.uk

British MP / Com For Affairs

kenpurchasemp@parliament.uk

British MP / Com For Affairs

popegj@parliament.uk

British MP / Com For Affairs

osbornes@parliament.uk

British MP / Com For Affairs

mossm@parliament.uk

British MP / Com For Affairs

mackinlaya@parliament.uk

British MP / Com For Affairs

keetchp@parliament.uk

British MP / Com For Affairs

illsleye@parliament.uk

British MP / Com For Affairs

horamj@parliament.uk

British MP / Com For Affairs

heathcoat-amoryd@parliament.uk

British MP / Com For Affairs

hamiltonf@parliament.uk
gapesm@parliament.uk

British MP / Com For Affairs
British MP / Chairman Com Foreign Affairs / House of
Commons

smithj@parliament.uk

British MP / Com Defense

renniew@parliament.uk

British MP / Com Defense

kevanjonesmp@parliament.uk

British MP / Com Defense

jenkinsb@parliament.uk

British MP / Com Defense

hollowaya@parliament.uk

British MP / Com Defense

havardd@parliament.uk

British MP / Com Defense

portsmouthldp@cix.co.uk

British MP / Com Defense

hamiltonda@parliament.uk

British MP / Com Defense

gilroyl@parliament.uk

British MP / Com Defense

Robert Key

British MP / Com Defense

11/20 short answer

12/11 meeting in London / House of Commons

no time but attached a speech

11/12 too busy
11/12 cannot help me, the Foreign Affairs Com has the lead on
this
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Name

Position / Affiliation

crausbyd@parliament.uk

British MP / Com Defense

borrowd@parliament.uk

British MP / Com Defense

Status

arbuthnotj@parliament.uk

British MP / Chairman Defence Com House of Commons

timothy.kirkhope@btinternet.com

British MEP / Delegation China

glyn.ford@europarl.europa.eu

British MEP / Delegation China

charles.tannock@europarl.europa.eu

British MEP / Com Foreign Affairs

emma.nicholson@europarl.europa.eu

British MEP / Com Foreign Affairs

richard.howitt@geo2.poptel.org.uk

British MEP / Com Foreign Affairs

11/9 Email_ No 11/22 too busy to meet

ratsmep@sir-robertatkins.org

British MEP / Com Foreign Affairs + China delegation

connartym@parliament.uk

British MP / Chairman european scrutiny Committee

baileya@parliament.uk

British MP / Com European Scrutiny

borrowd@parliament.uk

British MP / Com European Scrutiny

clappisonj@parliament.uk

British MP / Com European Scrutiny

William Cash

British MP / Com European Scrutiny

clarkk@parliament.uk

British MP / Com European Scrutiny

dobbinj@parliament.uk

British MP / Com European Scrutiny

heathcoat-amoryd@parliament.uk

British MP / Com European Scrutiny

mail@greghands.com

British MP / Com European Scrutiny

hillk@parliament.uk

British MP / Com European Scrutiny

hopkinsk@parliament.uk

British MP / Com European Scrutiny

wilsonp@parliament.uk

British MP / Com European Scrutiny

laxtonb@parliament.uk

British MP / Com European Scrutiny

robertsona@parliament.uk

British MP / Com European Scrutiny

yrossr@parliament.uk

British MP / Com European Scrutiny

steena@parliament.uk

British MP / Com European Scrutiny

11/13 too busy

Name

Position / Affiliation

Status

reidj@parliament.uk

MP House of Commons / former Defense Secretary

response 11/30, too busy, suggested to contact Des Browne

contact@geoffhoonmp.co.uk

MP House of Commons / former Defense Secretary

camerond@parliament.uk

Leader Conservative Party UK

Tessa Harris

First Secretary RELEX Counselor, UK Rep to the EU

no response

Andrew Jelfs

WMD Proliferation, UK Rep to the EU
Second Secretary Asia and COASI Representative,
UKREP

no response

Anna.Durham@fco.gov.uk

saw him in DC and gave the letter / questionnaire
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too buy that week_retry?

Deputy Ambassador Barow

deputy ambassador UKREP

sent an email but no response

Ambassador Darroch

UKREP

the asst forwarded my request to Ana Durham

Jim Murphy

Minister for Europe (Gordon Brown Cabinet)

gave a letter to his staffer when he came to Washington

Des Browne

Minister of Defense

gave a letter to his staffer when he came to Washington

haguew@parliament.uk

Shadow Foreign Secretary / Conservative Party UK

Roger Liddle
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Table Contacts European Union
The color code corresponds the following: green means a positive response (correspondence, documents or interview), yellow means a
suggestion to another contact, red means not available or not competent, blank means no response.

EUROPEAN UNION
Name

Position / Affiliation

evelyne.gebhardt@europarl.europa.eu
jorgo.chatzimarkakis@europarl.europa.eu
daniel.cohn-bendit@europarl.europa.eu
wahlkreisbuero@christian-ehler.de
alexandergraf.lambsdorff@europarl.europa.eu
info@wogau.de
mail@bernd-posselt.de
tobias.pflueger@europarl.europa.eu
cem.ozdemir@europarl.europa.eu
vural.oeger@europarl.europa.eu
helmut.kuhne@europarl.europa.eu
klaus.haensch@spd.de
elmar.brok@europarl.europa.eu
alfred.gomolka@europarl.europa.eu
michael.gahler@europarl.europa.eu
André Brie
Gerrard Quille
Tim Boden
Mr Latella
Raul Romeva

German MEP / Subcom Security And Defense
German MEP / Subcom Security And Defense
German MEP / Subcom Security And Defense
German MEP / Subcom Security And Defense
German MEP / Subcom Security And Defense
German MEP / Chairman Subcom Defense and security
German MEP / Com Foreign Affairs
German MEP / Com Foreign Affairs
German MEP / Com Foreign Affairs
German MEP / Com Foreign Affairs
German MEP / Com Foreign Affairs
German MEP / Com Foreign Affairs
German MEP / Com Foreign Affairs
German MEP / Com Foreign Affairs
German MEP / Com Foreign Affairs
German MEP / Committee Foreign Affairs
Specialist Security and Defence Policy Department, EPP
interparlemientary delegation fOr non eur countries
political advisor PSE-secretariat China delegation
Spanish MEP / Rapporteur Com. Foreign affairs
DG External Relations, DH 2 (China), European
Commmission

Franz Jessen
Michalis Rokas
Annalisa Gianella

EC / High Representative Non Proliferation
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Status
11/28 suggested two contacts Boden and
Latella

11/13 very detailed answer on his position

Meeting Brussels 12/17 at 4pm
meeting dec 17
meeting dec 17
meeting january 2008 but need to reschedule
met may 15

Ambassador Abou
dietmar.nickel@europarl.europa.eu
jean-luc.dehaene@europarl.europa.eu
Name
michel.rocard@europarl.eu.int
martine.roure@europarl.eu.int
anne.laperrouze@europarl.europa.eu
jhenin@europarl.eu.int
francis.wurtz@europarl.europa.eu
Helene Flautre
beatrice.patrie@europarl.europa.eu
paulmarie.couteaux@europarl.europa.eu
pmorillon@europarl.eu.int
avatanen@europarl.eu.int

Ambassador to the EU delegation in Beijing
Director for External Relations at the EP
Belgian MEP / Vice Pres China Delegation
Position / Affiliation
French MEP / Com Foreign Affairs
French MEP / Com Foreign Affairs
French MEP / Com Foreign Affairs
French MEP / Com Foreign Affairs
French MEP / Com Foreign Affairs
French MEP / Com Foreign Affairs
French MEP / Com Foreign Affairs
French MEP / Com Foreign Affairs
French MEP / Com Foreign Affairs
MEP / Com Foreign Affairs
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oriented me towards Gerrad Quille f
Status

suggested to contact Raumeva, rapporteur

recommended China delegation
met dec 17 2007

Table Contacts France
The color code corresponds the following: green means a positive response (correspondence, documents or interview), yellow means a
suggestion to another contact, red means not available or not competent, blank means no response.

FRANCE
Name

Position / Affiliation

Status

Bureau Hubert Vedrine

Former Minister Foreign Affairs France

meeting 11/22/2007

e.sallenave@senat.fr

Staff Senate Defense Commission

meeting dec 2007

s.dassault@senat.fr

French Senator / Delegation PRC

s.lagauche@senat.fr

French Senator / Delegation PRC / Rapporteur

j.faure@senat.fr

French Senator / Delegation PRC / Vice Chairman

p.brisepierre@senat.fr

French Senator / Delegation PRC / Vice Chairman

jl.dupont@senat.fr

French Senator / Delegation PRC / Vice Chairman

suggested contacted E. Sallenave

besson.jean@wanadoo.fr

French Senator / Delegation PRC / Chairman

l'administrateur, Mr Benoît Chadenet au 01 42 34 26 70

bdepierre@assemblee-nationale.fr

Frenc Representative / My district

meeting sept 12

jp.plancade@senat.fr

French Senator / Vice Pres Com Foreign Affairs and Defense

p.nogrix@senat.fr

French Senator / Vice Pres Com Foreign Affairs and Defense

robert.hue-senat@wanadoo.fr

French Senator / Vice Pres Com Foreign Affairs and Defense

r.delpicchia@senat.fr

French Senator / Vice Pres Com Foreign Affairs and Defense

m.cerisier-ben-guiga@senat.fr

French Senator / Vice Pres Com Foreign Affairs and Defense

jacques.blanc@senat.fr

French Senator / Vice Pres Com Foreign Affairs and Defense

j.francois-poncet@senat.fr

French Senator / Vice Pres Com Foreign Affairs and Defense

s.vincon@senat.fr

French Senator / Pres Pres Com Foreign Affairs and Defense

Name

Position / Affiliation

Chirac Jacques

Former French President / Member Constitutional Council

Recommended Francois R. Elysee + Asie Oceanie Foreign Affairs

Douste-Blazy Philippe

Special Advisor Pdt Sarkozy / Former Minister Foreign Affairs France

letter sent, no response

Levitte Jean-David

National Security Advisor Pdt Sarkozy / Former Ambassador in China

Meeting with Mr. R. @Elysee 12/12

Marc Abensour

Under director Industrial Issues and Sensitive Exports, Foreign Affairs

Laurent Delahousse

First Secretary French embassy

Raffarin Jean-Pierre

Former Prime Minister France / Senator

Letter and email sent, responded recommended me Senator Vallade

Pierre Lellouche

French MP / Com Defense

been treying to meet did not work out, one last try this fall?

meeting 12/12 French Senate
suggested contacted E. Sallenave

Status

gave me a few contacts
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Pierre Selal
pmoscovici@assembleenationale.fr

Ambassador for French Permanent Delegation in Brussels

1/4 h d'entretien telephonique durant sejour

Member of French Parliament

recommended by Michel Rocard, sent an email but no response

Christophe Parisot

Counselor RELEX COARM and CODUN

Ambassador Ladsous

French Ambassador to China

christine.roger@diplomatie.gouv.fr

French ambassador to COPS

jean-rene.legoff@diplomatie.gouv.fr

Counselor Armament / COPS

nicolas.demetriades@diplomatie.gouv.fr

Associate Counselor Armament / COPS

Christophe Viprey

DGTPE General Direction of the Treasury and the Political Economy

Emmanuel Vivet

French Permanent Representation in Brussels

Jean Louhest

Asst Assoc director Asia Desk / Minsiter for Foreign affairs France

suggested by French embassy in DC, but too busy

Louis de Broissia

French Senator / My district

could not meet in September or try December

Michelle Alliot-Marie

Minister of Interior France / Former Defense Minister

suggested I send my questions by mail

Army controller / Advisor to the Pdt of the Defence Committee / French Parl.
Director Non Proliferation Ministry Foreign Affairs, Former Advisor Ministry of
Defense

meeting 12/14 @ National Assembly 3pm

Juppe Alain
Gerard Bonnardot
Camille Grand

need to contact him, recommended by Vivet

responded that his former chief of staff would get back to me, never did
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met dec 19 2007

Table Contacts Germany
The color code corresponds the following: green means a positive response (correspondence, documents or interview), yellow means a
suggestion to another contact, red means not available or not competent, blank means no response.

GERMANY
Contact
Date

Name

Position / Affiliation

Ulrike Merten, SPD

Chairman Defence Com / Bundestag

8-Mar

De 5_

Dr. Karl A. Lamers (Heidelberg),
CDU/CSU

Vice Chairman Defence Com / Bundestag

8-Mar

8-Mar

Ulrich Adam |

German MP / Defence Com

Dec 4_

Status

no too busy

8-Mar

Ernst-Reinhard Beck (Reutlingen)

German MP / Defence Com

8-Mar

Monika Brüning

German MP / Defence Com

8-Mar

Jürgen Herrmann

German MP / Defence Com

8-Mar

Robert Hochbaum

German MP / Defence Com

8-Mar

Henning Otte

German MP / Defence Com

8-Mar

Hans Raidel

German MP / Defence Com

8-Mar

Kurt J. Rossmanith

German MP / Defence Com

8-Mar

Anita Schäfer (Saalstadt)

German MP / Defence Com

8-Mar

Bernd Siebert

German MP / Defence Com

8-Mar

Rainer Arnold | *)

German MP / Defence Com

8-Mar

Dr. Hans-Peter Bartels

German MP / Defence Com / SPD

8-Mar

Petra Heß

German MP / Defence Com / SPD

8-Mar

Gerd Höfer

German MP / Defence Com / SPD

8-Mar

Rolf Kramer

German MP / Defence Com / SPD

8-Mar

Ursula Mogg

German MP / Defence Com / SPD

Contact Heinrich Kreft at the CDU/CSU party

recommended to call Dr. Uwe Stehr for an appointment

German MP / Defence Com / SPD
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Maik Reichel
Dec 5_

Jörn Thießen

German MP / Defence Com / SPD

8-Mar

Hedi Wegener

German MP / Defence Com / SPD

8-Mar

Andreas Weigel

German MP / Defence Com / SPD

8-Mar

Elke Hoff |

German MP / Defence Com / FDP

10-Mar

Birgit Homburger

German MP / Defence Com / FDP

10-Mar

Dr. Rainer Stinner

German MP / Defence Com / FDP

14-Mar

Inge Höger |

German MP / Defence Com / Die Linke

14-Mar

Dr. Gesine Lötzsch

German MP / Defence Com / Die Linke

14-Mar

Paul Schäfer (Köln)

16-Mar

Alexander Bonde |

die grunen

16-Mar

Winfried Nachtwei

die Grunen

16-Mar

Gert Winkelmeier

16-Mar

Gunther Krichbaum, CDU/CSU

Chairman Affairs of the European Uniion Com

16-Mar

Kurt Bodewig, SPD

Deputy Chairman

18-Mar

Peter Albach

CDU / CSU

18-Mar

Thomas Bareiss

CDU / CSU

18-Mar

8-Mar
response 3/14

March 18 Contact Ottfried Nassauer, BITS

long response from a staffer
April 1, can send questions and also attached speeches

not

Veronika Bellmann

CDU / CSU

Carl Eduard von Bismarck

CDU / CSU

na

18-Mar

Dr. Stephan Eisel

CDU / CSU

4/23 termin

18-Mar

Bernhard Kaster

CDU / CSU

03/19 gave me four contacts: think tanks and scholars

18-Mar

Eduard Lintner

CDU / CSU

3/28 ok for an appointment

Thomas Silberhorn

CDU / CSU

Michael Stübgen

CDU / CSU

na

18-Mar

211

18-Mar

Hans Peter Thul

CDU / CSU

18-Mar
Contact
Date

Dr. Lale Akgün |

SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU

contact Gert Weisskirchen Arbeitsgruppe Aussen Polkitik

Name

Position / Affiliation

Status

18-Mar

Clemens Bollen

SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU

18-Mar

Hans Eichel

SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU

18-Mar

Rainer Fornahl

SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU

18-Mar

Lothar Ibrügger

SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU

4-11 recommends Wirtschaft und technologie

18-Mar

Josip Juratovic

SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU

no was not in office at the time

18-Mar

Steffen Reiche (Cottbus)

SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU

25-Mar

Michael Roth (Heringen)

SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU

25-Mar

Axel Schäfer (Bochum)

SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU

4-1 ok for a meeting but needs to set it up
3-28 redirected me towards Axel Schaefer europapolitischer
Sprecher der
SPD-Bundestagsfraktion

25-Mar

Ottmar Schreiner

SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU

25-Mar

Dr. Martin Schwanholz

SPD German MP / Com Affairs of the EU

Michael Georg Link (Heilbronn) |

FDP German MP / Com Affairs of the EU

NA

25-Mar

Markus Löning

FDP German MP / Com Affairs of the EU

4/16 responded by email and sent some literature

25-Mar

Florian Toncar

FDP German MP / Com Affairs of the EU

NA

na

Dr. Diether Dehm

Die Linke German MP / Com Affairs of the EU

na

na

Dr. Hakki Keskin

Die Linke German MP / Com Affairs of the EU

na

Alexander Ulrich

Die Linke German MP / Com Affairs of the EU

25-Mar
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25-Mar

Omid Nouripour

DIE GRÜNEN German MP / Com Affairs of the EU

Contact kerstin mueller, spokeswoman for the Greens

25-Mar

Rainder Steenblock

DIE GRÜNEN German MP / Com Affairs of the EU

contact Trittin oder or kerstin mueller

25-Mar

Jürgen Trittin

DIE GRÜNEN German MP / Com Affairs of the EU

25-Mar

Ruprecht Polenz, CDU/CSU

Chairman Foreign Affairs

25-Mar

Hans-Ulrich Klose, SPD

Vice Chairman Foreign affairs

25-Mar

Anke Eymer (Lübeck) |

CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Erich G. Fritz

CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Dr. Peter Gauweiler

CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Hermann Gröhe

CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Manfred Grund

CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Dr. Karl-Theodor Freiherr zu
Guttenberg

CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Joachim Hörster |

CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Eckart von Klaeden

CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Eduard Lintner

CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Ruprecht Polenz

CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Bernd Schmidbauer

CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Karl-Georg Wellmann

CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Willy Wimmer (Neuss)

CDU / CSU MEP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Niels Annen |

SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Detlef Dzembritzki

SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Monika Griefahn

SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs
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set up an appoointment, but had to reschedule

4-28 response

27-Apr

Brunhilde Irber

SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Johannes Jung (Karlsruhe)

SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Hans-Ulrich Klose

SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Markus Meckel

SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Dr. Rolf Mützenich

SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Johannes Andreas Pflug

SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Otto Schily

SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Dr. Ditmar Staffelt

SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Gert Weisskirchen (Wiesloch)

SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Uta Zapf

SPD German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

Johannes Pflug verantwortlich fir china

27-Apr

Dr. Wolfgang Gerhardt |

FDP German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

no nicht in Berlin 4/28

27-Apr

Dr. Werner Hoyer

FDP German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Harald Leibrecht

FDP German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Marina Schuster

FDP German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

24-Apr

Wolfgang Gehrcke | *)

Die Linke German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Monika Knoche

Die Linke German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Dr. Norman Paech

Die Linke German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Marieluise Beck (Bremen) |

DIE GRÜNEN German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

27-Apr

Dr. Uschi Eid

DIE GRÜNEN German MP / Com Foreign Affairs
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meeting set up, could not go, refused phone interview

ok to respond, need to send questions

27-Apr

Kerstin Müller (Köln

DIE GRÜNEN German MP / Com Foreign Affairs

15-May

Klara Maria Flint

press section

too short notice, try again

15-May

Valerie Karadelnizli

press section

tried but no response
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European Union Code of Conduct for Arms Exports
'European Union Code of Conduct for Arms Exports,' agreed by European Union (EU)
Foreign Ministers on 25 May; formally adopted at the EU Council of Ministers, 8-9 June
1998
"The Council of the European Union,
Building on the Common Criteria agreed at the Luxembourg and Lisbon European Councils
in 1991 and 1992,
Recognising the special responsibility of arms exporting States,
Determined to set high common standards which should be regarded as the minimum for the
management of, and restraint in, conventional arms transfers by all EU Member States, and
to strengthen the exchange of relevant information with a view to achieving greater
transparency,
Determined to prevent the export of equipment which might be used for internal repression
or international aggression, or contribute to regional instability,
Wishing within the framework of the CFSP [Common Foreign & Security Policy] to
reinforce their cooperation and to promote their convergence in the field of conventional
arms exports,
Noting complementary measures taken by the EU against illicit transfers, in the form of the
EU Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms,
Acknowledging the wish of EU Member States to maintain a defence industry as part of
their industrial base as well as their defence effort,
Recognising that States have a right to transfer the means of self-defence, consistent with the
right of self-defence recognised by the UN Charter,
have adopted the following Code of Conduct…:
Criterion One
Respect for the international commitments of EU Member States, in particular the
sanctions decreed by the UN Security Council and those decreed by the Community,
agreements on non-proliferation and other subjects, as well as other international
obligations
An export licence should be refused if approval would be inconsistent with, inter alia:
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a) the international obligations of Member States and their commitments to enforce UN,
OSCE and EU arms embargoes;
b) the international obligations of Member States under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons
Convention;
c) their commitments in the frameworks of the Australia Group, the Missile Technology
Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement;
d) their commitment not to export any form of anti-personnel landmine.
Criterion Two
The respect of human rights in the country of final destination
Having assessed the recipient country's attitude towards relevant principles established by
international human rights instruments, Member States will:
a) not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the proposed export might be used
for internal repression;
b) exercise special caution and vigilance in issuing licences, on a case-by-case basis and
taking account of the nature of the equipment, to countries where serious violations of human
rights have been established by the competent bodies of the UN, the Council of Europe or by
the EU.
For these purposes, equipment which might be used for internal repression will include, inter
alia, equipment where there is evidence of the use of this or similar equipment for internal
repression by the proposed end-user, or where there is reason to believe that the equipment
will be diverted from its stated end-use or end-user and used for internal repression. In line
with operative paragraph 1 of this Code, the nature of the equipment will be considered
carefully, particularly if it is intended for internal security purposes. Internal repression
includes, inter alia, torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment,
summary or arbitrary executions, disappearances, arbitrary detentions and other major
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms as set out in relevant international
human rights instruments, including the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Criterion Three
The internal situation in the country of final destination, as a function of the existence of
tensions or armed conflicts
Member States will not allow exports which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or
aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination.
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Criterion Four
Preservation of regional peace, security and stability
Member States will not issue an export licence if there is a clear risk that the intended
recipient would use the proposed export aggressively against another country or to assert by
force a territorial claim. When considering these risks, EU Member States will take into
account inter alia:
a) the existence or likelihood of armed conflict between the recipient and another country;
b) a claim against the territory of a neighbouring country which the recipient has in the past
tried or threatened to pursue by means of force;
c) whether the equipment would be likely to be used other than for the legitimate national
security and defence of the recipient;
d) the need not to affect adversely regional stability in any significant way.
Criterion Five
The national security of the Member States and of territories whose external relations are
the responsibility of a Member State, as well as that of friendly and allied countries
Member States will take into account:
a) the potential effect of the proposed export on their defence and security interests and those
of friends, allies and other Member States, while recognising that this factor cannot affect
consideration of the criteria on respect of human rights and on regional peace, security and
stability;
b) the risk of use of the goods concerned against their forces or those of friends, allies or
other Member States;
c) the risk of reverse engineering or unintended technology transfer.
Criterion Six
The behaviour of the buyer country with regard to the international community, as regards
in particular to its attitude to terrorism, the nature of its alliances and respect for
international law
Member States will take into account inter alia the record of the buyer country with regard
to:
a) its support or encouragement of terrorism and international organised crime;
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b) its compliance with its international commitments, in particular on the non-use of force,
including under international humanitarian law applicable to international and noninternational conflicts;
c) its commitment to non-proliferation and other areas of arms control and disarmament, in
particular the signature, ratification and implementation of relevant arms control and
disarmament conventions referred to in sub-paragraph b) of Criterion One.
Criterion Seven
The existence of a risk that the equipment will be diverted within the buyer country or reexported under undesirable conditions
In assessing the impact of the proposed export on the importing country and the risk that
exported goods might be diverted to an undesirable end-user, the following will be
considered:
a) the legitimate defence and domestic security interests of the recipient country, including
any involvement in UN or other peace-keeping activity;
b) the technical capability of the recipient country to use the equipment;
c) the capability of the recipient country to exert effective export controls;
d) the risk of the arms being re-exported or diverted to terrorist organisations (anti-terrorist
equipment would need particularly careful consideration in this context).
Criterion Eight
The compatibility of the arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the
recipient country, taking into account the desirability that States should achieve their
legitimate needs of security and defence with the least diversion for armaments of human
and economic resources
Member States will take into account, in the light of information from relevant sources such
as UNDP, World Bank, IMF and OECD reports, whether the proposed export would
seriously hamper the sustainable development of the recipient country. They will consider in
this context the recipient country's relative levels of military and social expenditure, taking
into account also any EU or bilateral aid."
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Armament Industry Data
European Union Arms Export Licences to China, 2001-2004

Country / Year

2002

2003

2004

France

€105,341,246

€171,530,641

168,900,766

Germany

10

1,096,261

882,890

UK

76,500,000

112,455,000

147,600,000

EU Total

209,794,157

415,820,913

340,664,219

Source: Stockholm Institute of International Peace
http://www.sipri.org/contents/expcon/annrep.html
Major armament companies sales in 2003 and market share from armament only.
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The top 20 arms exporters:
1. USA
2. Russia
3. Germany
4. France
5. United Kingdom
6. Netherlands
7. Italy
8. Sweden
9. China
10. Ukraine
11. Spain
12. Israel
13. Canada
14. Switzerland
15. Poland
16. Uzbekistan
17. South Korea
18. South Africa
19. Belgium
20. Denmark
Source: Stockholm International Peace Institute
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The top 20 arms importers:
1. China
2. India
3. United Arab Emirates
4. Greece
5. South Korea
6. Israel
7. Egypt
8. Australia
9. Turkey
10. USA
11. Pakistan
12. Chile
13. Japan
14. Poland
15. United Kingdom
16. Italy
17. Taiwan
18. Singapore
19. South Africa
20. Spain
Source: Stockholm International Peace Institute

222

REFERENCES
Adams Christopher. “UK fears on rights in China”, The Financial Times, November 11,
2004
Adams Christopher and Benoit Bertrand and Daniel Dombey. “Solana to mediate in China
arms ban dispute”, Financial Times, March 23, 2005
Adams Christopher “MPs seek assurances over arms to China”, The Financial Times, March
24, 2005
Allen David and Tim Oliver. “The Foreign and Commonwealth Office” in The
Europeanization of British Politics, ed. Ian Bache and Andrew Jordan, (Basingstoke:
Palgrave McMillian 2006)
Askari Hossein, John Forrer, Hildy Teegen, and Jiawen Yang. Economic sanctions:
examining their philosophy and efficacy. (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger), 84
Atkins Ralph and Hugh Williamson. “German exporters beat a path to the China market:
Hopes are riding high on the latest trade trip, headed by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder”,
Financial Times, December 6, 2004
Jordan Amos et al. American National Security, 5th edition. (Baltimore, London: John
Hopkins University Press, 1999)
Anselmo Joseph and Douglas Barrie and Robert Wall. “China showdown” Aviation Week
(March 6, 2005), p.1
www.asia-europe-network.org “Lifting of China arms embargo rejected again”, December 3,
2006
Austin Greg. “The 1989 China Arms Ban: putting Europe’s position to Congress”. The
Foreign policy Centre, (April 2005)
Auswartiges Amt, Federal Foreign Office “Tasks of German foreign policy, East Asia:
Japan, South and North Korea, Mongolia, China including Hong Kong and Macao, Taiwan at
the beginning of the 21st century”, Berlin, May 2002
www.asia-europe-network.org ‘Lifting of China arms embargo rejected again’, December 3,
2006
David Baldwin David. “The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice”, International
Security, Vol. 24, No 3 (Winter 1999-2000): 80-107

223

Balme Richard and Brian Bridges. Europe- Asia relations: Building Multilateralism
(Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan 2008), 137
Barysh Katinka Embracing the dragon: the EU’s partnership with China Charles Grant and
Mark Leonard, editors, (London: Centre for European Reform 2005)
BBC News On Line “EU China arms ban 'to be lifted”, January 12, 2005
http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4167693.stm
BBC News On Line, “Pressure to keep China arms ban”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4381421.stm, March 25, 2005
BBC News On Line, “Straw attacked on China arms deal”,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/4188017.stm, January 19, 2005
Benoit Bertrand et al.. “Blair backs EU plans for joint defense project”, The Financial Times,
September 22, 2003
Bulmer Simon and Claudio Radaelli. “The Europeanization of National Policy”. Queen’s
Papers on Europeanization, No1 / 2004,
Benoit Betrand and Daniel Dombey. “Schröder thwarted over China arms ban”, The
Financial Times, October 28, 2004
Benoit Bertrand Benoit and Mark Odell. “Germans hoping for Euros 1bn deals with China”,
The Financial Times, December 4, 2004
Berliner Zeitung. ‘German Greens Criticize Government Arms Export Report, Urge
Restrictive Exports’ Berliner Zeitung, 12 March 2004.
Biscop Sven, “Able and Willing? Assessing the EU’s capacity for military action”, European
Foreign Affairs Review 9 (2004): 509-527
Blitz James and Daniel Dombey “Straw admits ending EU arms embargo on China will
create tension with US”, The Financial Times, January 19, 2005
Boden Tim, Interparlamientary Delegation for non European countries,
European Parliament, Interview by Vivien Exartier, European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium,
December 17, 2007
Boese Wade, ‘EU retains China Arms embargo’. Arms Control Today, January / February
2005. Arms Control Association.
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_01-02/EU_China?print
Stefan Axel Boese, staffer of Axel Schäfer, Bundestag Member, Committee on European
Affairs Member, Phone Interview by Vivien Exartier, May 16, 2008

224

Börzel Tanja, “Pace-setting, foot-dragging and fence-setting: member states’ responses to
Europeanization” Journal of Common Market Studies Volume 40. Number 2, (2002): 193–
214
Alex Bonde, Green Party Member of Bundestag, Correspondence with Vivien Exartier, April
1, 2008
Bonnardot Gérard, Army controller / Advisor to the President of the Defense Committee /
French National Assembly, Interview by Vivien Exartier, Paris, France, 2007
Bonsignore Enzio and Eugene Kogan. “Fatal attraction: the EU Defence Industry and
China”. Military Technology. (June 2005)
Breslin Shaun. “Beyond Diplomacy? UK Relations With China Since 1997”. The British
Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 6 Issue 3 (August 2004),
Bretheron Charlotte. and Vogler, J. The European Union as a Global Actor, (London:
Routledge 1999), 47
Brie Andre, German Member of European Parliament / Committee Foreign Affairs,
Interview by Vivien Exartier, December 12, 2007
Brussels European Council Italian Presidency Conclusions, European Council, December 1213, 2003
Cabestan Jean-Pierre. “Relations between France and China: towards a Paris-Beijing Axis?”.
China: An International Journal 4.2 (2006) 327-340, p.328
David Calleo, Rethinking Europe’s Future, (Princeton: University Press 2001)
Maria Green Cowles et al. Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change.
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001)
Cameron Ross, Perspectives on the Enlargement of the European Union, (Leiden: Brill
2002)
Caruso Raul. “To lift or not to lift? A few notes on the lifting of the European Arms Embargo
on China” Crossroads, Vol.5, No 2, (2005), 10
Chen Edwin “Atlantic Divide on China”, Los Angeles Times, February 23, 2005
Ching Frank “Changing dynamics in EU-China arms relations”. The Jamestown Foundation,
China Brief, Volume 4, Issue 5 (March 8, 2004)
Chirac Jacques. Press conference given by Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, Hong
Kong, December 10, 2004. http://www.ambafrance-uk.org/Press-conference-given-byM,4385.html

225

Chirac Jacques, Press conference given by Jacques Chirac, President of the Republic, Hong
Kong October 12, 2004
Cowles, Maria Green et al. Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change.
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001)
Crossick Stanley, Cameron Fraser and Berkofsky Axel. “EU-China Relations, towards a
strategic partnership”, European Policy Center Working Paper, July 2005,
Crawford Beverly. Review of Randall E. Newnham, Deutsche Mark Diplomacy: Economic
Linkage in German-Russian Relations in Slavic Review, Vol. 63 no. 2 Summer 2004, pp.
427-28
Dale Reginald, “The search for a Common Foreign Policy”, Europe, Issue 388 (July/August
1999)
Defense Industry Daily, “China Arms Embargo Controversy Will Have Domestic Ripples”,
February 28, 2005
Defense News “French renews calls for EU to end China arms embargo”, December 12,
2006
Dempsey Judy, “US hits at EU move to lift arms ban on China”, The Financial Times, April
2, 2004
Huband Mark “Arms embargo on China divides defence industry: The next government will
come under US pressure to keep the weapons ban during the UK's EU presidency” The
Financial Times, April 7, 2005
Dempsey Judy “Big powers back more muscular foreign policy”, The Financial Times, June
12, 2003
Dempsey Judy and Katrin Benhold. “Britain lands in middle of U.S.-EU China spat”
International Herald Tribune March 23, 2005
Ann Deighton Ann “The European Security and Defense Policy”, Journal of Common
Market Studies, Vol.40, Number 4, (November 2002): 719-741
Deutsche Welle. „Hu meets Merkel As Germany Reaffirms EU Arms Ban“, November 11,
2005
Dinmore James and James Harding. “Level of US opposition surprises” , The Financial
Times, March 22, 2005

226

Dinmore Guy and James Harding, “UK seeks support for move to delay lifting of EU's arms
ban on China”, The Financial Times, March 22, 2005
Dinan Desmond, Ever closer Union: an introduction to European Integration, (Lynne
Rienner Publishers: 1999)
Dombey Daniel, “EU unlikely to lift China arms ban this year”, The Financial Times,
October 12, 2004
Dombey Daniel and James Blitz “EU doubles arms sales approvals to China”, The Financial
Times, January 19, 2005
Dombey Daniel and Peter Spiegel “Up in arms: why Europe is ready to defy the US and lift
its weapons ban on China,” The Financial Times, February 10, 2005
Dombey Daniel and Raphael Minder. “Positions unmoved on China embargo”, The
Financial Times, March 24, 2005.
Dombey Daniel and Stephen Fidler, “Top US official rejects Straw's attempt to ease tension
over China arms embargo”, The Financial Times, January 20, 2005
Dombey Daniel, “EU finalises plan to lift arms embargo on China”, The Financial Times,
February 3, 2005
Dombey Daniel, “EU considers binding rules on arms sales”, The Financial Times, April
18, 2005
Dombey Daniel, Raphael Minder, Demetri Sevastapulo and Hugh Williamson. “Pressure
mounts as ministers discuss EU embargo on China”, The Financial Times, April 15, 2005
Dover Robert. Europeanization of British Defence Policy, (Burlington, VT.: Ashgate, 2007)
The Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in New Zealand “China, UK vow to develop
strategic partnership: joint statement”, December 5, 2004
Esslin M.J. . “East Germany: Peking-Pankow Axis?” The China Quarterly, No. 3 (Jul. - Sep.,
1960): 85-88
Euractiv.com “EU Security and Defence Policy”, Policy Summary, last modified January 5,
2006
http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-117486-16&type=LinksDossier
European Council “Conclusions Seven EU-China summit”, the Hague, December 8, 2004
European Council, Brussels European Council Italian Presidency Conclusions, December 1213, 2003

227

Eur-Lex, Official Journal of the European Union “Sixth Annual Report according to
Operative Provision 8 of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports”, (2004/C
316/01) 21 December 2004
European Report. “EU/China: MEPs reject French pleas over arms ban.” December 20, 2003
European Report. “EU/China: ministers mull lifting arms ban”. January 28, 2004
European Report. “Arms ban drops off agenda for Hu’s European tour.” November 11, 2005.
European Commission. “Speaking with one voice: Overview”,
http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm
European Commission. “Sanctions or restrictive measures”
http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/cfsp/sanctions/index_en.htm
European Community. Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957
European Navigator, multimedia digital library on the history of Europe, http://www.ena.lu/
European Union Council Secretariat. “Basic Principles on the Use of Restrictive Measures
(Sanction)”, Brussels, June 7, 2004
European Union Council. “Brussels European Council Presidency Conclusions”, December
12-13, 2003
European Council, “Helsinky European Council Summit:Presidency Conclusions”, Helinski,
Finland: December 10-11, 1999
European Union Council “A Secure Europe in a better world, European Security Strategy”,
Brussels, 12 December 2003, CFSP web site http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf
(2003)
European Report “Most member states opposed to lifting arms embargo”, December 12,
2006
Jenny Fairbrass, “The Europeanization of business interest representation: UK and French
firms compared”, Comparative European Politics, 1 (3) (2003) 313-334
Federal Foreign Office, “East Asia_Japan, South and North Korea, Mongolia, China
including Hong-Kong and Macao Taiwan_ at the beginning of the 21st century”, Tasks of
German foreign policy, Auswärtiges Amt (German Foreign Ministry Archives), Berlin, (May
2002), 7

228

Fidler Stephen, Parker George and Frederick Studemann. UK expects Brussels to lift
China arms ban, The Financial Times, January 13, 2005
Financial Times reporters “China arms embargo moves off EU agenda, The Financial Times,
November 9, 2005
François-Poncet Jean, Monique Cerisier-ben Guiga and Robert del Picchia, Senators.
‘Relations Transatlantiques : quelles perspectives pour le second mandat du President Bush’
(Transatlantic Relations : what perspectves for the second term of President Bush ?). French
Senate Joint Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee, Rapport no 307, April 14, 2005. 20042005.
Falkner, Gerda, Oliver Treib, Miriam Hartlapp and Simone Leiber Complying with Europe:
EU Harmonization and Soft law in the Member States Cambridge: University Press 2005
Fierke, K.M. and Antje Wiener. “Constructing institutional interests: EU and NATO
enlargement”, Journal of European Public Policy, Volume 6, Number 5, 2, (December
1999): 721-744, 726
Foreign and Commonwelath Office, Response to Questionnaire by Vivien Exartier, August
15, 2008
France, Presidency of the Republic. “Dinner with President Bush at the US embassy in
Belgium”, Brussels February 21, 2005
France, Ministry of Foreign Affairs “Official visit of the Chinese Prime Minister (December
4-7, 2005)”, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/article-imprim.php3?id_article=2989
France, Ministry of Defense, Rapport au Parlement sur les Exportations d’Armement de la
France en 2002 et 2003, 28 January 2005
Franco-British Summit, Joint Declaration on European Defense, (St Malo: December 4,
1998)
Frankel Glenn “EU wavers on allowing arms sales to Beijing, Washington Post”, March 23,
2005
Fraser Cameron “What They Said: Fraser Cameron on CFSP, ESDP and the Balkans”,
Europe, Issue 397, (June 2000)
French Ministry of Defence. Report to the Parliament on France armament exports in 2004.
French Ministry of Foreign Affairs Official visit of the Chinese Prime Minister (December 47, 2005). www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/article-imprim.php3?id_article=2989

229

French Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Statement of the Spokesperson of the French Ministry
for Foreign Affairs. December 6, 2004.
Annalisa Giannella, Personal representative of the High Representative on Non Proliferation,
European Council, Interview by Vivien Exartier, European Coucil, Brussels, Belgium, May
17, 2008.
Glen Carol and Richard C. Murgo “EU-China relations: balancing political challenges
with economic opportunities”, Asia Europe Journal (2007) 5:331-344
Gottwald Joern-Carsten “Europe and China: Convergence, Politicization and Assertiveness”,
East Asia (2010) 27:79–97
Gottwald Joern-Carsten “Germany’s China-Policy: Trade Promotion, Human Rights and
European Disunity” in German-Chinese Relations: Trade promotion or something else, eds
Overhaus Maro, Sebastian Harnish and Hans Marell, German Foreign Policy in Dialogue,
Newsletter-Issue 16, Vol. 6, Trier, Germany, June 23, 2005
Gaspers Jan. ‘Europeanization of British Defence Policy by R. Dover’
German –Foreign- Policy.com. “Background Report: Strategic Partnership and Containment”
January 5, 2004,
http://www.german-foreign
policy.com/en/fulltext/40108?PHPSESSID=i6ug0kg390914k0sjmr5grchv3
German-Foreign-Policy.com “Strategic Maneuvers German Foreign Policy” March 20, 2004
Ginsberg Roy. The European Union in International Politics: Baptism by Fire, (Lanham MD:
Rowman and Littlefield 2001)
German Ministry for Foreign Affairs, “Bilateral relations with
http://www.diplo.de/diplo/en/Laenderinformationen/01-Laender/China.html

China”

Glenn John, “From Nation-States to Member States: Accession Negotiations as an
Instrument of Europeanization”, Comparative European Politics 3-28, (2004)
Godement Francois. “Europe’s second thoughts on China Embargo”. YaleGlobal (March
25), 200
Grabbe Heather, “How does Europeanization affect CEE governance? Conditionality,
Diffusion and Diversity, Journal of European Public Policy Vol 8, Issue 4, (December
2001): 1013-1031
Grand Camille, Director Non Proliferation Ministry Foreign Affairs, Former Advisor
Ministry of Defense, Interview by Vivien Exartier, French Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
Paris, December 18, 2007

230

Gueldry Michel “France and European Integration: toward a transnational polity”, (Westport:
Praeger 2001)
Grant Charles, Ulrike Guerot. “A military plan to cut Europe in two”, The Financial Times,
April 17, 2003
Griffin Christopher and Raffaello Pantucci. “A treacherous triangle? China and the
transatlantic alliance”. SAIS Review Vol XXVII no 1 (Winter-Spring 2007)
Grimmett Richard and Theresa Papademetriou. “European Union’s Arms Control Regime
and Arms Exports to China: Background and Legal Analysis”. CRS (Congressional Research
Service) Report for Congress, March 1, 2005
Hansen Fred Ketil and Axel Borchgrevink. “Cutting aid to promote peace and democracy?
Intentions and effectiveness of aid sanctions” The European Journal of Development
Research, Vol. 18, No 4 (December 2006): 622-641
Heritier A. ‘Leaders’ and ‘Laggards’ in European Clean Air Policy” in Unger B. and F.V.
Waarden (eds) Convergence or Diversity? Internationalization and Economic Policy
Response, Aldershot: Avebury
Hill Christopher, The Actors in Europe’s Foreign Policy, London, (Routledge 1996)
Hill John “China arms ban hinders developing Sino-EU relations”. Jane’s Intelligence
Review (June 2005)
Hill Christopher. “Putting the world to rights: Tony Blair’s foreign policy mission” in The
Blair Effect 2001-5, ed. by Anthony Seldon and Dennis Kavanagh, (Cambridge: University
Press 2005)
Hix Simon and Goetz Klaus. “Introduction: European Integration and National Political
Systems” in Europeanised Politics? European Integration and National Political Systems
edited by Goetz Klaus, Hix Simon, pp 1-26 (Frank Cass Publishers 2001)
Horton Frank and others (eds). Comparative Defense Policy, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press 1974)
Huband Mark “Arms embargo on China divides defence industry: The next government will
come under US pressure to keep the weapons ban during the UK's EU presidency” The
Financial Times, April 7, 2005
Hufbauer Gary Clyde and Jeffrey J. Schott, assisted by Kimberly Ann Elliott Economic
Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for
International Economics, 1985), (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985)

231

Irondelle Bastien. (2001) "Europeanization without European Union? French military
reforms 1991-1996" . (In European Union Studies Association (EUSA) Biennial Conference
2001 (7th), May 31-June 2, 2001), Madison, Wisconsin
Jessen Franz, DG External Relations, DH 2 (China), European Commission, Interview by
Vivien Exartier, European Commission, Brussels, Belgium, May 15, 2008
Jonas Paul “EU Foreign Policy After Lisbon: Will the New High Representative and the
External Action Service Make a Difference?” Report Center for Applied Policy Research
(C·A·P), No 2, June 2008
Keetch Paul, Liberal Party Member of Parliament, Interview by Vivien Exartier, House of
Commons, London, UK, December 10, 2007
Peking Teresa Poole “Kinkel goes fence-fixing in China”, The Independent, October 23,
1996
Knill Christoph and Dick Lehmkuhl. “How Europe matters: different mechanisms of
Europeanization, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 3, No. 7, (June 15, 1999)
Kogan Eugene. “The European Union Defense Industry and the Appeal of the Chinese
Market”. Report, Studien und Berichte zur Sicherheitspolitik, Schriftenreihe der
Landesverteidigungsakademie, January 2005.
Kohlmeier Gabrielle “EU eyes lifting China arms embargo” Arms Control Today,
(September 2004)
Kreutz Joakim. “Hard measures by a Soft Power? Sanctions Policy of the European Union
1981-2004”. Bonn International Center for Conversion, Paper 45, Bonn, 2005, 40.
Kreutz Joakim. “Reviewing the arms embargo on China: the clash between value and
rationale in the European Security Strategy”. Perspectives: The Central European Review of
International Affairs 22, (Summer 2004): 43-58,
Kuhne Helmut, Member of the Bundestag (German Parliament), Questionnaire by Vivien
Exartier, November 11, 2007
Kurzer Paulette “Review: Comparative views of Europe”, International Studies Review, Vol.
4, No. 1 (Spring, 2002), pp. 182-186
Latella Silvestro, political advisor PSE-secretariat China delegation, European Parliament,
Interview by Vivien Exartier, Brussels, Belgium, December 18, 2007

Linsdsey Daryl “A transatlantic Crisis foretold” Spiegel Online, March 18, 2005

232

Major Claudia. “Europeanization and Foreign and Security Policy_Undermining or Rescuing
the Nation State?” Politics: 2005, Vol. 25 (3): .175-190
Maull Hans “Editorial” in “German-Chinese Relations: Trade promotion or something else”,
ed. Overhaus Maro, Sebastian Harnish and Hans Marell. German foreign policy in dialogue,
Newsletter-Issue 16, Vol. 6, Trier, Germany, June 23, 2005
McGowan Lee. “Europeanization unleashed and rebounding: assessing the modernization of
EU cartel policy”, Journal of European Public Policy 12:6, (December 2005): 986-1004
McLean Elena and Tahee Wang. “Friends and Foes? Major trading partners and the success of economic
sanctions”. International Studies Quarterly (2010) 54: 427-447

McKenna Ted. Euro Parliament favors China Arms Ban. The Journal of Electronic Defense,
June 2005.
McKenna Ted. Controversy Dogs EU-China Arms Ban. The Journal of Electronic Defense,
March 2005.
Military
Photos.net.
‘France
backs
lifting
of
China
arms
www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?t=29388, December 9, 2004

embargo’.

Möller, Kay. “Diplomatic Relations and Mutual strategic Perceptions: China and the
European Union”. The China Quarterly: 196, March 2002, Special Issue: China and Europe
since 1978: a European Perspective
Moore Matthew. “Arming the embargoed: a supply-side understanding of arms embargo violations”. Journal of
Conflict Resolution 54 (4): 593-615, (2010), 593

Moskos Charles, Jr.. “The Military”.Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 2, 1976 (1976), 55-77
Muller-Brandeck-Bocquet Gisela “The new CFSP and ESDP Decision-Making System of
the European Union”, European Foreign Affairs Review 7: 257-282, (2002)
Mure Dickie. “EU seeks to end China arms embargo”, The Financial Times, March 17, 2004
Mure Dickie, Guy Dinmore, Daniel Dombey, Kathrim Hille, Demetri Sevastapulo and Peter
Spiegel. “The EU's bar on selling military equipment to Beijing lacks credibility but
Washington believes any change would be irresponsible” , The Financial Times, February
10, 2005
Murray Douglas and Paul Viotti. The Defense Policies of Nations: a comparative study,
Third edition, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994
Newman Cathy, “Brown backs EU on arms sales to China”, The Financial Times, February
22, 2005

233

Newman Cathy “Howard attacks moves to lift China arms ban” The Financial Times, March
31, 2005
Nouvelles Atlantiques. UE/Armements: vers de nouvelles regles communes de controle des
exportations d’armes’, no3693, July 5, 2005
Olsen Johan. “The many faces of Europeanization”, Arena Working Papers WP ½, Center of
European Studies, University of Oslo, (2002), pp.2-3
Pagedas Constantine “Post-Ismay Europe: Britain and the Rebalance of European Security”,
Mediterranean Quarterly, (12-4, 2001), 8
Pape Robert “Why economic sanctions do not work”. International Security, Vol. 22, No2,
(Fall 1997): 90-136
Parker George and Daniel Dombey. “Dual ambitions”, The Financial Times, May 24, 2002
Parker George, “EU team moots building foreign policy under one minister”, The Financial
Times, (April 15, 2003)
Peel Quentin “Where trade comes before politics” , The Financial Times, February 3, 2005
People’s Daily Online “China, Britain hold strategic security consultations” October 21,
2003.
Peking Teresa Poole “Kinkel goes fence-fixing in China”, The Independent, October 23,
1996
Piana Claire, “The EU’s Decision-Making Process in the Common Foreign and Security
Policy: the Case of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia”, European Foreign Affairs
Review 7: 209-226, (2002)
Pozzo di Borgio Cecile, Spokesperson of the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Agence
France Presse Statement, December 7, 2004.
Presidential Advisor, French Presidency, Interview by Vivien Exartier, Elyséee Palace, Paris,
France, December 18, 2007
Gerard Quille, Specialist Security and Defence Policy Department, Directorate General
External Policies European Parliament, Interview by Vivien Exartier, European Parliament,
Brussels, Belgium, December 18, 2007
Ramirez Luis. “China arms embargo outdated, French foreign says” Voices of America,
Beijing, April 21, 2005.

234

Rashmi Mukhopadhyay Alok, “EU Arms Embargo on China: The German debate” IDSA
Comment, Institute for Defense Studies and Strategic Analysis, (May 2, 2005)
http://www.idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/EUArmsEmbargoonChina_AkMukhopadhyay_02
0505
Rennie David “Crisis over plan to end China arms embargo”, The Telegraph, February 23,
2005
Roberts Geoffrey. “German Politics today”. (Manchester University Press 2000)
Rometsch Dietrich and Wolfgang Wessels, eds. “The European Union and Member States:
towards Institutional Fusion?”, European Policy Research Unit Series, (Manchester
:University Press 1996), 329
Saalman Lora, Yuan Jing-Dong. “The European Union and the Arms Ban on China”. Center
for Non Proliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute of International Studies, July 2004
Sandschenider Eberhard. “Transatlantic Divergences on the Rise of China” p.24 in American
and European relations with China: advancing common agendas, ed. David Shambaugh,
Gudrin Wacker (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenshaft und Politik, German Institute for International
and Security Affairs, 2008)
Seung Chong “Europeans keen to lift arms ban: Trade in defence technology has never been
entirely closed”, The Financial Times, February 16, 2005
Shambaugh David “China and Europe: the Emerging Axis” Current History (2004)
Shambaugh David “Don’t lift the arms embargo on China”, Brookings Institution, February
23, 2005
Shambaugh David. “China and Europe, The Emerging Axis”. Current History, September
2004
Sheehan Michael. International security, (Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers ,
2005).
Shen Dingli. “Can sanctions stop proliferation?”, The Washington Quarterly, 31:3 (Summer
2008): 89-100
Schmidt Vivien. “Europeanization and the mechanics of economics policy adjustment”.
Journal of European Public Policy 9:6 (December 2002): 894-912, 909
Schulte-Kulkman Nicole “The German-Chinese ‘Rule of Law Dialogue’:
Substantial Interaction or Political Delusion”, in German-Chinese Relations: Trade
promotion or something else, ed. Overhaus Maro, Sebastian Harnish and Hans Marell ,

235

German Foreign Policy in Dialogue, Newsletter-Issue 16, Vol. 6, Trier, Germany, June 23,
2005, 36
Shulz Stefan “Foreign Policy: Aims, Instruments and Achievements”, European Parliament,
Fact Sheets on the European Union., July 2008
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/parliament/expert/displayFtu.do?language=en&id=74&ftuId=FTU_6.1.1.html

Sipri Anthony. “Military relevant EU-China trade and technology transfers: issues and
problem”. Paper presented at the Conference on Chinese Military Modernization: East Asian
Political, Economic, and Defense Industrial Responses, organized by the Freeman Chair in
China Studies and the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington D.C.,
19-20 May 2005
Smith Craig. “In US visit, French envoy seeks support on arms issue” New York Times,
March 29, 2005
Solana Javier. “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy”, Brussels,
December 12, 2003
Spiegel Peter “US threat to UK defence groups over China arms: Pentagon decries European
plans to lift embargo imposed after Tiananmen Square”, The Financial Times, 24/12/2004
Spiegel Online International The China Arms Embargo: “Sketching Out the Next TransAtlantic Crisis”, March 3, 2005, http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,345333,00.html
Spiegel International Online “Schroeder Lonely at Home Over China Arms Ban” April 15,
2005 http://www.spiegel.de/international/0,1518,351503,00.html
Sonika Gupta, “EU and the Arms Embargo” Issue Brief Vol. 1 Issue. 1, Observer Research
Foundation, 27 February 2004
Stumbaum May-Brit. The European Union and China. Decision-making in EU and Security
Policy towards the People’s Republic of China, DGAP-Schriften zur Internationalen Politik,
(Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2009),
Tkacik John, “E.U. Leadership Finds Little Public Support for Lifting China Arms Ban”,
Web Memo, Heritage Foundation, March 17, 2005
Taipei Central News Agency. “CNA: Germany Urged Not to Support Easing of Arms Sales Ban to
China,” 8 April 2004.

The Parliament.com “Berlin split over EU’s China arms embargo” April 14, 2005
Thornhill John and Daniel Dombey and Mark Huband “French minister defends plan to lift
China arms embargo”, The Financial Times, April 6, 2005

236

Tonra Ben. “The Europeanisation of national foreign policy : Dutch, Danish and Irish
foreign policy in the European Union”, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001)
TTU Lettre Hebdomadaire d’Informations Stratégiques, « Europe-Chine : la panne », June
29, 2005
Umbach Frank “Will the EU Arms embargo towards PR China be lifted? Perspectives and
implications” Taiwan Perspective e-paper, Issue no 29, (June 23, 2004)
Van Kemenade Willem. “ China-EU Issues: 2005-2010, Commonalities, Limitations,
Potential” (prepared for XRG China: Developments & Prospects 2005-2010 Report,
European Institute for Asian Studies, Hong-Kong 2006),
Védrine Hubert, Former French Minister for Foreign Affairs, Interview by Vivien Exartier,
Washington D.C., November 14, 2007.
Verification Research, Training and information Centre. “Verifying European Union arms
embargoes”. Paper submitted to the United Nations Institute for Disarmamanet Research
(UNDIR) for the European Commission project on “European Action on Small Arms, Light
Weapons and Explosive Remnants of War”, 18 april 2005
UK Ministry of Defense, Policy and Defense Relations, “Response to Questionnaire by
Vivien Exartier”, August 6, 2008
USA Today on line. “EU fails to lift ban on arms sales to China”., April 14, 2005,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2005-04-15-eu-china_x.htm
Nicola Verola, “The New EU Foreign Policy under the Treaty of Lisbon” in The Foreign
Policy of the European Union: Assessing Europe’s Role in the World, ed. by Federiga Bindi,
Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press 2010), 42
Volmer Karl . “German policy on Asia-Everything different after 11 September? –Speech by
Minister of State Volmer, Berlin, Tuesday, 25 June 2002.
Watt Nicholas “EU could lift arms embargo on Chin”. The Guardian. 01/12/2005.
Weske Simon, “ The Role of France and Germany in EU-China Relations”, EU-China
Studies Center Programme,(August 2007), 8
Williams Paul. “The Europeanization of British Foreign Policy and the Crisis in Zimbabwe”,
paper presented at the European Foreign Policy Unit workshop on 'Europeanisation of
national foreign policies' London School of Economics, 5 June 5, 2002
Williams Paul. “Who’s making UK foreign policy?” International Affairs 80, 5 (2004): 909919, 915

237

Wolfe Adam. “France and Germany move to resume arms sales to China”, Power and
Interest News Report (February 11, 2004).
Wong Ruben. The Europeanization of French policy: France and the EU in East Asia.
(Basingstoke: Palgrave McMillan, 2006)
Wong Reuben. “Towards a Common European Policy on China.” Paper presented at the
conference ‘The European Union and the World: Asia, Enlargement and Constitutional
Change’, organized by IPSA Research Committee 3 on European Unification, in Beijing, 5-6
May 2005.
Xinhuanet News Agency “Brief Introduction to Relations between China and the UK”, May
15, 2002, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2002-05/15/content_393213.htm

CURRICULUM VITAE
EDUCATION
WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY, Morgantown, West Virginia, USA
General Ph.D. in Political Science: Comparative Politics, Public Policy, International Relations,
December 2010

238

DISSERTATION: “The influence of Britain, France and Germany in the China EU policy: the case of the arms
embargo.” Committee Chair: Dr. Donley Studlar
OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY, Stillwater, Oklahoma
Masters of Political Science, Major in International Relations 2006
THESIS: “The influence of Eastern European EU Member States in ESDP Operations”
ECOLE SUPERIEURE DE COMMERCE DE DIJON
(BURGUNDY BUSINESS SCHOOL), Dijon, France
Business Graduate Diploma 1999
French: native language, English: Fluent, Certificate of Proficiency of Cambridge University
German: written and spoken

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE
WASHINGTON WORKSHOPS FOUNDATION, Washington, D.C., USA
Coordinator “Washington Internship Experience” and Director Operations, 2004-2009.
Run a congressional academic seminar for high school seminars: responsible for the marketing
strategy, the placement of the candidates, the scheduling, the syllabus for an academic component, the
budget and the students monitoringl; Increased enrollement through sales and marketing campaigns,
expanded partnerships, upgraded the program.
Operations work for middle-school seminars and high-school seminars: field, scheduling, curriculum
writing, staff assignment
WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY, Morgantown, West Virginia, USA
Coordinator Office of Multicultural Programs-Student Life, Fall 2008 till present
Maintain existing multicultural programs, propose and develop new initiatives, enhance
understanding and appreciation of different cultures, outreach and engagement of students, staff,
administrators and community
Programming to retain and educate the Freshmen population and Latino population. Develop
marketing plans, develop promotional material. Provide guidance and assistance to Latino population
.

WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY, Morgantown, West Virginia, USA
Graduate Assistant, Center for Black Culture and Research, August 2004-May 2007
Assisted with Multicultural Programming. Auditing of multicultural needs on campus; organization
of film series; organization of a forum on global warming; planning of cultural attachés embassies
series; promotion of diversity among the University and the Morgantown communities.
2004 OUTSTANDING GRADUATE ASSISTANT AWARD Recipient

239

WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY, Morgantown, West Virginia, USA
Teaching Assistant, Political Science Department, Fall 2005.
Assisted Dr. Donley Studlar for the “Western Democracies” Political Science undergraduate course
by teaching a couple of lectures on France, the European Union, contributed to other classes, prepared
and graded exams.

WOODROW WILSON INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS
Research Assistant, June-August 2004
Performed research duties for Dr. Anne-Marie Le Gloannec, on the topic of the transatlantic relation
in the field of foreign policy: failures, successes and prospects.

WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY, Morgantown, West Virginia, USA
Research Assistant, Political Science Department. Fall 2002
Performed research duties for the Debate Varsity Team on Foreign Policy issues.
OKLAHOMA STATE UNIVERSITY, Stillwater, Oklahoma, USA
Teaching Assistant for the Political Science Department, 2001-2002
Assisted Dr. Jeff Lewis and Dr. Danny Atkison for the “American Government” Political Science
freshman course class by monitoring, grading and recording exams, helping with instructional
research.
2002 OUTSTANDING GRADUATE ASSISTANT AWARD Recipient

UPWARD BOUND FEDERAL PROGRAM, OSU, Stillwater, Oklahoma, USA
Graduate Assistant for the Office of Scholarships and Financial Aid, 2001-2002
In charge of the monthly workshops and summer programs during which low-income and first
generation students complete a college preparatory program developing their personal, cultural,
social, and aca.demic awareness.

AMORA MAILLE (BESTFOODS, UNILEVER), Dijon, France
Assistant Area Manager UK/Eire, 1999
Commercial follow-up of local distributors: meeting orders, marketing, promotional, sales, logistics, R&D
demands, launch of products and market analysis.
Assistant International Brand Manager
Follow-up of marketing projects for the Area Managers and the subsidiaries (launch and adaptation of
products, promotions), coordinated the actions of various departments: R&D, buying, production, sales;
rationalization and optimization of export ranges, adaptation of domestic products for export.

INVITED LECTURES AND TEACHING
POLS 352: The Politics of the European Union Spring 2009 and 2010: “Global Policies: Trade and Aid,
Foreign and Defense Policies”. Instructor: Dr. Donley Studlar, West Virginia University

240

POLS 353: Western Democratic Governments Fall 2007, 2008 and 2009: “Major States and their interaction
with the European Union: France”. Instructor: Dr. Donley Studlar, West Virginia University
HONRS 439: “Global Awareness”, Fall 2010. Instructor: Vivien Exartier

CONFERENCES AND PAPERS
Southern Political Association, 2010 Annual Conference, Atlanta, Georgia, Jan 7-10
Paper: “French response to Europeanization of EU China policy”

EUSA Eleventh Biennial International Conference, Marina del Rey, USA, April 23-April 25,
2009
Paper: The influence of Britain, Germany and France on EU China policy: the case of the lift of the
arms embargo
EUSA Tenth Biennial International Conference, Montreal, Canada, May 17-May 19, 2007
Paper: “The security implications of the European Union Enlargement”
Young Leaders Forum, 2006 NATO Heads of State Summit, Riga, Latvia Nov 28-30
Representing France in discussions on the future of NATO
Model NATO 2006, Portoroz, Slovenia Sept 22-26, sponsored by NATO, MEF and IAPSS
Representing France in a simulation of the summit of the Ministers of Defense
Southern Political Association, 2006 Annual Conference, Atlanta, Georgia, Jan 4-7
Paper: “Europeanization and the impact on regional governance in the new Member States of the European
Union”
Midwest Political Science Association, 2005 Annual Conference, Chicago, April 7-10
Paper: “Principal or Agent Theory applied to the European Union model of governance: the case of the
Common Foreign Security Policy”
International Studies Association, 2005 Annual Convention, Honolulu, Hawaii, March 1-5,
Poster: “The European Commission: Principal or Agent?”

ASSOCIATIONS MEMBERSHIP
EUSA (European Union Studies Association
Southern Political Science Association
Midwest Political Association

TRAVELS
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Latvia, People’s Republic of China,
Slovenia, Switzerland, United Kingdom Denmark

John H.
Hagen

Digitally signed by John H. Hagen
DN: cn=John H. Hagen, o=West
Virginia University Libraries,
ou=Acquisitions Department,
email=John.Hagen@mail.wvu.edu,
c=US
Date: 2010.12.15 14:28:12 -05'00'

241

